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This dissertation studies the long-term decline in state preferences for 
education spending in the United States.  It constructs an expansive state-level panel 
data set spanning the fiscal years 1976-77 through 2000-2001 to examine how three 
budget share measures have changed within states over time and across states at a 
point in time.  The share of state discretionary expenditures allocated to public 
education has fallen by four percentage points since 1977, while the share of public 
education expenditures allocated to public higher education has fallen by six points.  
In addition, the share of public higher education dollars appropriated to institutions (as 
opposed to directly to students) has fallen by four percentage points.  Together the 
declines translate into real institutional appropriation losses of $2,800 per student in an 
“average” state – significantly more than the $1,700 increase in real average public 
four-year instate tuition rates since 1977.   
Among the main findings are that competing budget items do not appear to 
“crowd out” education’s budget share.  Court mandated K12 funding equalization has 
resulted in substantial increases in education spending within states, with over a 
quarter of the increase coming at the expense of public higher education.  Attempts by 
public institutions to increase tuition or raise private funds are seen to trigger a cycle 
of future budget share cuts, calling into question what institutions can do as they 
 
 rapidly spiral toward the private “high tuition” equilibrium.  The sensitivity of higher 
education budget shares to observable state factors has increased over time and 
dynamic panel estimates indicate that states exercise more discretion over the 
determination of the higher education – K12 split than over other budgetary decisions.   
Three additional findings are noteworthy.  First, cross-cohort ethnic 
heterogeneity increases have led to funding shifts away from higher education.  
Second, the surging popularity of targeted, merit student-aid programs appears to have 
been in an effort to redistribute income to economically well-off families.  Third, as 
more households in a state become eligible to receive federal Pell grants, states move 
aid away from institutions and toward students – sanctioning tuition increases to 
potentially capture increased student eligibility for federal grant aid.  
 
 
 BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH 
On August 12, 1974, New Yorkers had much to celebrate.  A former wild Mets 
reliever struck out 19 batters in a 4-2 victory over the Red Sox.  Mickey Mantle and 
Whitey Ford became the first teammates to be inducted into Cooperstown on the same 
day.  The Amazin’s handed Andy Messersmith and the Dodgers a 3-1 loss to vault 
themselves to a mere 14 games under .500.  And, just a few short steps from Shea 
Stadium, Michael John Rizzo was born to two wonderful parents.  He was born in a 
time and place where getting a Ph.D. was as realistic as the Rangers winning the 
Stanley Cup.  While baseball, hockey and his five siblings sustained him for his first 
17 years in Queens, it was football that punched his ticket to a BA in Economics from 
Amherst College in May of 1996.  His love of the dismal science was spawned from 
the wasteland of theoretical quantum physics (he just couldn’t hack it) and reared in 
the concrete jungle of investment banking in New York City.  Lured by the siren call 
of having a Ph.D. stamp legitimize his lofty ambitions, his sojourn to Ithaca left him 
with several indelible impressions including: 
 
1. Don’t bet your bottom dollar that the sun will come out tomorrow. 
 
2. An inability to walk into any situation without the incessant nagging of 
needing to understand exactly what economic cost-benefit decision led to its 
outcome. 
 
3. If he knew ex-ante how cool it would feel to wear the funny hat and flowing 
robes at graduation, he would have applied to Cornell three years earlier. 
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 4. He should have been trained to work with one arm tied behind his back – 
economists are incapable of completing a sentence without adding, “on the 
other hand.” 
 
5. While he will always be a Lord Jeff, Cornell will remain dear to his heart - for 
its bounty bestowed upon him his wonderful wife, his incredible mentor, and 
of course, Lynah Rink. 
 
Upon receiving his Ph.D. in August, 2004, he and his wife settled in the 
Commonwealth of Kentucky, where like Abe and Mary before them, they begin their 
improbable (and some say ludicrous) journey toward restoring America to a place 
resembling that which our grandparents and forefathers fought so hard to create and 
defend. 
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   PREFACE 
  
 The state of Oregon cut the budget of the Oregon University System by 9% 
from 2001-2003 and by 11% in 2004.  The System will receive the same amount of 
state support in the 2005 academic year as it did in the 1991 academic year.  The share 
of state tax dollars going to the university system fell from 12.2 percent to 6.1 percent 
over this time period.  Despite these trends and a substantial run-up in tuition, Oregon 
taxpayers soundly rejected a personal income tax increase (Measure 30) in a 
referendum that would have raised $800 million for public education in the state.  The 
University of Oregon System was (and is) forced with an unattractive decision:  
respond to further budget cuts by reducing support for its undergraduate students, and 
thereby allow an erosion of  its academic quality; or maintain its program quality but 
limit the number of students enrolled in the system.  Oregon chose the former and now 
enrolls 20,000 more students in 2004 than it did in 1991, with the same absolute level 
of state support. 
 The state of California’s budget situation has been so desperate that its voters 
recalled Governor Gray Davis and voted in Arnold Shwarzenegger in November of 
2003 on a platform of fiscal reform.  Faced with funding cuts as dramatic as the 
Oregon System, the University System of California was faced with the same 
unattractive decision as its northern neighbor – but rather than take measures that 
would reduce program quality, this system that was dedicated to access and built by 
the visionary Clark Kerr has now begun turning away qualified students from its 
overcrowded colleges and universities and forcing them into the Community College 
system, to the private system, out-of-state, or out of the system entirely. 
 In response to a dramatic cut in state support for higher education in Maryland 
during the 2003-04 fiscal year, the public colleges and universities in that state raised 
 xiii
 tuition rates by an average of 19%.  In response, the state legislature is pushing 
through a measure that would impose caps on tuition increases. Building on 
Representative Buck McKeon’s proposal to cap tuition increases at any college 
receiving federal funding, Iowa, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan and several other states 
are pushing for similar measures in their states.   
 Budget cuts in Delaware have reduced state support for its colleges and 
universities from 6 percent of state budgets in 1990 to 4 percent in 2004.  Based on 
cuts in 2003-2004 alone, the University of Delaware was forced to increase tuition by 
11 percent.  The University’s longer term response to budget cuts has been to build an 
endowment that has now reached a value of $1 billion.  In response to the completion 
of a five-year, $383 million campaign, University of Delaware President David 
Roselle said, “If we fall flat on our face, we might get more money from the state …, 
it’s the curse of the competent.”1   
 The state of Colorado Senate Education Committee voted to send a bill to the 
Appropriations Committee that would make future Colorado high school graduates 
eligible for vouchers to attend in-state colleges and universities, prompted by dramatic 
tuition hikes following years of state budget difficulties.  "We are faced with the 
potential end of public higher education in this state," University of Colorado 
President Betsy Hoffman told lawmakers in a dramatic plea for support.2  She 
continued, “This bill alone will not solve the problem - I understand that perfectly. It 
is step one. Step two is achieving enterprise status, (which would give universities 
more budget flexibility and ability to raise tuitions) step three is a ballot initiative to 
reform TABOR and Amendment 23."   TABOR is the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights which 
limits government revenues and spending. Amendment 23 mandates annual increases 
                                                 
1 University Business, February 26, 2004. 
 
2 John J. Sanko, Rocky Mountain News, March 4, 2004 
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 for funding education in kindergarten through 12th grade, but provides no such 
security for higher education.  With the sharp cuts to public colleges in Colorado in 
recent years, Hoffman believes that all state funding could dry up by the end of the 
decade."  Rome is burning," Hoffman said. "If this bill does not pass, it could well be 
the end of public higher education." 
 President Hoffman’s comments might be viewed as histrionic were in not for 
the fact that her situation is not unique.  A three inch thick volume could be dedicated 
to a telling of similar stories in all of the remaining states.  These recent budgetary 
difficulties and the varying responses to them by colleges and universities in different 
states have obscured the fact that there has been a systematic withdrawal of state 
support for the operating expenses of public colleges and universities relative to other 
items states spend money on, over a period of nearly 30 years.  Amidst the scrambling 
by institutions to stay afloat and by states to respond to ever increasing demands on 
their budgets (most notably by providing health care for low-income families and by a 
boom in prison building and incarceration rates) gets lost two important questions.  
How did we get here?  And what are the implications? 
 This dissertation will focus largely on the first of these two questions.  The 
attention paid to recent funding changes in higher education obscure the dramatic 
long-term systematic withdrawal of public support for higher education.  Chapter one 
will present data that shows that higher education funding has been lagging since the 
mid-1970s and will discuss the reasons the general public might be concerned about 
this.  The second chapter will present a theoretical model that provides a basis for 
thinking about how funding decisions are made at the state level.  While the model I 
present is a simple application of consumer demand to a situation where state 
legislatures follow a multi-stage budgeting process, it does not prevent me from 
explicitly considering the political economy of the questions I am asking.  Embedded 
 xv
 in the resulting empirical analyses are many of the political economic factors that one 
would expect to impact how budget levels are set in different states.3  The remainder 
of chapter two describes in detail the data and empirical specifications that I will 
estimate as well as the expected impacts of the variables included in the models.  
Chapter three presents econometric estimates of models that seek to answer the 
question of why, within a particular state, budget shares have changed over time the 
way that they have.  Chapter four uses similar econometric techniques to seek answers 
to the question of why budgetary equilibriums are so different across the United States 
at a point in time.  Chapter five compares the results from chapters three and four by 
presenting the results of statistical tests which examine whether differences in cross-
state and within-state estimates are due to systematic differences in unobserved state 
characteristics (which are time-invariant, such as an inherent preference for funding 
education) or due to random variation in the data.  Chapter six concludes.   
                                                 
3 These factors would act as “taste shifters” in the consumer demand framework. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“In general, however, my impression is that the great danger is not so 
much institutional extinction, or even that there will be a sudden, 
dramatic downward shift from one level of quality to another.  The 
greater danger, I believe, is that there will be a slow, unspectacular, 
but cumulative decline in what it is possible to achieve – and then, as a 
next step in the process, in what one tries to achieve.  Gradual changes 
of this sort are, in their nature, impossible to measure with any 
precision, and they may not even be noticeable to quite experienced 
observers until some considerable time after they have occurred.”  
 
 -- William Bowen, President of Princeton University (1977) 
 
 Considerable time has passed since Bowen made these ominous comments to 
the American Economic Association.  While there is nothing unusual about university 
administrators crying out for more funds, a dramatic decline in support for public 
higher education in the intervening time period suggests that Chicken Little can no 
longer be ignored.    
Few observers would disagree that America’s stellar economic, scientific, 
political and cultural standing is largely a result of the proliferation of its system of 
education throughout the states since the nation’s founding.  Further, it is not a 
coincidence that America’s permanent place among the global powers occurred only 
after public monies from our various legislative entities began spilling into a growing 
higher education system, changing it from largely a private domain of the elite 
aristocracy, to a tool for the lower and middle class public to achieve the “American 
Dream” as well.1  Despite this and despite the large literature espousing the many 
benefits of investing in education, public higher education seems to be increasingly 
falling out of favor with both voters and governments alike.   
                                                 
1 Goldin and Katz (1999) present an excellent analysis of the shaping of American public higher 
education during the time that it is commonly believed that America took its place on the world stage, 
1890-1940. 
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 2
The goal of this dissertation is to explain why public higher education 
institutions find themselves in the precarious budget situations they are in today.  
Among my findings are that changes in observable state characteristics can explain 
little of the observed fall in higher education budget shares.  Generally speaking, 
public higher education spending has been crowded out by increasing demands for 
state support of K12 education as a result of court mandated equalization programs, 
but more importantly because of the great deal of discretion legislatures have over 
higher education spending.  That institutional efforts to raise private money and to 
increase tuition rates have been met with sharp cuts in budget shares, coupled with 
projected future enrollment pressures and the political popularity of non-need based 
aid program expansion, casts a pall on the ability of our public institutions to maintain 
accessibility and quality much longer into the future. 
It should be emphasized that public universities are accustomed to their state 
funding being at the mercy of economic cycles.  In bad budget times, higher education 
typically bears a disproportionate burden of state funding cuts, with the full 
expectation that it will be compensated during a recovery.  This is not surprising given 
that higher education is the single largest discretionary item in state budgets.  Higher 
education is also an attractive target for the legislative axe due to its ability to draw 
revenue from a variety of sources, most prominently tuition – a feature unique to this 
state budget item.  That higher education funding levels fluctuate so much is well 
known and is not the focus of this dissertation.  Rather I emphasize that, in relative 
terms, higher education funding has not fluctuated with the business cycle.  Public 
higher education has faced a continuous precipitous drop in state governmental 
priority for nearly three decades. 
In real terms, the level of state funding for public higher education doubled 
from $30 billion in 1974 to nearly $60 billion in 2000.  However, due to the growth in 
 3
public enrollments, the bottom line in figure 1.1 shows that per student funding 
increased in real terms by less than 1% per year (25.9% overall).  Real current 
educational and general expenditures per student (less dollars spent on sponsored 
research) in public higher education, shown in the top line of figure 1.1, grew by over 
3% per year (130% overall).2  As a result, while state appropriations in 1974 were 
generous enough to cover 78% of the cost of schooling, in 2000 this support has fallen 
to just 43%.3  That public universities and colleges are turning to tuition to more than 
make up for lost state appropriations has raised the ire of taxpayers and politicians 
alike.   
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Figure 1.1 
Growth in State Appropriations vs. Current Educational and General 
Expenditures (net of Sponsored Research) per FTE Student at All Public 
Universities, 1973-74 – 2000-01AY 
 
                                                 
2 The sharp increase in reported expenditures may be due to differences in accounting and institutional 
reporting beginning with the 1997 academic year.  Data prior to this year are reported in a different 
source than later data.  However, even if in the unlikely event that actual expenditure levels were flat 
since 1997; overall growth for the period would have been approximately 70%. 
 
3 A large body of literature has been devoted to this phenomenon.  I will not examine the reasons for 
expenditure growth in any detail in this paper.  While this growth may be a reflection of improvements 
in quality, it is also likely a result from the increasingly fierce competitive environment institutions are 
operating in.  For a detailed discussion on this matter, see Ehrenberg (2000). 
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What is less well known is that public education has undergone a sea-change in 
public priorities during this time period.  While most laypeople, administrators and 
even statehouse representatives focus on the dollar values of the state appropriations, 
very little attention is paid to how higher education fares in relation to other budget 
items within each state.  It is to this relative funding that I now turn. 
As figure 1.2 indicates, between the fiscal year (ending) FY1972 to FY2001, 
the average (across states) share of total state general fund expenditures on education 
fell from a high of 39.9% in 1972 to a low of 35.0% in 1993, with a slight recovery to 
36.1% over the remainder of the decade.4  While the decrease has not been monotonic, 
there is a clear downward trend; the cyclical behavior appears to revolve around this 
trend and the slight recovery in the late 1990s does not return shares anywhere near 
their pre-1990s levels.  The average general fund budget size (in 1998 dollars) in 
FY2001 was $19.7 billion.  Had education been able to maintain its budget share at 
1972 levels, the “average” state would have spent a whopping $750 million more for 
education in 2001.  Given that there are on average one million public school students 
in each state, this represents an additional $750 of resources that could have been 
devoted to every single elementary, secondary and college student in a state.   
 
                                                 
4 I analyze expenditures made from state general fund budgets because this is the fund where 
legislatures and governors have the most appropriative discretion.  This is the predominant fund for 
financing a state’s operations.  Revenues coming into the general fund derive from a variety of broad 
based state taxes.  The trends that I present below look similar if one were to analyze total state 
expenditures as well.  I will discuss this in more detail later.  
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Figure 1.2  
Average Share of State General Expenditures on Education 
1971-72 to 2000-2001 
 
The decline in relative state support for education has occurred throughout the 
distribution of states – in those that have traditionally devoted a large share of 
resources to public education (North Carolina’s share has fallen from 51% to 41%) 
and those that have not (Massachusetts’ share has fallen from 30% to 22%).  In fact, 
only 11 states have seen increases over this period, with an average increase of about 4 
percentage points.   
There is nothing particularly sacred about education’s share of the budget and 
the many factors thought to be responsible for its decline are well known.  Medicaid 
expenditures have skyrocketed due to large increases in caseloads (it is a means-tested 
entitlement program), escalating prescription drug costs and lagging support from the 
federal government.  An aging and growing population is putting further stress on 
health care expenditures and other state services.  Corrections expenditures have been 
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growing due to more vigilant prosecution, mandatory sentencing laws and the 
resulting expansion of prison capacity.  Whether education’s falling out of favor 
represent demographic changes alone or a shift of funding priority is unclear and is 
analyzed in the empirical section of the dissertation. 
In addition to these trends, there is a wide disparity across states in their budget 
commitment to education.  To give readers a sense for what the current equilibrium 
looks like, figure 1.3 presents a map where more darkly shaded states are those that 
allocate a larger share of their budgets to education.5   The range of budget shares in 
FY2001 is rather dramatic - with New York and Massachusetts spending 
approximately 25% of their budgets on education and Utah, Georgia, Michigan and 
Oklahoma all expending approximately 45% for education.  The regional patterns are 
hard to ignore – the Eastern and Northern Plains states expend a much smaller share of 
their budgets on education than do their Midwestern, Mountain and Southwestern 
counterparts.   
                                                 
5 The categories were defined using a means clustering analysis described by Everitt (1993).  This is an 
exploratory data technique meant to find natural groups in the data.   I chose to employ a partition 
method that breaks the observations into k-non-overlapping groups.  Multiple iterations suggest that the 
most natural partition was 4 groups. States near the average include Nebraska and Arizona, expending 
about 36% each.   
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Figure 1.3 
Share of State General Fund Expenditures on Education 
2001 Fiscal Year 
 Figure 1.4 describes how the average share of state educational budgets 
allocated to public higher education has changed in the United States between FY72 to 
FY01.  After a sharp increase in the early 70’s, higher education’s share has fallen 
steadily.6  Since 1977, the average share of education budgets allocated to higher 
education across states fell over six percentage points, from 22.6% to 16.4% after 
peaking at 23.5% in 1982 (a 27% drop).  While the most precipitous drops occurred 
during the recessions of the early 80’s and 90’s, the lush budget environment in the 
1990’s was insufficient to halt the bleeding.  
 
                                                 
6 Allow me to begin the discussion of the “fall” with 1977.  The rise in the early 70s can be attributed to 
a number of factors.  Chiefly among them are states preparing for the children of the baby boomers 
attending college and leaving the K12 sector, accommodation of the enrollment surges as a result of the 
Vietnam War draft deferments and a residual effect of the space and arms race that culminated in the 
moon landing in 1969.  
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Figure 1.4  
Average Share of State Education Expenditures on Higher Education 
1971-72 to 2000-2001 
 
This decline occurred in the vast majority of states.  States like Oregon, 
Wisconsin and California that initially expended well over 25% of their education 
budget on higher education have all cut their higher education share by over 40% (12 
percentage points) while states like Vermont, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and 
Delaware that initially expended less than 19% of their education budget on higher 
education, have also cut their shares by over 35% (6 percentage points).  Even those 
states where advances were made (only four states increased their share overall during 
the period) have seen much of it weathered away by the end of the period.  In fact, 
only one state saw its higher education share increase since 1990 (New Mexico).   
The average public education budget size (in 1998 dollars) in FY2001 was 
$7.1 billion.  Had it been able to maintain its budget share at 1977 levels, public higher 
education in an “average” state would have received $439 million more than it 
actually received in 2001.  Considering that average overall full-time equivalent (FTE) 
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enrollment in public two- and four-year institutions, including all graduate and 
professional students, was approximately 160,000 students in 2001 (up from 125,000 
in 1977), this  would have meant an additional $2,744 per FTE student in support in 
the average state.  To appreciate the magnitude of this loss, recall from figure 1.1 that 
average expenditures per student across the U.S. in public higher education in FY2001 
was $16,796.  Thus, the decline in higher education’s share of state public education 
budgets represents over 16% of the cost of educating a FTE student.  In fact, the 
monies this loss represents would have been enough to cover 83% of the cost of 
instate tuition at a public four year institution in 2001!7   
Figure 1.5 shows that in 2001 there is also a wide disparity across states in 
their commitment to higher education.  The more darkly shaded states are those that 
allocate a larger share of their education budgets to the higher education sector. This 
map also shows clear regional patterns with states in the Northeast and in the rust-belt 
spending smaller shares for higher education (New Hampshire, Vermont, Michigan 
and Rhode Island each under 13%) than their Midwestern and Southern counterparts 
(Nebraska,  Iowa, Mississippi and North Carolina each over 20%).  These patterns are 
suggestive of the historical and private influences that many have attributed to the 
shaping of U.S. public higher education.8
 
                                                 
7 The Digest of Education Statistics (2001) reports that average instate tuition at all public four year 
institutions across the US was $3,314 in 1998 dollars.  An enrollment weighted average (my 
calculations) suggests this figure is closer to $2,850.  In addition, the “loss” alone would have been 
more than enough to allow institutions to keep their real tuition rates at 1977 levels, when, in real terms, 
weighted average four year public tuition was $1,693.   
 
8 See John M. Quigley and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, “Public Choices in Public Higher Education” in 
Clotfelter and Rothschild, eds Studies of Supply and Demand in Higher Education, 1993, University of 
Chicago Press. 
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Figure 1.5 
Share of Education Expenditures on Higher Education  
2001 Fiscal Year 
 
A further strain being placed on public higher education institutions is revealed 
in figure 1.6.  Fueled by the popularity of merit-based aid programs in the 1990s, the 
share of higher education funding going directly to institutions (as opposed to 
students)  declined over the period, from 97.2% in 1977 to 93.5% in 2002, with most 
of the decline occurring after the implementation of Georgia’s HOPE scholarship 
program in 1993.9  While ultimately student aid dollars make their way back to the 
institution that an aid recipient attends, this aid travels with the student and cannot be 
depended upon to support institutional operations. 
                                                 
9 By then end of FY2001, 13 states had instituted merit based aid programs similar to Georgia’s HOPE 
program (Krueger 2001).  These states are Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, New Mexico, South Carolina and West Virginia. While some states 
have had small merit programs for over 30 years, which were targeted to specific ethnic groups or 
students with specific skills, the popularity of broad based programs and their growth did not begin until 
Georgia’s HOPE program exploded on the scene in 1993.  The concurrent growth in need-based aid 
awards may signal that a paradigmatic shift away from broad-based in-kind aid policies is underway. 
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Figure 1.6  
Average Share of State Higher Education Expenditures to Institutions 
1976-77 to 2001-2002 
 
The average public higher education state appropriation (in 1998 dollars) in 
FY2002 was $1.3 billion.  Had institutions been able to maintain their budget share at 
the 1977 level, public higher education institutions in an “average” state would have 
received $43 million more than they actually received in 2002.  Considering that 
average FTE enrollment in public two- and four-year institutions, including all 
graduate and professional students, was approximately 160,000 students in 2002, this 
“loss” represents an additional $270 per FTE student in support in the average state.10  
States that were initially less generous to institutions have continued to increase their 
support for students.  For example, New York, Vermont, Illinois and Pennsylvania all 
decreased their shares to institutions from 83-90% to under 77-85%.  On the other 
hand, there were many states changing their funding strategies and moving 
aggressively to expand student aid programs from nearly nonexistent in 1977 to rather 
                                                 
10 For comparison purposes, the real value of the maximum Pell grant awarded fell by $465 over this 
period. 
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substantially sized in 2002.  Among these states are Georgia, Louisiana, Florida, South 
Carolina, New Mexico and Arkansas – averaging an 11 percentage point drop in the 
share allocated to institutions over the entire period and 8 percentage points since 1993 
alone.   
Though the magnitude of the “loss” is far smaller than that represented in 
figures 1.2 and 1.4, this trend should be worrisome nonetheless.  Proponents of direct 
student aid programs champion its cause for two primary reasons: student access and 
to ensure an accrual of economic benefits within a state.  However, recent empirical 
evidence suggests that the ability of student aid programs to achieve these two goals is 
very limited.  With regard to student access, policymakers have long feared that more 
generous student aid packages would encourage institutions to capture these additional 
revenues through higher tuition and other fees, thereby negating the impact of the aid 
programs.  Bridget Long (2003) and Michael Rizzo and Ronald Ehrenberg (2004) 
provide evidence that supports this view.  
With regard to economic development, there is a belief that increasing the 
generosity of direct student aid awards (and merit programs in particular) would both 
increase the propensity for students to attend colleges in their home states and increase 
the propensity for these talented students to remain in-state after graduating.11  While a 
number of studies have found that generous student aid programs result in more 
talented students remaining in-state to attend college, Jeffrey Groen (2003) finds that 
although students that attend college within a state are more likely to remain in the 
state, the magnitude is much too small to justify using economic development as a 
rationale for merit-based student aid programs.   
                                                 
11 It is believed that areas with a more highly educated workforce have higher wage levels than other 
areas – and with more highly educated people earning more and therefore paying higher taxes (Moretti, 
2003).  It is also believed that more highly talented students are most likely to attend colleges outside of 
the home state and do not return upon graduating (Hoxby, 1997). 
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Just as with the first two trends above, on average, the share of higher 
education budgets going to institutions varies widely across states.  Figure 1.7 displays 
the FY2002 cross-sectional variation in the relative popularity of student aid 
programs.  Clear regional patterns emerge with the Northeastern, Southeastern and 
Great Lakes states committing a relatively larger share of funds to students while the 
more rural states west of the Mississippi River commit almost all of their resources to 
institutions.   
 
Figure 1.7 
Share of Higher Education Expenditures to Public Institutions 
2002 Fiscal Year 
 
 The combined effect of the trends depicted in figures 1.2, 1.4 and 1.6 indicates 
that if public higher education institutions had been able to simply maintain their 
budget shares at 1977 levels, in an average state, institutions would have garnered an 
additional $605 million per year.  To appreciate the magnitude of this sum, consider 
that it represents fully 50% of the total public higher education budget in an average 
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state ($1.2 billion).  Had states been able to retain these dollars, the $3,781 per full 
time equivalent student it represents would have been sufficient to cover an additional 
23% of institutional expenditures or 114% of in-state undergraduate tuition at an 
average public four year institution in 2001.  These declines have occurred steadily 
and almost unnoticeably for over 20 years; however institutional responses to this 
funding withdrawal have enjoyed no such anonymity.12
 
Why I Focus on Budget Shares 
That budget shares, as opposed to levels, are a metric of interest is not driven 
alone by analytical convenience.  Empirical and behavioral evidence suggests that 
legislatures behave in a way that is amenable to an analysis of shares.  In prior 
empirical work examining levels, the only consistent interest group found to have an 
impact on higher education expenditures is elementary and secondary education.  
While empirical analyses of levels might show that the volatility in per student 
funding levels reflect business cycles, underlying demographic trends and the ability 
for public institutions to raise money from other sources, they cannot easily explain 
why public higher education has steadily fallen out of favor as a budgetary priority – 
even during robust economic times.   
Behaviorally, there are a multitude of examples that demonstrate that states 
explicitly tradeoff K12 funding for higher education funding.  A recent, well 
publicized debate in the South Carolina Capitol in Columbia highlights such a battle.13  
                                                 
12 It must be emphasized that the national averages presented in figures 1.2, 1.4 and 1.6 above are not 
driven by any one particular state or group of states.  Appendix figure 1 combines the information in 
these figures to present, for each state, the share of general fund expenditures directly allocated to 
public higher education institutions from 1977-2001.  The steady declines are remarkably similar across 
all states.  Even in states where there had been some recovery during the mid-1990s (California, 
Louisiana, Florida, Massachusetts), the budget shares never returned anywhere near their initial levels, 
and began to fall again as the economy turned south in 2001.   
 
13 Chronicle of Higher Education, 5/24/02.  In November of 2001, South Carolina voters approved a 
lottery to raise funds for “education” which is expected to raise $172 million annually.  As the state 
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Despite the statutory requirements in most state constitutions that legislatures and 
budget officers practice “zero-base budgeting,” it is a rare scenario where states weigh 
and balance the recurring needs annually or biennially from the askings of the 
administrative officers of the respective departments.  What actually happens is that 
budget directors and governors obtain a reliable estimate of what state revenues are 
likely to be for the ensuing fiscal period, mindful of the political consequences of 
increasing taxes or imposing income redistributions.  Then, they place this figure on a 
chalkboard and draw a circle around it.  All that remains is to parcel the slices to the 
different departments and institutions.  This intensifies competition because all 
departments assume that the total available funding is limited to the figure placed on 
the chalkboard.  If any slice is enlarged, it means other slices must shrink.  Major 
attention is therefore paid to defending the allocations of the previous fiscal period, the 
status quo.  In this atmosphere it is very difficult to get a hearing for the funding of 
any entirely new needs or for expansion of any existing services. 
 Budget share analysis is not immune from criticism.  Focusing solely on shares 
leaves an observer yearning for more information about what optimal economic 
equilibria should look like.  For example, does the fact that Nebraska spends 26% of 
its education budget on higher education mean that it spends “too much” or that New 
Hampshire spends 7.6% of its education budget on higher education mean that it 
spends “too little?”  Without studying the level of higher education expenditures in 
                                                                                                                                            
faced a $350 million budget deficit, the Senate proposed that the bulk of the money be spent on college 
scholarships and endowed professorships at research universities while the House wants to focus the 
spending on reading, math and science programs for elementary-school pupils.  House opponents of 
higher education spending cite the Bennett Hypothesis as a defense and that increasing college 
scholarship awards would only encourage colleges hamstrung by tight state budgets to increase tuition – 
even citing Clemson’s decision in 2001 to increase tuition by 42% ($1,500) in response to a $6.5 
million reduction in state appropriations as a harbinger of things to come.  Even lottery revenues are 
uncertain lawmakers say – which just highlights the fact that overall state revenues are uncertain.  They 
claim that scholarships and professorships are harder to eliminate in tough times than are elementary 
school grants – indicative of the dilemma states face in wanting to strengthen universities through these 
means.   
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each state, as well as acknowledging that marginal productivities and marginal costs 
likely differ greatly across states, one cannot make an accurate assessment here.  
However, there is insight to be gained from the fact that these shares have declined 
across all states over the time period I am considering.  
Data on budget shares might also mask potential nonlinearities in the 
educational production function in a state.  Hence, there are two ways that observed 
recent declines in budget shares may not indicate a fall in funding priority.  First, as 
higher education budgets expand in real dollar terms, economies of scale may be able 
to be taken advantage of.  Second, the observed declines in budget shares may only be 
a reflection of cyclical patterns in seating capacity.  States aggressively built capacity 
in the late 1950s and the 1960s in anticipation of college attendance of the baby 
boomers.  As the population bulge has subsided over the past two decades, states have 
not needed to expend a great deal of resources building capacity.  Therefore, the 
declining shares may merely represent a trough in the capital cycle.   
 All along, I have emphasized that declining higher education budget shares 
represent states’ falling commitment to public higher education institutions.  Though it 
might be argued that this measure is fraught with ambiguities, other measures also 
signal that something has gone awry for public higher education institutions.  A 
common measure of a state’s commitment to a particular budget item in the public 
finance literature is a notion of “tax effort” – how much of a state’s available resources 
are allocated to that particular budget item.  Figures 1.8 and 1.9 below present the state 
average tax effort for elementary and secondary education and higher education 
respectively.  The figures represent how many dollars out of every $1,000 of median 
household income in a state are allocated to public elementary and secondary state 
expenditures per full time equivalent student (figure 1.8) and how many dollars are 
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allocated to public higher education appropriations per full time equivalent student 
(figure 1.9).14      
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Figure 1.8  
K12 Education Tax Effort  
50 U.S. State Average, FY79 - FY01 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Data for 1999-2001 are estimated due to a lack of complete enrollment data for both elementary and 
secondary schooling and higher education by state.  Estimates are based on growth rates in the relevant 
age group in the population during that time period and I have also assumed that the college enrollment 
rate was constant across states.  Each data series begins in 1979 due to availability of detailed state 
income data from the Current Population Survey. 
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Figure 1.9  
Higher Education Tax Effort  
50 U.S. State Average, FY79 - FY01 
 
 Taken together these figures indicate that the driving force behind the fall of 
education’s share of the general fund budget (figure 1.2) has been the falling out of 
favor of public higher education.  While a steadily increasing share of household 
income is being allocated to the elementary and secondary sector throughout the states 
(figure 1.8), higher education has enjoyed no such increase.  After a period of relative 
prosperity in the early 1980s, the share of median income devoted to public higher 
education fell from $204 per student out of every $1,000 in 1986 to $167 per student 
in 1998, with a slight rebound in recent years.  This 18% drop from 1986 to 1998, and 
flat “growth” otherwise result in this picture eerily resembling that of the higher 
education budget share depicted in figure 1.4 above.   
 Figure 1.10 plots the change in higher education tax effort versus the change in 
elementary and secondary tax effort over the period 1986 to 2001.  Noting the tight 
distribution of points along the vertical axis and the wide distribution along the 
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horizontal axis is informative.15  This figure indicates that while states remain nearly 
uniform in their commitment to elementary and secondary education (or exceedingly 
generous), commitment to higher education is subject to a great deal of variability 
across states.  Therefore, the trends observed earlier in the budget shares are also 
mirrored in other measures of educational commitment as seen in figures 1.8 through 
1.10. 
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Figure 1.10 
Change in Higher Education Tax Effort vs. K12 Tax Effort  
1986-2001 
Why is this Issue So Important? 
The raw data underlying figure 1.1 conceals the troublesome financial situation 
facing public higher education institutions.  While a cursory glance at this figure 
                                                 
15 In fact, the coefficient of variation for higher education effort is twice that for elementary and 
secondary effort (2.0 to 1.1).  The difference in coefficient of variation is even larger for the longer time 
period between 1979-2001 due again to the relatively steady commitment to elementary and secondary 
education. 
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indicates that public higher education receives larger sums of money today than it did 
25 years ago, by any other measure it is alarmingly evident that higher education is 
receiving an ever shrinking piece of a shrinking pie.  An analysis of this decline is 
important for a several reasons. 
 
Tax Support for Public Higher Education 
 Were a researcher to look solely at expenditure data published by the National 
Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), they would think that figures 1.2 and 
1.4 were fabricated.  Their expenditure calculations indicate that higher education’s 
share of the education budget has remained flat since 1990.  However, 42 of the 50 
state budget officers include student tuition and fees and 39 also include student loan 
dollars in their calculations of higher education expenditures.  These student payments 
represent $20 billion in higher education spending that NASBO reports as coming 
from the states (out of a total of $60 billion) that is not actually appropriated from tax 
sources.  I am not arguing that NASBO is intentionally misleading people, rather that 
their data is often the data that policymakers have access to and is not indicative of 
how well each state supports its institutions of higher education. 
 
Rates of Return to Public Expenditures 
When you see dramatic withdrawal of support for one budget item in favor of 
others, one would expect that the shift be due in part to changing relative rates of 
return to spending on each budget item.  Were states to behave as homo economicus 
would, they would spend money on each budget item until the marginal social benefit 
equals the marginal social cost (which should also equal the shadow price of a state’s 
wealth) of each budget item.  At face value, it does not appear that legislatures are 
behaving this way.  Dozens of studies indicate that the private rates of return to 
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investments in higher education are substantial and growing (believed to be on the 
order of 15%, which exceeds the 13% historical average rate of return provided by 
investments in the stocks of companies in the Dow Jones Industrial Average).  It is 
difficult to obtain reliable estimates of the social rate of return to higher education.  
However, a recent economic impact study by the National Association of State 
Universities and Land-Grant Colleges (NASULGC) provides evidence that the social 
returns are substantial.  Based on a survey of its member institutions it finds that for 
every dollar invested by a state in a NASULGC institution, there is an average return 
of $5.  Considering the large investment value of higher education expenditures it is 
concerning to see this withdrawal and it begs the question of what is happening to the 
returns to other items states spend their money on.16
 
Tuition Receives the Lion’s Share of Attention 
 Since market forces do not encourage many institutions to manage costs 
effectively, financial pressures are not necessarily bad all the time, as they work to 
make institutions focus on increasing efficiency.17  As higher education outputs are 
hard to measure, and the aforementioned budget cuts likely don’t translate into dollar 
for dollar paring of institutional budgets, I want to focus on budget shares in order to 
place higher education in a larger relative context of public priorities.  Though I can’t 
put a finger on exactly by how much institutions have suffered, I want to emphasize 
that the continued decline in budget shares makes it impossible for institutions to 
adjust to long-term losses of budget priorities without corresponding attenuation in 
quality.  Once again, William Bowen (1977) summarizes the issue perfectly: 
 
                                                 
16 The NASULGC report cites significant job generation, additional spending and substantial increases 
in tax revenues for both local and regional economies.   
 
17 See Ehrenberg (2000) for an analysis of why this is the case at elite private universities. 
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“Some savings are one-time cuts and there is a limit to the number of 
additional windows that can be found each year to be left unwashed. 
The related danger is that too many people seek to achieve temporary 
financial equilibrium by marginalizing the future.  In fact, it is scary 
that there is a fear among university administrators that legislatures 
think of these as sustainable and healthy equilibria and may be loathe 
to finance institutions fully when times improve.  There are many ways 
legislators see this happening – schools can allow their physical 
capital to depreciate, can spend endowments at unsustainable rates, or 
use annual giving to supplement revenue shortfalls, to not building 
infrastructure with an eye on long-term quality, to not being tough 
enough with tenure decisions to insure a minimal number of positions 
being open in the future for top academics, etc.” 
 
In the past, public institutions have been able to freely increase tuition as governors 
have long sympathized with their budgetary volatility.  However, in today’s sensitive 
political environment schools are looked upon with extreme scorn by both legislatures 
and voters if they raise tuition in response to appropriations cuts because while in 
dollar terms the tuition increases haven’t been large, due to the low levels at which it 
starts from, the increases make for dramatic percentage changes.  Legislatures are also 
becoming wary of institutional behavior as they feel schools have been increasing 
tuition excessively in an attempt to capture the revenues generated by the increasingly 
generous student aid awarded by the state.  
 Higher education institutions are vilified for raising tuition rates to cover these 
increased costs and to make up for funding shortages.  While tuition rates have 
increased at more than the rate of inflation for several decades, it has not been until 
recently that these increases have drawn substantial attention.  Figure 1.11 provides 
some insight.  Tuition rates at public colleges and universities have not only outpaced 
the growth of inflation since 1979, but have significantly outpaced the growth in 
family incomes.  For students that must pay the full cost of a college education, the 
tuition bill makes up an ever increasing portion of their family’s incomes.   
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Figure 1.11 
Comparison of Growth in Median Household Income  
and Four Year Public University Tuition Levels  
(1979 values normalized to = 1) 
 
Schools are hesitant to cut costs (and hence keeping tuition down) because of a 
fear that legislatures think they can run forever on a pared budget.  Their ability to 
fundraise is limited because so many start from such a low base and if a school 
happens to be successful (e.g. the University of Texas-Austin) a state may in turn cut 
appropriations further or redistribute the giving revenues to other schools in the 
system.  Finally, while public institutions have struggled to remain afloat during the 
past two decades, they have had the luxury of using a large portion of their revenues to 
fund ongoing operations.  However, many states do not have the capital capacity to 
accommodate the expected enrollment boom in the next decade (due to changes in 
migration, birth rates and enrollment rates) and will have to find a way to build 
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classrooms, dormitories and other facilities in addition to providing adequate funding 
for instruction, salaries, research and other essential services.18   
 Even as support has fallen, state appropriations are still the largest single 
source of funding for current operating expenses of public universities, averaging just 
less than 40% of current fund revenues nationally.19  This high degree of reliance on 
the state makes it very susceptible to the whims and politicking of legislatures and 
other (non)interested parties. Gordon Winston (1999) has indicated that the price that 
students pay for public education covers a tremendously small portion of the costs of 
providing education (he estimates that less than 20% of the true cost is covered by the 
price) and their subsidies from other sources are so large a part, that even a small 
percentage reduction in state support means large percentage increases in “sticker 
prices” and bold headlines.   
 
The Broader Economic Picture is Not Bright 
Higher education budget shares have fallen during a period of astonishing 
economic health in the United States.  From 1977 through 2001, real GDP more than 
doubled, the unemployment rate fell by 2.3 percentage points, prices have remained 
relatively stable and low, and in aggregate states posted budget deficits in only three 
years during this period.20   Currently forty states are running structural budget deficits 
and these are expected to continue for at least two more fiscal years.21  State debt 
                                                 
18 Full-time attendance in four year public institutions is expected to grow between 14%-17% by 2011 
(Tables 10 and 15-22 in Projections of Education Statistics). The growth, however, will largely occur in 
areas without the capacity (western and southwestern states) and among ethnic minorities or first-
generation students.  
 
19 Intergrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) via WebCaspar (http:// caspar.nsf.gov). 
 
20 2003 Economic Report of the President, Tables B-2, B-42 and B-85. 
 
21 National Association of State Budget Officers (www.nasbo.org).  A structural budget deficit is a 
deficit in the state general fund.   
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service levels have reached all time highs, “rainy day funds” have already been 
depleted and the increasing priority of homeland security and other federal initiatives 
at the state level are putting enormous pressure on previously unstressed budget items.   
Elementary and secondary school finance court challenges are expected to 
continue, placing more pressure on state budgets to maintain funding for K12 
education, a record number of people are in prison22 and demographic shifts aren’t 
working in higher education’s favor.23  While the increasing demand for state support 
of these and other budget items has been dramatic and well documented, there have 
been no equivalent pushes for higher education institutional support.  These budget 
pressures are compounded by the fact that many states have rapidly decaying 
infrastructures, have significant security concerns post-9/11, have entrenched and 
deadlocked state congresspersons all during a time when a rapidly changing economy 
has rendered most state tax codes obsolete.  Given that higher education experienced a 
sharp cutting of the knife during plush times, concern about its fate would be 
justifiable during these leaner times.  
 
Most Students are Educated in the Public Sector and These Institutions are Falling 
Behind their Private Counterparts 
 Throughout the past 25 years, roughly ¾ of all students enrolled in American 
colleges and universities and 2/3 of all students enrolled in four-year institutions have 
been enrolled in public institutions.24  The Census Bureau and Department of 
                                                 
22 Ithaca Journal, 08/17/03. 
 
23 Medicaid expenditures have skyrocketed due to large increases in caseloads (it is a means-tested 
entitlement program), escalating presciption drug costs and lagging support from the federal 
government.  An aging and growing population is putting further stress on health care expenditures and 
other state services.  Corrections expenditures have been growing due to more vigilant prosecution, 
mandatory sentencing laws and the resulting expansion of prison capacity.  In the K-12 education 
sector, a rash of court mandated state school finance equalization programs in 26 states has led to an 
increase in aggregate state spending on K-12 education in these states, typically funded through higher 
state taxes.   
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Education estimate that the majority of the enrollment expansion in higher education 
in the coming decades will be from current under-represented minorities and/or 
students that are first generation college matriculants.  Inasmuch as the vast majority 
of these students will attend public higher education institutions, what is happening to 
public higher education is much more important to our nation’s well-being than what 
is happening to selective private colleges and universities.25   
 A dependable revenue stream is essential for universities to preserve 
instructional services, continue in their public service mission, make plans for the 
future and most important, to maintain quality.26  As William Bowen predicted, 
enough time has passed for us to begin to observe a subtle decay in institutional 
quality due to higher education’s declining budget share.  Table 1.1 shows how the 
withdrawal of state support from the public higher education sector has resulted in a 
growing divergence of academic quality across the private and public sectors.  For 
each of the four outcome measures shown (expenditures per student, associate 
professor salaries, student-faculty ratios and the share of faculty members that are 
part-time), the quality premium in the private sector is growing.  Real expenditures per 
student in the public sector have increased by 56.4% since 1977.  At the same time, 
their private counterparts have increased spending by 79.9%, causing the expenditure 
gap to grow from $3,100 per FTE in 1977 to $7,400 per FTE in 2000.   
                                                                                                                                            
24 Digest of Education Statistics, various years. 
 
25 As such, one should recall why the public universities and land-grant colleges were founded in the 
first place.  The first Morrill Act of 1862 and the expansion of the public system after World War II 
created public institutions precisely because the private marketplace underprovided higher education 
services to the general public and those generally not from wealthy families.  If this notion still prevails 
in the general public, it brings into question the increasingly private nature of public university revenue 
generation (tuition and fees, fundraising and entrepreneurial activities).       
 
26 It is not surprising that most of the top 25 schools in the U.S. News and World Report rankings are 
privates.  More money allows schools to purchase the inputs that affect educational quality (top faculty, 
technology and training, infrastructure that attracts top students, etc.) 
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Table 1.1 
Higher Education Quality Measures by Sector and Changes over Time 
 
 Year Public Private 
Private 
Premium 
     
1977 8.1 11.2 3.1 Expenditures Per 
Student1 ($1,000) 2000 12.6 20.0 7.4 
 growth 56.4% 79.7% 140.6% 
     
1978 54.3 55.9 1.6 Faculty Salaries 
($1,000 - Assoc.) 2002 61.5 74.1 12.6 
 growth 13.3% 32.6% 687.5% 
     
1977 49.0 37.9 -11.1 Faculty1 - Student2 
Ratio 1999 39.4 41.5 2.1 
 growth -19.6% 9.5% -118.9% 
     
1989 38.1 33.3 4.8 Part-Time Faculty 
Share 1998 43.5 37.8 5.7 
 growth 14.2% 13.5% 18.8% 
     
Sources: Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) via 
http://caspar.nsf.gov.   
 
1. Faculty are measured by full-time ranked faculty members, lecturers and 
instructors. 
 
2. Students are measured in thousands by full-time equivalent undergraduate, 
graduate and professional school enrollments.   
 The ratio of average faculty salaries at public institutions to private institutions 
has fallen dramatically since 1978.  In 1978, the average associate professor salaries in 
the two sectors were nearly identical.  By 2002, the average salary in the public sector 
was nearly $13,000 lower than salaries in the private sector.  In addition, Ehrenberg 
(2003) has pointed out is that there has also been a dramatic increase in the dispersion 
of faculty salaries (at all ranks) within the public sector, largely driven by changes in 
state appropriations across these institutions.  Thus, it is becoming increasingly 
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difficult both within the public sector and relative to the private sector, for universities 
to attract and retain high quality faculty.   
Between 1977 and 1999, the enrollment weighted average faculty-student ratio 
across all states fell from 49.0 faculty members per thousand students to 39.4 faculty 
members per thousand students in the public sector.  While the decrease in any one 
year may not have been noticeable, over the intervening period, the 20% decrease is 
sizable.  At the same time, faculty-student ratios have been increasing in the private 
sector.  Last, for the limited time period that data are available, between 1989 and 
1998 the weighted average (by enrollments) share of the faculty that is comprised of 
part-timers and graduate students (i.e. “cheaper”) across all states rose from 38.1% to 
43.5% in the public sector.27  These increases are similar to what has happened in the 
private sector; however, since class sizes and enrollments in publics continue to rise 
and are larger than in the private sector, it is likely that a much larger percentage of 
students are being instructed by part-time faculty members in the public sector than in 
the private sector.   
The quality measures in table 1.1 are readily observable.  It should be noted 
that during every budget crunch, institutions take many additional steps to cut 
expenses until funding can be returned to normal levels.  Among the steps taken by the 
typical public institution include reducing library acquisitions and services, cutting 
custodial services, eliminating landscaping programs, reducing building maintenance, 
eliminating or combining courses, holding faculty positions open, cutting 
nonacademic and academic support staff, and many other actions.  Each individual 
action may not seem very dramatic, but over the course of many years these may 
translate into larger concerns.  These concerns include a fall in graduation rates, a 
                                                 
27 IPEDS Fall Staffing Surveys.  The survey does not indicate the number of courses taught by each 
type of faculty member, nor does it indicate the percentage of the total credit hours taught by each type 
of faculty member. 
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decrease in public service expenditures, a change in the composition of undergraduate 
and graduate degrees awarded, an inability to pay start-up costs for new scientists, 
limiting enrollments, changing composition of enrollments, a change in the way tenure 
decisions are made, and alarmingly perhaps a change in the composition of the student 
body.  If it is true that student college choices have a significant affect on future 
outcomes, and if such a large portion of our population attends public universities, 
then where students choose to attend college will increase in importance in the future 
beyond what it does today.28
 
Control and Conflicts of Interest 
 The fall in state support has also led to a number of institutional concerns 
about the nature of non-state sources of support.  Many publics fear that if they go out 
and successfully obtain outside funding, the state will simply rely on those funds 
rather than providing continuous support.  Even if states institute programs for 
matching grants, tax breaks to corporations that donate, etc. fundraising is costly.  
Unlike with state appropriations, not nearly 100 cents to the dollar collected in outside 
funding are kept due to the large expenses incurred by development offices in 
soliciting donations.    
 Another major concern with non-state sources of funding is related to control 
issues.  Many observers fear that the nature of private fundraising may encourage a 
suboptimal move from basic to applied scientific research.  Private fundraising also 
generates a fear that curricula will be influenced, a fear of an imbalance between a 
university’s public service commitments and corporate interests, and changing 
expectations for university presidents and trustees.  There is also a concern about how 
                                                 
28 Very little empirical research has been done linking these institutional outcomes to long term 
depression in student outcomes and is a fertile area for future study. 
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intellectual property rights are assigned and what returns privates expect on their 
investments in higher education. 
 Finally, institutions find themselves backed into a corner as federal legislators 
are becoming frustrated that colleges continue to increase prices just as they increase 
spending on Pell grants and reduce interest rates on student loans.  In March 2003, 
Representative (R-CA) Buck McKeon announced that he intended to bring forth 
legislation that would punish colleges that raised their prices too high by rescinding 
their eligibility to participate in federal student aid programs.29  While such a move is 
dramatic and extremely unlikely, it is significant because it would disproportionately 
hurt the publics and also because it would signal the arrival of yet another interest 
group in the operations of our public universities. 
 
Higher Education as a Catalyst for Economic Growth 
 Economist Caroline Hoxby (2000) has noted, “several factors underscore 
higher education’s role as an economic growth engine for the nation, including: a) the 
high correlation between educational attainment and economic growth in the US; b) 
the fact that the United States has a comparative advantage in producing goods and 
services with high skill content; and c) the extent to which growth of technology 
related sectors of the economy depends on an ample supply of educated labor.”  As 
Alexander (2001) points out, there are literally dozens of studies showing that rates of 
return to higher education are significant for private persons and society as a whole.30  
Thus, it is important that policy-makers ensure that investment in higher education is 
high enough (and also equitable).  Given the unique abilities for universities to 
                                                 
29 Chronicle of Higher Education, 03/06/03.  This proposal has subsequently been withdrawn. 
 
30 In the study Education at a Glance 2002 completed in October 2002, the OECD determined that the 
private rate of return to higher education in the United States was 15%. 
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produce both basic and applied research, adapt quickly to a changing economy, 
prepare students to work in a large variety of industries, provide job training and re-
training for displaced workers, etc., it is very surprising the extent to which higher 
education has fallen out of favor at the state level.  These benefits do not appear to be 
lost on the federal government however, as its agencies have tripled the amount of 
support for science and engineering research and development at public institutions, 
committing $4.7 billion (real dollars) in 1977 to $13.9 billion in 2001. 
 
Distributional Concerns 
Public universities, in particular the land-grants, were founded to challenge the 
elite private institutions and provide an education for the people as a whole, not the 
privileged classes alone.  The publics were built to provide training in wide spans of 
disciplines and bring the fruits of university research to the nation’s fields and 
factories.  In this way, publics were to serve society and to make vertical mobility 
more than just an American dream.   The recent dramatic fall in state support for 
public higher education and the resulting consequences put this mission in jeopardy.  
Dramatic increases in tuition disproportionately hurt the lower and middle classes, 
whose incomes have not kept pace with either those at the top of the income 
distribution or with these tuition increases.   
The method by which states choose to finance higher education may affect the 
distribution of income within a state.  The prominence of merit-based aid programs 
and the movement away from broad-based in-kind aid policies effectively redistributes 
income to the middle- and upper-classes – to people that would have attended colleges 
even if such aid was not available.  Empirical research on the distributional effects of 
institutional subsidies has been mixed.  Hansen and Weisbrod (1969b) found that the 
financing scheme in California favors upper income families and Fernandez and 
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Rogerson (1995) describe a more general model where income is also regressively 
redistributed.  However, Lee, Ram and Smith (1999) find that the system in Illinois 
favors lower- and middle-income groups with most significant transfer going from 
high income families to those with incomes below $40,000.  Fortin (2002) finds that 
increases in public expenditures for college reduce wage inequality in the United 
States (likely due to the increased supply of college graduates it generates).  Though I 
will not analyze this issue in great detail, it is clear that the declining budget shares 
will not result in a benefit to the less fortunate members of society unless states 
aggressively expand their need-based aid programs in the face of cutting institutional 
appropriations.31   
 
Challenges in the Public Higher Education Finance Research Environment and 
Prior Research 
 Given that public higher education is one of the largest budget items in a state, 
the dearth of economic research (both empirical and theoretical) devoted to its 
determinants is surprising.  The few empirical pieces that have been completed have 
yielded little in the way of policy relevance as very few explanatory variables have 
been found to be statistically significant.  In fact, the most consistent finding across 
studies is that findings are inconsistent and that more analysis is needed.  The 
sparseness of theoretical treatments derives from two important realities.32  First, due 
                                                 
31 Even if states generously fund need-based aid programs, since private school tuitions are much higher 
and the quality of the privates is increasingly better than the publics, it is likely that aggressive need-
based aid programs would constitute a redistribution of money from the low-cost (relatively) public 
sector to the higher cost private sector.  From a positive economic perspective this may be desirable, but 
from a normative perspective taxpayers may like this implicit transfer of public monies to the private 
sector. 
 
32 All of the papers that I have seen treat the higher education funding process in a partial equilibrium 
framework.  That these treatments are necessarily simplistic may be contributing to the dearth of 
significant findings in the literature.  More complete computable generate equilibrium (CGE) treatments 
are still in their nascent stages.  The top researchers in this area (Tom Nechyba, Dennis Epple, Richard 
Romano and Holger Sieg to name a few) are only beginning to turn their attention to the higher 
education sector.   
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to the large number of interested agents and competing factors at the state level, a 
single model of state budget determination has proven to be elusive.  Second, the 
awkward economics of the higher education process itself make modeling institutional 
behavior and pricing extremely tricky.33  The coupling of these factors makes 
modeling public higher education at the state level a daunting task for theoretical 
economists and an analytical morass for empirical researchers.  Below, I outline some 
of the general difficulties and common threads in the public higher education finance 
literature. 
No universally accepted behavioral model of state expenditures exists.  The 
most common assumption is that funding decisions can be described by a median 
voter framework34 (in order to general empirical tractability), though a variety of other 
models have been employed.35  Little consensus has been reached on a number of 
additional salient issues, which has contributed to the dearth of significant empirical 
findings.  Researchers have been unable to agree upon the proper measurement of 
higher education funding – using higher education appropriations in levels, in per 
student terms, per capita terms, per voting-age population terms, and even annual 
percentage changes in the levels.  Nor has a consensus been reached on the proper unit 
of analysis, with some researchers focusing on the states, while others use institutional 
level data for all public institutions, all public research institutions, or even a single 
public research institution over a long time series.  Further, higher education finance 
                                                 
33 Rothschild and White (1993) analyze the difficulty in writing down an economic model of higher 
education.  The most significant challenge lies in the fact that the major inputs in the production process 
(students) are also the primary consumers of the output of that process.   
 
34 The work of Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Clotefelter (1976) and Peterson (1976) falls squarely in 
this category. 
 
35 Cohen and Noll (1998) and Hoenack and Pierro (1990) are good examples of competing interest 
group studies while Clotfelter (1976) and Strathman (1994) include measures of out-migration in their 
regressions to represent a state’s ability to capture benefits from investments in higher education in a 
human capital motivated model.    
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researchers have differed widely in their objectives.  Many set out to test whether 
specific theories of legislative behavior apply to higher education while others intend 
to find whether statistical relationships between particular variables exist (for example, 
between public tuition and state aid for education, between state aid and enrollments, 
between migration and state aid, and many more). 
 Data availability is a significant constraint.  Due to the difficulty of assembling 
a panel data set on state level variables, a majority of studies use cross-sectional 
analyses.36  There is nothing inherently “wrong” with doing this, but there are three 
points worth noting.  First, due to the very small number of degrees of freedom, cross-
section econometric models that use state level data are forced to be parsimoniously 
specified.  Even in cases where relationships exist in the underlying population, there 
may not be enough variation in such a small sample of data for it to be realized 
statistically.  Second, cross-sectional estimates tell us why higher education funding 
levels differ across states; they do not provide any information on how changes in 
various factors have affected changes in funding within any given state.  Third, 
omitted unobserved state-specific, time-invariant variables may lead to biased 
estimates if they are correlated with the included variables. 
Endogeneity issues also create particularly difficult problems for researchers.  
The level of state funding for higher education likely affects a number of factors 
thought to also affect funding levels, in particular enrollments and prices.  For 
example, if higher state support translates into higher enrollments, then estimates of 
other parameters in a model that includes enrollments as an exogenous determinant of 
state funding would be biased upward if they are correlated with enrollments.37  In 
                                                 
36 Very little state data on demographics, budgets, economic conditions, etc. are found in a single 
source.  In addition, even as we speak, most of the data one would need to do a detailed budget study 
have yet to be put in easily retrievable electronic form. 
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addition, state institutions themselves may be endogenously determined.  For example, 
legislators in states with a higher education funding formula may react differently to 
changing economic and demographic climates than those in states without them or 
states that operate on a biennial budget cycle may behave differently than those on an 
annual budget cycle.  It is likely that budget cycles and funding formulas are a result 
of prior spending habits in the states.  With very few exceptions, the literature does not 
recognize these complications.   
The multitude of difficulties described above has forced the empirical work on 
higher education finance in the literature to be largely atheoretic.  Though the models I 
estimate in the following chapters are approximations to underlying demand functions, 
I carefully address each of the above challenges.  Finally, prior research has not 
considered an analysis of the determinants of the shares of state budgets allocated to 
higher education.  That is, there has been no empirical work done to explain why 
higher education has fallen in priority at the state level.  My focus on explaining these 
budget share outcomes allows me to sidestep the difficult decisions of choosing which 
behavioral model to subscribe to and the relevant measure of state higher education 
expenditures, and it also provides me with a logical set of restrictions to place upon 
the underlying structural demand system.   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
37 While Clotfelter (1976) and Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998) attempt to correct for the fact that 
enrollments are likely determined by the level of state support, many papers simply include enrollments 
exogenously on the right hand side of their regressions, or ignore them completely. 
CHAPTER TWO 
EXPLAINING BUDGET SHARES 
 
Theoretical Model of State Decision Making - The Utility Tree 
 The empirical estimates I present in chapter three and chapter four are derived 
from a simple application of the classical theory of consumer choice to collective 
decisions made at the state level that determine expenditures for various categories of 
public services.  Broadly speaking, such a model requires that a utility function exists 
that can logically describe the preferences of some effective decision making agent(s) 
over a bundle of public sector and private sector goods and services.38 The agent is 
assumed to choose expenditure levels for the various categories to maximize this 
satisfaction, subject to the constraint on total resources in the state.  However, in order 
to estimate any demand functions that result from this process, there are two major 
issues that I must confront. 
 First, it is not entirely clear who the single decision making agent within a state 
is.  The public finance and political economics literature contain hundreds of studies 
aimed at determining just whose preferences are being maximized by the 
aforementioned utility function, with absolutely no consensus reached.  Since it is the 
legislators who ultimately cast budget votes in statehouses, I abstract from the 
countless interest groups and decision-making entities within a state and consider them 
as the single optimizing agent, though there is nothing sacrosanct about this 
selection.39     
                                                 
38 By logically, I mean that the preferences are rational and that the function describing these 
preferences is well-behaved. 
 
39 It could very well be that a median voter is the effective decision maker, but it may also be any 
number of other entities.  For instance, in many states the governors have substantial powers to cut line 
items from budget bills; can veto entire budgets, etc.  As I am interested in understanding what specific  
 36
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 Second, I need to describe the process by which the optimum amounts of 
expenditures on each of the available public and private goods and services are chosen 
by this representative agent.  The legislature will maximize its utility by allocating 
expenditures to the various categories of public services until the marginal utility 
generated by that public service equals the marginal utility they receive from wealth 
times the price of that service, taking the total available resources in the state and the 
prices of all of the various services as constraints.  Without imposing any structure at 
this point, the resulting demand equations are virtually inestimable since the demand 
for any one service will depend upon the prices of all of the services in the system.   
 That the legislative demand for a particular public service in an unconstrained 
structural model depends on a large number of prices presents a number of challenges.  
Even if prices for the various public services were easily obtainable,40 the data 
requirements for empirical estimation on a sample of only 50 states are simply too 
demanding.41  It is also likely that a vector of prices, if found, would be highly 
collinear – making it unlikely that all could be included in a single demand equation.  
Further, in the event that all prices could be included, concerns about endogeneity and 
interpretation need to be addressed.42
                                                                                                                                            
factors determine education budget outcomes, whether my empirical results are consistent with any 
underlying theory is of secondary importance. 
 
40 Determining a single price for any one aggregate budget item is an extremely difficult task.  For 
instance, what is the proper measurement for the cost of road maintenance in a state?  Is it the wages 
paid to construction workers?  Or the per-capita cost of the machinery used to pave roads?  Or the cost 
of the administrators in the capital making decisions about road construction?  Something else?  The 
task would be easier if I were analyzing state expenditures at a more disaggregated level – for instance, 
in studies of public employment, the relative prices are the wages in each employment category. 
 
41 Too demanding in two respects:  First, it is not inconceivable that a state spends money on more than 
50 budget items.  In this case, there simply aren’t enough degrees of freedom to include the prices of all 
50 budget items in a demand equation with only 50 observations.  Second, it is simply not plausible that 
all prices directly affect the demand for all budget items.  For example, would anyone believe that an 
individual decision maker considers the increase in the price of highway paint when determining 
scholarship awards to top high school achievers in science?  The number of choices confronted by our 
representative agent is overwhelming in this unconstrained framework. 
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 In order to generate an empirically tractable model, I need to impose some 
behavioral structure on the legislatures.  Following the lead of Strotz (1957) and 
subsequent application by Ehrenberg (1973) and others, I employ a “utility-tree” 
approach.  Rather than assuming that legislatures allocate resources to budget items in 
a single step, I assume that legislatures follow a multi-stage choice process.  Figure 2.1 
graphically depicts this choice process.   
 Legislatures will optimally follow this multi-stage process only if I make a 
critical assumption that the utility function represented in each stage of the budget 
process is strongly separable.  Intuitively, this assumption means that in each stage of 
the budget process, the legislature considers only the budgeted expenditures and prices 
of specific goods for that stage alone when allocating funds to specific categories.  
Formally, this assumption requires that the marginal rates of substitution between 
different categories of goods and services within a budget category, are independent of 
consumption levels of goods and services outside that category.   
 
                                                                                                                                            
42 In terms of endogeneity, it is not unimaginable that the level of state expenditures for a budget item 
affects the measure “price” of that budget item.  For example, if the price of higher education is 
measured by faculty salaries, it is also likely that public universities can increase faculty salaries more 
when state funding is higher.  In terms of interpretation, many prices likely reflect quality, so it would 
be difficult to disentangle changes in quality and changes in technology from changes in the actual cost 
of providing a service (e.g. think medical advancements).  Instrumenting for prices or controlling for 
technology and quality is not a simple task.  In estimation, the quality component seems to dominate the 
cost component, making inference difficult (see Clotfelter 1976 for an example). 
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Figure 2.1 
Legislative “Utility Tree” 
 To illustrate, if I can bundle all public education expenditures into one group 
and non-education public expenditures into another (level (II) above), the legislature 
can rank different spending bundles within public education with a well defined 
ordering which would be independent of the level of public provision of budget items 
outside the group.  Thus, legislative preferences between public higher education and 
public elementary and secondary education are independent of spending on 
corrections, Medicaid, welfare, and anything else outside the education group.43  Each 
                                                 
43 As Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) point out, there is “no reason why each sub-utility function could 
not have one or more deeper sub groupings within it, nor should we rule out the possibility that some 
sub grouping may only have one unit.”  Thus, the categorical groupings in figure 5 are elastic.  As I 
describe in more detail below however, the validity of this assumption depends on which level of the 
utility-tree I am analyzing. 
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group is said to have a sub-utility function with the values of each sub-utility function 
adding up to yield total utility to the legislature.            
 A complete description of the process begins with branch (I) on the “tree.”  
The legislature derives utility from both publicly and privately produced goods and 
services, which can be written as: 
 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
services & goods
 providedprivately 
,
services & goods 
providedpublicly 21 VVUU . (2.1) 
The legislature is constrained by the total available resources in the state, which 
include all tax revenues per capita, per capita personal income and transfers from the 
federal government.44  The split between private and public goods provision is 
implicitly decided by the determination of the tax code.  Strong separability imposes 
that the utility the legislature derives from the provision of any publicly provided good 
or service is independent of the level of private goods and service provision.  More 
formally, the marginal rate of substitution between any two publicly provided goods is 
unchanged by a change in a privately provided good or service.  It is at this top level 
of the tree that the separability assumption is most tenuous.  Among other things, it 
implies that funding decisions between public education and public health care should 
not be affected by the level of private expenditures on education and health (i.e. strong 
separability is not a great assumption if goods and services produced in the public 
sector have valid private substitutes).45   
Given the budgeted expenditure on public goods and services determined by 
the process in (2.1) above, the legislature then budgets for each of the various 
                                                 
44 I will assume that all grant aid is fungible (though block grants from the federal government are 
becoming a rarity).  
 
45 V1 would also include any publicly purchased, but privately produced goods and services. 
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categories of publicly provided goods and services (education, corrections, health care, 
transportation, etc.) based only on this income and aggregate price indices for each 
category.  The branch sub-utility function, V1, is a function of public education 
spending and spending on all other goods and services and can be expressed as:46   
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Strong separability in (2.2) imposes that the utility the legislature derives from the 
provision of any education good or service is independent of the level of other public 
good or service provision.  More formally, the marginal rate of substitution between 
higher education and elementary and secondary education is unaffected by a change in 
any other publicly provided good or service.  The restrictions placed on preferences in 
this branch of the utility function are less objectionable than in (2.1).  For example, an 
increase in the cost of road construction should not affect the share of education 
dollars allocated to higher education, wealth constant. 
Moving “down the tree,” I assume that the legislature derives utility from each 
of the various categories of publicly provided education goods and services.  I am 
focused on two particular categories, higher education (HE) and elementary & 
secondary education (K12).47  In this step of the process, legislatures maximize utility 
                                                 
46 Note, the analysis would be unchanged by separately budgeting for all other state items at this level.  
Grouping them into one allows me to use a composite price in the empirical analysis as opposed to 
finding prices for each particular budget item.  As you will see, the pricing doesn’t much matter in the 
empirical results that follow as I try to account for other public budget items by including variables that 
affect state preferences for these items, aside from prices.  This isn’t too objectionable.  Educational 
services make up nearly half of state payrolls and it is plausible that educational services satisfy wants 
independent of non-educational services. 
 
47 Since I am focused on higher education’s share of the total education budget, included in K12 
expenditures are actually all dollars spent on education that are not higher education institutional 
appropriations or student grant aid.  Therefore, the K12 expenditures include funding for special 
education, for programs like New York State’s BOCES, etc. 
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subject to the budgeted expenditures on public education decided in (2.2), and only the 
relative prices of HE and K12.   The branch sub-utility function, ZA, is a function of 
only HE and K12 and can be written as: 
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Strong separability in (2.3) imposes that the utility the legislature derives from the 
provision of any public higher education good or service is independent of the level of 
K12 provision.  More formally, the marginal rate of substitution between funding 
categories within higher education (for example, between student grant aid and 
institutional appropriations) is unaffected by a change in the level or price of K12 
provision.  While the restrictions placed on preferences in this branch of the utility 
function are less objectionable than in (2.1), they may still cause concern.  For 
instance, a decrease in the cost of high school advanced placement instructors is 
assumed to have no affect on the share of higher education dollars allocated to fund 
student grant aid programs. 
The lowest branch on the tree indicates that the legislature derives utility from 
each of the various categories of publicly provided higher education goods and 
services.   Legislatures allocate higher education dollars in two ways. First, they may 
award money directly to the institutions – these dollars are typically referred to as state 
appropriations.  Second, rather than providing an across the board subsidy to all 
students, they can use more targeted programs (both means-tested and merit based) of 
direct student aid, which I will refer to simply as grant aid.  The branch sub-utility 
function θ1 can be written as: 
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The split between state appropriations and grant aid will be constrained by the total 
allocation to higher education determined in (2.3) and the relative perceived prices of 
grant aid and state appropriations.  Note that the estimation of the within branch 
allocations in this model depends upon the separability imposed in the branch above it.  
Since the split in (IV) is as far “down the tree” as I am interested in exploring, I do not 
need to place additional restrictions at this level.   
 
Justification  
As alluded to above, the utility tree approach is attractive due to its analytical 
convenience.  Since I cannot rely on an external factor such as prices to naturally 
group commodities, I look to preferences themselves to provide a natural structuring.  
I emphasize that these restrictions were not made solely to suit the data.  Rather, in the 
higher education setting, this preference structuring is quite natural and is supported 
by both legislative behavior and prior empirical research. 
Abstracting from the many examples across the 50 states, in Alabama there 
was a recent explicit debate as to whether the shortfall in the education trust fund 
should be borne equally by K12 or higher education or simply all of it should be borne 
by the latter.  Nearly 50% of the states cut higher education appropriations midway 
through the 2003 fiscal year, leaving other budget items untouched.48   Further, as of 
the summer of 2003, only six states spent any money on direct institutional 
appropriations to private schools, and in very small amounts at that.49   
                                                 
48 Chronicle of Higher Education, 6/05/03. 
 
49 NY, MD, IL, MI, MN and PA – data from Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System Peer 
Analysis System via National Center for Education Statistics website.  In fact, the aid is not in the form 
of block grants to any institution, but rather is a function of resident and nonresident enrollment and 
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In addition to the behavioral evidence, empirical work provides support for the 
separability assumption.  Very few papers have found any evidence that competing 
interest groups affect higher education when higher education is modeled as a separate 
budget item at the state level (e.g. Hossler, et al 1997, Lydell and Lyddon 1997).  A 
recent paper that does find some evidence, Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998) indicates 
that the only competing interest group that seems to affect higher education 
appropriations is K12.  In fact, the broader public finance literature rarely (if ever) 
considers higher education as a separate budget item when analyzing demand at the 
state level (Painter and Bee 2001, Poterba 1997, Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg 1975, 
Ehrenberg 1973 to name a few).50
 
The Empirical Model 
 In order to explain the budget share outcomes depicted in chapter one I move 
to a multivariate analysis.  I estimate three equations using panel data, with the state-
year as my unit of analysis, in which the share of the public general fund budget 
allocated to education (in state i and year t), the share of the education budget 
allocated to higher education (in state i and year t) and the share of the higher 
education budget allocated to institutions (in state i and year t) are specified to be 
functions of the total available resources in that branch, demographic characteristics, 
enrollment pressures, economic conditions, competing interests in that branch 
                                                                                                                                            
graduation rates.  In the state with the largest private expenditure (Maryland) the largest allocation goes 
to Johns Hopkins, where state appropriations make up only 1% of their operating budget.   
 
50 As Ashenfelter and Ehrenberg (1975, p.62) point out about multi-stage budgeting: “although this 
description of the consumer’s budgeting process seems generally plausible, it has special appeal for the 
problem of allocation within and to the public sector.  In this decentralized budget process, there is no 
reason why the detailed choices of purchases within a broad category need be made by the consumer at 
all … … these are, however, precisely the types of information that elected officials are expected to 
have; indeed, it is presumably the reason for their election.  The framework we set out for economic 
choices is thus consistent with the existence of a role for the political process.” 
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(including private alternatives), political factors, state institutional characteristics and 
random error terms.  
 
( ) ititit uXfOutcome += β  (2.5) 
 
The random error terms, uit, are specified in several ways throughout this dissertation.  
In chapter three, the error terms are decomposed into a fixed time component, a fixed 
cross-sectional component and a random component varying over time and across 
observations.  Models are then estimated assuming several possible treatments of the 
random components and cross-sectional components of the error terms.51
The education budget share (EDSHARE) is assumed to result from the 
maximization of equation 2.2, subject to the budget constraint in that branch (a 
function of potential total tax revenues collected, prices and any transfers from the 
federal government).  The higher education share of the education budget 
(HESHARE) is assumed to result from the maximization of equation 2.3, subject to 
the total dollars allocated to the education sector from the EDSHARE equation.  The 
institutional share of the higher education budget (INSHARE) is assumed to result 
from the maximization of equation 4, subject to the total dollars allocated to the higher 
education sector from the HESHARE equation.  My empirical specification of 
equations 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 depends on the separability of utility in equations 2.1, 2.2 
and 2.3 respectively.52    
                                                 
51 Baseline models assume that the random errors are uncorrelated across each equation and 
uncorrelated over time.  Models are then estimating controlling for auto-correlated error terms and / or 
with the error terms correlated across equations.  Additionally, models are also estimated assuming that 
that error variances are both independent of, and dependent on, the explanatory variables in the model. 
 
52 I don’t specify the form of the utility function beyond the separability notion.  Though I’d like to 
estimate as flexible a form as possible, lack of information on prices and a smallish data set do not 
permit this.   
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An outgrowth of this key assumption is that different relative price variables 
enter into the different levels of the model.  All of the “other prices” are captured by 
the inclusion of a wealth measure in each equation.  In other words, all budget items 
outside a branch are assumed to only have an income effect, and zero cross-
substitution effects, with budget items within the branch.  Only budget items within a 
particular branch are assumed to have non-zero cross-substitution effects.53
Despite my intention to model legislative demand, variables included on the 
right hand side of each equation may also capture supply factors.  Therefore, the 
estimated equations likely represent equilibrium conditions in the underlying structural 
demand and supply model.  The empirical specifications should also be viewed as 
approximations to the underlying demand functions that would be generated from 
maximization of equations 2.2 - 2.4 given appropriate budget constraints.54   
Empirical estimates should therefore be interpreted with caution.  For example, 
it might be difficult to assess whether my results in the EDSHARE equation arise from 
differences in legislative demand for educational spending, or differences in the 
technology of supplying educational services to states with different demographic 
characteristics.  It might seem reasonable to exclude the ethnic share of the population 
from the education production function – which suggests that the demographic effects 
associated with these variables are likely to result from demand side factors alone.  
Interpretation of the effect of fluctuations in the school-age population is more 
                                                 
53 Imposing such a structure on my model is not without faults.  The elimination of substitution effects 
from changes in prices across branches may not such a horrible assumption for some branches, but it 
may do violence to common sense in others.  For example, an increase in the price of health care is 
assumed to not have a substitution effect on the amount of K12 vs. HE spending in a state.  However, if 
the state universities are all medical colleges and undergraduate nursing schools, this is surely an 
inaccurate assumption.  The only change my structure allows is that an increase in health care prices 
generates an income effect that would be captured by the size of the education budget being smaller.   
 
54 In actuality, legislatures choose expenditure levels, not budget shares.  However, shares are implied 
by this choice.  My model should be viewed as reduced form approximations to the true expenditure 
model because I do not derive these budget shares formally. 
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difficult, for example, because economies of scale in education could make it possible 
to deliver the same education to a larger cohort with a less than proportional expansion 
in education spending.55  
Public choice and public finance theories of legislative demand abound and 
may be grouped into five broad categories.  Researchers typically subscribe to one of 
these theories to place structure on their empirical models, as they amount to different 
specifications of a state legislature’s utility function (and hence the form of the 
demand equation to be estimated).  Indeed, many researchers set out to explicitly test 
the validity of a given theory.  As I am interested in explaining outcomes and not 
behavior, my empirical analysis is not derived from any one theory in particular, but 
the theories are useful for guiding the selection of explanatory variables in my analysis 
nonetheless.  These political economic considerations fit seamlessly into the consumer 
demand framework described above.  Rather than estimating pure reduced-form 
outcome models as is common in the empirical public economics literature, I include 
political economic variables as “taste shifters” in the demand model, which are linear 
augmentations of the demand functions derived from equations 2.2 through 2.4.  
Before I describe the variables that are included in the estimating equations, I briefly 
describe the political economic theories that empirical researchers typically invoke. 
 
                                                 
55 Since the “amount” of higher education services captured by voters is not observable, but 
expenditures are, it may be necessary to model the production side of the market for public higher 
education services.  It would be extremely difficult to formulate a model of institutional supply 
however.  State higher education is not likely to be produced efficiently (meaning that individual 
schools deliver services at minimum cost).   Measuring higher education outputs is also notoriously 
difficult.  Quality is an important output, but how can one effectively measure it?  If a state focused on 
measured tangible outputs, universities might focus on minimizing quality and maximizing some 
tangible output, but this is at odds standard models of prestige maximization.  So, what I do above 
should be viewed as a partial equilibrium analysis.   
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Political Economic Theories – Direct Democracy 
This is a system where fiscal decisions are made by referendums among 
individual voters.  In actuality, most state budgeting is not done in this manner.  The 
most common voting rule under this system is majority rule, which results in a much 
researched theory in the literature, the median voter theorem.  The theorem says that 
when all voters preferences are single peaked the outcome of majority voting reflects 
the preferences of the median voter.  Therefore, legislators should act in ways that 
appeal to the majority of voters by making choices consistent with that of the median 
voter.  Analytically, simple regression models subscribing to this theory need only 
contain the quantity of a public good as the dependent variable and the relative per 
unit price of the good and the income of the median voter as explanatory variables.  
The regressions can also include variables that affect states’ tastes for education.56   
 
Political Economic Theories – Representative Democracy  
This system is one where fiscal decisions are delegated to legislative 
representatives who seek election as nominees of political parties.  The behavioral 
translation of this system is a vote maximization model.  It states that political 
representatives are self-interested, and as such will seek to maximize votes so as to 
win election or reelection - and will offer programs and support legislation that most 
closely match the desires of their constituents.  As legislators aim to please voters, the 
empirical specification should emphasize voter characteristics as opposed to legislator 
behavior.  
 
                                                 
56 The work of Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Clotefelter (1976) and Peterson (1976) falls squarely in 
this category. 
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Political Economic Theories – Leviathan  
This view holds that the public sector has a systematic bias built in its fiscal 
system toward overexpansion.  The explanations for this bias guide the empirical 
testing of this model.  Included among these explanations are:  that voting majorities 
only realize the part of public goods costs that they must bear directly, ignoring those 
incurred by the minority; theories also suggest that the actual tax burden is 
underestimated by each voter; other theories are related to deficit financing 
perceptions, public employee voting, bureaucrats and politicians imposing their own 
will instead of that of the voters, campaign financing schemes, political business 
cycles, and alternative taxation schemes.  A simple objective function would specify 
that legislatures seek to maximize the size of state budgets subject to some state 
resource constraint.   
 
Political Economic Theories – Classes and Interest Groups 
This is a simple modification of the median voter model indicating that elected 
officials are in effect “hired” to represent the interests of special interest groups.  The 
pressures applied by interest groups to fire politicians or repudiate their choices forces 
politicians to not deviate from the interests of these groups.  Empirical tests of this 
theory include demographic or monetary variables that proxy for the size of the 
interest group in question.57
 
Political Economic Theories – Human Capital 
Legislative demand for a particular budget item depends on the expected future 
public benefits / externalities from investing in all budget items.  Proxies for the public 
benefits are included in regressions to test this theory.  For example, both Clotfelter 
                                                 
57 Cohen and Noll (1998) and Hoenack and Pierro (1990) are good examples. 
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(1976) and Strathman (1994) include measures of out-migration in their regressions to 
represent a state’s ability to capture benefits from investments in higher education.    
  
Variables Common to All Baseline Equations  
 I take a heuristic approach in determining a baseline model from which to 
begin my analysis.  Measures of wealth (INC) and its square (INC2) are included in 
each regression not only to represent a state’s financial ability to provide public goods 
and services, but also to capture the income effect of prices that have been excluded 
because of separability.58  Therefore, the wealth measures in the EDSHARE equation 
also capture the impact of changing prices of private goods in the branch above it.  
The wealth measures in the HESHARE equation capture the impact of changing prices 
of other public budget items such as corrections, transportation, etc. from the branch 
above it.  Similarly, the wealth measures in the INSHARE equation capture the 
changing price of K12 education. 
There is no requirement specifying that higher education is a normal good in 
the eyes of the legislature.  When income increases, one might expect holding all else 
constant, that state support for higher education increases; however, there may be a 
perception among legislators that as economic conditions improve (and income 
increases), that individuals are better positioned to pay their own educational costs.  In 
fact, previous research on state support for higher education budgets (in levels) has 
been inconclusive about the role of income.  While work by Borcherding and Deacon 
(1972), Strathman (1994) and Goldin and Katz (1999) find that higher education is a 
normal good, Clotfelter (1976), Coughlin and Erekson (1986) and Hoeneck and Pierro 
                                                 
58 As I will discuss in the results section, I test a variety of different specifications for many variables in 
each equation, which is why I do not specify a definition for many items here.  For instance, I analyze 
three different wealth measures in my regressions: median household income in the state, state tax 
revenues per capita and real gross state product per capita.  Median income is preferred because it is 
less likely to be affected by state tax policies or other state institutional characteristics.    
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(1990), find no significant impact and Toutkoshian and Hollis (1998) even find some 
evidence that higher education is an inferior good.  Further, theory does not indicate 
how budget shares will react to changes in state income, and its impact is left as an 
empirical exercise. 
Preferences for different public goods are likely to depend upon the 
distribution of income within states.  For instance, states with income distributed 
tightly around the mean might be expected to support public higher education due to 
the large subsidy that would be available to the middle class.  States with wide income 
dispersion may be less likely to support higher education because wealthy families are 
more likely to pursue private alternatives while less fortunate families may prefer 
scarce resources be allocated to other public goods (for instance, for public 
transportation).   
On the other hand, it may also be the case that states with more unequal 
distributions tend to over-support higher education.  Fernandez and Rogerson (95) 
determined that increases in the level of income inequality make it more likely that 
poorer individuals are excluded from obtaining an education and that their tax 
payments help offset the cost of education obtained by others.  This echoes much of 
the early research on the distributional impacts of higher education such as that done 
by Hansen and Weisbrod (1969a).  If it is the case that the structure of state higher 
education systems effectively redistributes income to the upper- and upper-middle 
class, then one expects to find states with wide income distributions disproportionately 
supporting public higher education.  This issue has been studied in the development 
literature as well.  UNESCO (2003) reports a concern that in countries where income 
is very unevenly distributed, investments in higher education may exacerbate any 
inequalities that are already there.  Further, they express a concern that “These 
challenges include both ensuring that educational opportunities are equitably 
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distributed at all levels of schooling and that the expansion of higher levels of 
education does not come at the expense of maintaining good-quality primary 
education.”  I include an ordinal measure of the income distribution in each regression, 
measured by the ratio of household income for people at the 75th percentile of the 
income distribution to those at the 25th percentile (INEQU).59  I also include an 
interaction term between the income level and income distribution (INCINEQU) to 
capture the differential impacts of income dispersion on education budget shares in 
wealthy versus poorer states.   
Each of the regressions also includes measures of a variety of demographic 
factors.60  If a particular demographic group places substantial demands on the public 
sector, and this raises non-educational government spending, then the shadow cost of 
funds for education spending will rise, and this spending program is likely to contract.  
It is also possible that certain groups do not place high priority on spending for 
education or higher education. In this case, jurisdictions where these voters are more 
important will spend less on education as a result of the different tastes of their voting 
population. 
Discrete measures of the population age distribution are included to capture the 
competing demands of different cohorts within a population.  For instance, college and 
K12 aged children and their parents are likely to support education, while the older 
population (in the absence of preferences for intergenerational transfers), would tend 
not to.  Some of the costs of public higher education inevitably fall upon households 
that do not receive any direct benefits from these services.  For example, elderly 
                                                 
59 I am limited by the CPS data in how I measure income inequality.  I also analyze the impacts of 
including different order statistics, such as the 90-10 ratio, the 90-50 and the 50-10.   
 
60 Median voter models say that demographic variables should not affect state expenditures unless they 
affect the preferences of the median voter.  Despite this, many spending demand studies include 
demographics by claiming that they shift the level of spending that is needed to achieve a given level of 
output, rather than the political support for such spending. 
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households pay sales taxes that are used to finance appropriations.  Elderly residents 
are unlikely to attend college and K12 schools, or have children who attend either, but 
do benefit a great deal from other state programs such as medical expenditures and 
public transportation.  One would then expect to find a negative effect of this variable 
in the first two equations and a positive impact in the third.61  However, what is not 
understood is how changes in the share of the population that is aged are likely to 
affect higher education funding.  The rising number of elderly in a state may result in 
an increase in federal transfers in a state and the elderly may wish to support the 
education and training of state residents to expand the pool of money from which 
federal dollars can be redistributed and also to raise the quality of services received in 
that state.   
Measures of the racial composition within a state are included to test whether 
racial mix affects support for public spending, but they might also proxy for higher 
moments of the income distribution that I may not have captured properly, such as the 
fraction of households with low income levels or the demand for other public budget 
items (e.g. many lower income families reside in large cities and this may increase the 
demand for public spending on transportation).62  A key related explanatory variable is 
how the racial composition differs across different age cohorts.  Independent of a 
group’s own preferences for a public good, they may be more or less willing to 
support funding for a good benefiting another cohort because members of that cohort 
“look like them.” 
                                                 
61 If there is a relationship, I would expect the elderly population to support institutions rather than 
students in the INSHARE equation because in many communities the institutions provide services to 
the general population to take advantage of.  
 
62 An explicit measure of urbanity could be included to capture the differences in the cost of delivering 
school services as well as the differential preferences for school services between urban and rural 
residents.  This variable was highly collinear with unemployment and the racial composition variables 
and is heretofore dropped from the analysis.   
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Out- and in-migration measures are also included.  Rates of return to education 
by states depend upon the fraction of the people a state educates that move out of the 
state and the impact of state expenditures on the migration of educated people.  In 
other words, legislative demand for university instruction depends on the discounted 
future benefits from investing in human capital, which are lower in states with 
significant out-migration (OUTMIG - the state can no longer capture the positive 
externalities and future tax payments from educating a resident).  In addition, the form 
of the state subsidy for higher education would likely depend on the location decision 
of university graduates.  More targeted student aid programs may engender loyalty in 
residents that broad based appropriations may not be able to accomplish.63  I include 
the level of in-migration (INMIG) because higher education spending may not 
represent a fixed benefit to those directly being educated, and may in fact affect the 
decision to move to another state.64   
Different measures of the unemployment rate are included in all three 
equations (UNEMP).  In the EDSHARE equation, unemployment rates capture the 
competing interest for welfare funding and other social programs in a state.  In the 
HESHARE and INSHARE equations, changing unemployment rates reflect changing 
student demand for particular higher education services.  As economic conditions 
worsen, the opportunity cost of attending a university falls, but so too does a student’s 
ability to pay.   
                                                 
63 Groen and White (2003) find that attending a public university increases a marginal in-state student’s 
probability of locating in the state after graduation by more than for similar nonresidents.  However, the 
marginal instaters earn less when they stay than do the nonresidents and hence pay less in taxes.  The 
former effect is larger – so states should prefer residents.  However, nonresidents pay higher tuition – 
which they find more than offsets the tax losses mentioned above. 
 
64 Strathman (1994) finds strong evidence that out migration proxies for benefit spillovers in higher 
education funding, but no evidence that in migration affects higher education funding. 
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Variables Specific to Each Baseline Equation  
The EDSHARE equation includes a measure of the relative price of 
educational services (EDPRICE).  This relative price is calculated as the weighted 
average earnings of public K12 and higher education instructional faculty divided by 
the average earnings of non-educational public employees in a state.   While relative 
cost increases lead to decreased demand, the impact on expenditures and budget shares 
is a priori indeterminate.   The empirical impact of pricing is also clouded by 
endogeneity concerns.  Implicitly my model assumes that legislatures are free to 
purchase as much education and other public goods as they want without affecting the 
price; the only manner by which education expenditures can vary is via shifts in the 
demand function or through variation in prices that shift supply curves vertically.  This 
means that the quantity of education services demanded will primarily change 
expenditures as opposed to the quality of services delivered.  However, the salaries 
that are paid to K12 and higher educational instructors are clearly a function of the 
level of state support provided, and higher salaries likely reflect higher levels of 
educational quality as well.   
While the relative price variable intends to capture the (combined) effects of 
competing budget items in this branch of the utility tree, I also include non-price 
measures that reflect the demand for the largest remaining budget items in the states.  
The demand for medical services (HEALTH) is measured by a variable interacting the 
national health care consumer price index with the share of the population in each 
state that is 65 years old or older.65  The demand for correctional facilities and services 
                                                 
65 Medicaid is a medical assistance program for those who have no other means to pay for necessary 
medical care.  Entitlement is based upon need alone.  While Medicaid is operated primarily by the 
states, the federal government reimburses 50-80% of the funds paid out by a state for Medicaid, as long 
as the state complies with requirements in the federal Medicaid statute regarding services, eligibility, 
estate recovery and other matters.  There has been concern in recent years about reductions in federal 
reimbursements, which is but one reason why Medicaid expenditures have grown the fastest of any 
budget item.  Inasmuch as 10% of Medicaid participants are in the 65 year old and older demographic 
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is proxied by the crime rate (CRIME).66  To control for the impacts of the private 
sector, I include the share of full-time equivalent enrollments in higher education that 
attend private institutions (HEPRV) and the share of K12 enrollments in private 
institutions (K12PRV).  Families that send their children to private schools may 
oppose the use of their tax dollars to support public education.  These variables may 
also capture the importance of historical factors on public education provision.67
Currently 24 states have had their K12 education finance system shifted toward 
more centralized funding as a result of court mandated reforms (to equalize spending 
across districts).  With court decisions pending in many more states, this clearly is an 
important determinant of state education budget shares.  Fernandez and Rogerson 
(1998) constructed a dynamic, general equilibrium  model of public education 
provision, calibrated using US data, to determine that moving from locally to state 
financed K12 education leads to both an increase in average income in the state and 
the share of income spent on education.   A secondary analysis in a seminal paper by 
Murray, Evans & Schwab (1998) estimates that a court ruling in a state caused a 23% 
spending increase on K12 education.68  However, they find no evidence that states 
reduced funding of other budget areas in order to offset this increased spending on 
K12 education.  Though my analysis is not as rigorous as theirs, it is worth turning 
                                                                                                                                            
and 46% are dependent children under age 21 (www.stateline.org), I’d like to include an interaction for 
the latter.  However, I cannot get demographic data by this age grouping.  In the future I hope to find 
participant data by state to include in the regressions.   
 
66 The crime rate is calculated as the number of murders, rapes, robberies, assaults, burglary, larceny 
and motor vehicle thefts per capita.  Admittedly, this measure may also be affected by the level of 
expenditures for corrections, but less so than other measures, such as the number of prisoners in a state.   
 
67 Goldin and Katz (1999) show that state funding for education in a given year is a negative function of 
private enrollments in previous years.  Their paper details the historical influences on public higher 
education provision that are likely to be captured by these share variables.  For example, Massachusetts 
may not need to provide as much public education services as Arizona because of the large private 
infrastructure that has been there since the birth of the nation. 
 
68 Their intention was to determine whether court mandated reform resulted in the stated goals of 
equalizing expenditures across districts within a state.  
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attention to since the number of states that have had their K12 systems overturned 
since the time their paper covers has doubled (there were 12 in 1992). 
I capture the effect of court-mandated equalization of K12 financing by 
including a dichotomous variable equal to one in state-years with a mandated reform 
and zero otherwise (COURT). There are two important considerations.  First, the court 
decisions in each state are very different and this measure does not capture differences 
in reforms across states.  My estimates therefore reflect the average effect of court 
decisions, but cannot capture the effects of any particular decision.  Second, whether a 
state was ordered to reform its finance system may have been a function of low 
previous levels of state support.  Inclusion of state fixed-effects may alleviate some of 
this concern and will allow me to estimate the impact of a program on a state’s budget 
share as it moves from being a non-reform state to being a reform state.   
Finally, per capita transfers from the federal government (FEDTRAN) are 
included because they expand the budget constraint for public sector goods and 
services.69  These transfers are not included in lower branches of the model because 
their impact is captured by the expenditure decision in the branches above it.   
The HESHARE equation is similarly specified.  However, the variables 
relating to non-educational budget preferences and resources are excluded because 
separability implies that the only factors affecting the higher education – K12 funding 
decision are the relative prices of each and the total level of expenditures allocated to 
education.  The price variable that is now included (HEPRICE) is calculated as the 
ratio of average earnings of public higher education instructors to the average earnings 
                                                 
69 There is a large public finance literature studying whether these dollars replace state dollars or 
whether the presence of federal dollars causes state expenditures to expand (i.e. the “flypaper effect”).  I 
will not address these issues in this paper. M  Poterba (94) finds evidence that increasing federal 
generosity does not result in significant state expenditure increases, and only small state tax decreases.   
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of public K12 instructors in a state.  As with the EDSHARE equation, endogeneity of 
the relative price measure is a concern.   
The bottom branch of the utility tree describes the INSHARE equation.  Since 
separability implies that K12 funding factors should not influence the share of higher 
education budgets allocated to public institutions, I exclude the K12 court decision 
dummy and the share of K12 enrollments in privates.  There is no price variable in this 
equation however, because it is not clear what the “prices” of higher education 
institutions and students are.  The baseline specification for this model also includes 
variables that capture the composition of enrollments and student characteristics 
within a state, and other higher education specific variables – though endogeneity may 
be a small concern with some of them. 
While it is not theoretically clear why states would prefer one form of 
financing to another, student grant aid awards are more visible than broad based in-
kind aid policies.  Further, states may believe that they are better able to retain top 
talent through generous grant aid programs.  The average SAT score in a state is 
included (SAT) and is expected to be negatively correlated with the INSHARE, as 
states are likely to use grant aid awards to retain top talent.70  The share of full-time 
equivalent public enrollments that attend two year institutions (TWOYEAR) is 
included as is the number of PhDs relative to the number of bachelors degrees 
awarded at public institutions in the state (PHDBA).71  Each is included to represent 
                                                 
70 As Caroline Hoxby (1998) has pointed out, American higher education has experience a dramatic 
change in market structure during the last 60 years. In 1949 about 93% of all undergraduate college 
students attended college in the state in which they went to high school, this figure fell to about 75% by 
the mid 1990s, and among other factors has been driven by the increased competition for top students at 
the national level.  Rizzo and Ehrenberg (2004) find evidence to suggest that flagship public institutions 
enroll nonresident students in an effort to augment quality. 
 
71 Whether I should include the share of enrollments that are graduate students in any equation is 
debatable.  Graduate students are more expensive and therefore might cause the share allocated to 
higher education to lag.  However, their impact also depends whether a priori they are more likely to 
remain in states than undergraduates.  In addition, the research that is produced by graduate students 
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student demand for financial aid.  Two year institutions are low cost and largely 
funded through local taxes, with states facing lower demand for need-based aid 
awards.  Graduate students (especially in the sciences) are often sponsored by federal 
grants and receive less than 0.7% of need-based and less than 5.0% of non-need based 
aid awards nationwide.72
Though historically many states have had small merit-aid programs, funding 
problems in the late 70s and early 80s nearly extinguished them.73  However, by 2001, 
10 states (re)introduced serious merit based aid programs (AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MI, 
MS, NV, NM, SC) and their political popularity make them an attractive alternative to 
broad-based state institutional appropriations.  I include a dichotomous variable taking 
a value of one in the state-year where merit-based aid programs are prevalent 
(MERIT).  The presence of merit aid would both reduce student demand for need-
based aid and reduce a state’s pool of available resources from which it might fund 
both need-based and institutional aid.  I suspect the substitution effect will dominate 
the income effect in this case, though this is speculation that requires empirical 
confirmation.   
Also included are the proportion of households with incomes below the 
maximum for which they would be eligible to receive a Pell grant (PELL) and an 
interaction between this term and the share of the population that is college-aged 
(PELLPOP).  These are included to determine whether states make explicit attempts to 
                                                                                                                                            
and their advisors may be viewed as more or less useful to the states than the general education of an 
undergraduate.    
 
72 National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs 32nd Annual Survey (2001), Table 
One.  
 
73 For example, the once substantial NYS Regents Scholarship Program ended in 1982 due to lack of 
available funds (Source: various NASSGAP Annual Surveys).  
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capture additional revenues by allowing tuition to rise as more families become 
eligible for federal Pell grants. 
Last, I include the enrollment weighted average nonresident tuition at four-year 
public institutions in the geographical region that the state is located in, excluding 
schools in that state (REGTUIT).  When tuition at public institutions in neighboring 
states is higher, it allows public institutions in the state to increase tuition, increasing 
the demand for need-based aid by instate residents.  Further, Rizzo and Ehrenberg 
(2004) find that nonresident students tend to migrate more when the average tuition in 
their region is higher.  Since state residents do not want to subsidize the children of 
non-taxpayers, it is likely that institutional support will lag under these conditions.   
 
Variables Added to Baseline Models 
 The baseline models above were determined through a heuristic process, 
guided by intuition and the goal of econometric stability.  The latter implies that the 
included variables in each equation were largely invariant to different econometric 
specifications and variable definitions.  For efficiency reasons, it was necessary to 
keep these baseline specifications are simple as possible.  However, I also estimated 
equations that included additional variables.  These variables were excluded from the 
baseline specifications because of suspected endogeneity, extreme multicollinearity or 
due to objections over whether they belonged in the models at all.  The following is 
not intended to read like a laundry list, but rather is indicative of the large number of 
factors that affect state funding for education.       
 Were one to peruse the relevant literature, it would be apparent that the most 
glaring omissions from the baseline specifications are explicit measures of 
enrollments.  Enrollments in both public K12 and higher education institutions are 
very likely a function of government revenues and expenditures themselves, and are 
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also likely heavily correlated with many explanatory variables in the baseline models.  
Since there are no obvious exogenous instruments for enrollments, I address this issue 
in four ways.   
First, the baseline regressions include variables that capture enrollment 
pressures, such as HEPRV and K12PRV as well as measures of the age distribution in 
the population.  Second, I test whether treating explicit measures of enrollment as 
exogenous affect parameter estimates.  I include the level of full-time equivalent 
public higher education enrollments (HE_ENROLL) and the level of public K12 
enrollments (K12_ENROLL) in the EDSHARE equation; I include the ratio of these 
variables in the HESHARE equation and HE_ENROLL alone in the INSHARE 
equation.  Third, I instrument for enrollments using public university tuition, measures 
of the age distribution in the population and the education level of the population as 
exogenous variation.74  Last, I include a measure of a state’s higher education seating 
capacity to proxy for enrollment pressure – which is calculated as the ratio of a state’s 
predicted enrollment in public higher education institutions to its actual enrollment in 
these institutions in a year (CAPAC).75   
One might expect political factors to shift legislative preferences among 
different budget items.  I estimate equations using a variety of combinations of the 
political variables.  Liberal governments might be expected to spend more than 
                                                 
74 It is not clear that these instruments are really exogenous.  Since the IV estimates look identical to the 
non-instrumented regressions including enrollments treated as exogenous (with much higher standard 
errors) I will not report these results. 
 
75 Predicted enrollments are calculated by dividing a state’s full-time equivalent public enrollments in 
1970 by the size of the college-age population in the state in 1970 (ages 18-24) and then multiplying 
this ratio by a weighted cohort size in each year of the study.  If both the share of students going to 
publics and college enrollment rates in a state remained constant over time, then the weight used to 
calculate predicted enrollments in year t would simply be the size of the college age population in year 
t.  Between 1970-2000, the share of students attending publics was stable (between 75-80%), but 
enrollment rates increased nationwide from 28.8% to 42%.  To account for the enrollment rate 
expansion, I allow the population weight to grow as the enrollment rate grows in each year.  I would 
prefer to have used the ratio of seats available in public colleges to the number of its high school 
graduates as a capacity measure, but did not do so because of endogeneity concerns.  
 62
conservative governments, or prefer one type of education service to another.  I 
therefore include an indicator variable which takes a value of one in the state-years 
when the governor is a democrat (GOVDEM).  To determine if political control of the 
statehouse affects funding priorities, included is a dummy variable taking a value of 
one if both the assembly and the senate are controlled by a single political party 
(UNIPARTY).  I also include a dummy variable to control for governor election years 
(GOVELECT) because research has found that political business cycles are marked by 
increased spending and other reflationary policies in periods immediately before and 
after an election (Nordhaus 1975) and that tax hikes and spending cuts are smaller in 
these years (Poterba 1994).   
There may be political benefits associated with the provision of different types 
of education.  According to this view, politicians use logrolling to trade for forms of 
public education that benefit their constituencies. 76  For example, logrolling may have 
led to the creation of a large number of new two year colleges in a sufficiently large 
number of legislative districts in California so as to make the entire education package 
politically viable.  Since most state assemblypersons have a K12 school system and/or 
a community college in their district, they might be expected to support programs in 
the legislature that directly benefit their district.  Many state senate districts include 
multiple K12 school systems and likely include regional public colleges and 
universities.  Thus, state senators might be expected to support more broad based 
                                                 
76 Paul Johnson provides a useful definition of the process on his web page at 
http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/index.html?http://www.auburn.edu/~johnspm/gloss/logrolling.h
tml.  He describes it as “a practice common in the U.S. Congress and in many other legislative 
assemblies in which two (or more) legislators agree for each to trade his vote on one bill he cares little 
about in exchange for the other's vote on a bill that is personally much more important to him. 
Logrolling is especially common when the legislators are relatively free of control by their national 
party leaders and are trying to secure votes for bills that will concentrate sizable benefits on their own 
home districts while spreading most of the costs out over taxpayers in the rest of the country. Local 
projects such as federally funded dams, bridges, highways, housing projects, VA hospitals; job-training 
centers, military bases and the like are often pushed through by logrolling.”  Some papers infer that a 
positive impact of two year enrollments on higher education funding as evidence of logrolling. 
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educational and other initiatives.  To control for these factors, I include a measure of 
the number of assembly seats per the number of senate seats in a state (LEGSEAT).     
Finally, I include the percentage of the voting age population that cast votes in 
congressional elections (VOTE).  High levels of voter interest force legislators to more 
accurately represent their preferences.  In addition, voters may favor more or less 
spending on K12 and higher education because the funding schemes for these budget 
items are largely more transparent than that for other state budget items.  The a priori 
impact of an active populace is unclear however.77
Goldin and Katz (1999) discuss the importance of a state’s industrial 
composition on the structure of its higher education system.  To control for these 
impacts, I include measures of the share of gross state products generated by broad 
industrial categories (GSP*).78  For example, states with significant mining industries 
have historically benefited from the research and extension services produced by 
public land-grant institutions in their state.  On the other hand, states with a majority 
of their productivity generated from financial services may not depend on universities 
for anything more than producing pools of talented individuals to fill its employment 
ranks – which need not come from in-state.  More highly developed states are also 
assumed to require increased levels of societal interdependence, greater need for 
police protection, and externalities requiring governmental regulation and intervention 
that may draw resources away from education (Garland 1988).    
                                                 
77 I’d like to analyze models of bureaucratic behavior by including the number of government 
employees in each budget category (i.e. bureaucrats) in the regressions.  These self-interested 
bureaucrats are likely to push government spending beyond the level represented by median voter 
preferences and may also push spending disproportionately to areas where their numbers are strongest.  
However, government employment is also a function of expenditures and the data I was able to find 
were not sufficient to address this issue.  
 
78 (1) Agriculture, Forest, Fisheries and Mining; (2) Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation and 
Utilities; (3) Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Service; (4) Government Spending; (5) Retail and 
Wholesale Trade. 
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To control for the structure of the tax system in each state, I include measures 
of the share of state general fund tax revenues generated by different sources 
(TAX*).79  Some taxes are more transparent to voters than others and these measures 
may partially pick up the effects of fiscal illusion.80  These measures may also capture 
a state’s ability to raise additional revenues during difficult financial times.   
Among the other variables tested in the models are the education level of the 
population (EDLEVEL), the quality of high school students in a state as measured by 
average SAT scores (SAT), college enrollment rates (ENRATE), and variables 
specific to the higher education system in the state.  These higher education variables 
are included because outcomes are notoriously difficult to measure (and likely 
endogenous) and state government funding for public higher education may well 
depend on the following: total expenditures on research and development at public 
institutions per capita (RND), total annual giving per student at the publics in the state 
(GIVE), total market value of endowment per student at publics in the state 
(ENDOW), the mix of PhD degrees awarded relative to undergraduate degrees 
(PHDBA) and the share PhDs awarded in sciences (SCIPHD). 
 
Splitting the Sample  
The regression estimates from above produce average state responses to 
changes in the various included variables.  However, since there are important 
institutional and demographic differences across states (most if which are time 
invariant), I will test for the presence of identifiable differences in short-run state 
budgetary dynamics that are related to these institutions by splitting my estimation 
                                                 
79 These sources include individual income taxes, corporate income taxes, motor fuels taxes, license 
taxes, lottery revenues, general sales taxes, and other taxes. 
 
80 Voters-taxpayers may not be fully aware of the true composition of government expenditures because 
all types of taxes and expenditures are not equally visible.  
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sample along a number of dimensions.  In other words, while institutional 
characteristics may explain differences in budget outcomes across states, they also 
suggest that educational funding in a state like New York, for example, may respond 
differently to a widening income distribution than a state like Iowa.   
Splitting the sample is preferred to including explicit controls for institutional 
characteristics for four reasons.  First, doing so will increase the homogeneity of each 
estimated sample.  Second, including explicit controls that do not vary over time will 
wash away in panel estimation as all of the variation in fixed-effects regressions are 
identified off of within state changes.  Third, including explicit controls, even if they 
vary over time and are estimable, constrains parameter estimates of the other 
explanatory variables to be the same across different states.  I want to be able to test 
whether different states react differently to changes in the other explanatory variables.  
Fourth, it is very likely that the fiscal institutions represented by these variables are 
themselves endogenous.  For example, states with funding formulae for higher 
education may have also been the states with historically low levels of higher 
education funding – spurring the need for a formula.  Again, to highlight just how 
difficult estimating legislative demand is, I cut the sample according to nine different 
structures. 
Funding formulae were instituted (in 29 states) to assist states in setting higher 
education appropriations levels and to ensure institutional funding continuity by 
linking state funding to enrollments based on pre-defined ratios and expenditure 
rates.81  One might expect EDSHARE and HESHARE to be more affected by 
variables reflecting enrollment pressures in funding formula states than in non-funding 
                                                 
81 MGT of America.  www.mgtofamerica.com . This does not mean that states with funding formulae 
have predictable funding levels.  Quite the contrary occurs.  The determination of the funding formulae 
themselves has become part of the political process, as opposed to determination of funding levels 
directly.  In addition, these funding formulae themselves are not binding as actual appropriations can 
vary from the prescribed amounts. 
 66
formula states.  Further, one may also expect the impact of income, other 
demographics and competing interest groups to be lessened in these states.  Leslie and 
Ramey (1986) found that the relationship between funding levels and enrollments was 
stronger in the formula states while Toutkoushian and Hollis (1998) found just the 
opposite.   
Lowry (2001) points out that most studies on higher education do not account 
for the ability of public universities to lobby the legislature.  States where there are 
fewer governing boards should be able to coordinate lobbying efforts more effectively 
and prevent the lobbying of one institution to cannibalize support for another.  
Therefore, one would expect to find a larger HESHARE in these states than in those 
with less coordinated governance, ceteris paribus.  For example, CA has 2 governing 
boards and a 17% HESHARE while MI has 13 governing boards and a 12% 
HESHARE.  Based on Lowry’s estimates, I split the sample classifying half the states 
as having “relatively autonomous” institutions and the remaining half as having 
“relatively non-autonomous” institutions.  Institutional autonomy comes at the 
expense of state support and one would expect that the link between demographic and 
economic factors and budget shares to be weaker in these states. 
The structure of state budget processes also likely affects how budget shares 
are determined.  Currently 23 states operate on a biennial budget cycle and 37 states 
have granted their governors powers to reduce appropriations levels without 
legislative approval.82  The latter may prevent pork-barrel spending or political 
logrolling while the former might limit the year-to-year variations in the budget shares 
that might otherwise be observed as demographic or economic conditions change. 
I also split the sample based on political institutions.  It might be the case that 
in states where there is less political competition, historical factors play a larger role, 
                                                 
82 National Association of State Budget Officers, Budget Processes of the States.   
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or that higher income individuals and competing interest groups have influence in the 
political process.  In more competitive states, budget outcomes are likely determined 
by representatives taking measures to insure their reelection – we would therefore 
expect the impact of median voter type variables to be larger in these states.  As a 
result, I split my sample in half based on a political competition index created by 
Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993).83  One might also expect that fiscal behavior is 
different when the state executive and legislative branches are controlled by a single 
party.  Multiparty governments are unlikely to reach a consensus on many issues.  
Further, when the government is multiparty, both the governor and legislature are 
politically vulnerable and may be unwilling to take unpopular actions, such as raising 
taxes or cutting spending and would therefore be more responsive to the demands of 
the median voter.  Single party governments may be able to pursue agendas 
independent of voter desires, or have budget outcomes influenced by interest groups 
that help them remain in power. 
Last, I split the sample according to demographic structures.  Estimating 
equations according to population density allows me to capture the scope and 
dispersion of a state’s economic activities as well as to increase the homogeneity in 
the demands for particular public services within each sample.  High density states are 
much more homogeneous in character than the low density states and one would 
expect the impact of competing interests to dominate in states with more dense 
populations.  I also split the sample according to the time periods representing 
inflection points in education funding from figure 1.2 that closely match the timing of 
the previous decades’ recessions.  It will be interesting to determine if education 
funding behavior has significantly changed after each of the earlier recessions – which 
                                                 
83 They calculate an index for each state where 100 represents perfect competition and 0 represents no 
competition.  The average is 38.2 with states in the Southeast generally near the bottom and states in the 
Midwest and Northwest near the top. 
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may provide us with some insight into how states might respond to the current and 
future economic difficulties.  Regressions are also run separately for states in the 
South and the Northeast to better control for historical economic and private market 
factors. 
 
Data 
The analysis in this dissertation involves a broad panel data set which was 
assembled from over 30 different sources.  Appendix table 1 provides a description of 
how each variable was calculated and the sources from which each originated.84  The 
large number of variables, permutations thereof, and assumptions used in creating 
them would merit a volume unto itself.  Therefore, I will limit this discussion to some 
general comments about the data set and the outcome variables I am interested in 
explaining.  
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for six categories of variables used in the 
analysis.  The income and budget measures and the demographic characteristics are 
derived largely from U.S. Census sources, while the enrollment pressure, competing 
interests, political, and higher education specific characteristics are derived from less 
prominent sources.  The table presents data for two representative years (1977 and 
2001) to highlight how each of the explanatory variables has changed over time.  All 
year references represent fiscal years ending on June 30 of the corresponding year 
while all dollar values used in the analysis herein represent constant 1998 dollars. 
 
                                                 
84 Unfortunately, there does not exist a comprehensive “state data book” for all of the information I was 
interested in collecting.  Since much of the data was collected manually, there no doubt exists 
measurement error in many of the variables, though any errors are likely to be unsystematic. 
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Table 2.1 
Summary Statistics for Baseline and Selected Variables and Years 
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Income and Budget Measures:
Median Household Income (1980 earliest) 33,457 24,321 51,100 40,402 28,445 52,744
75-25 Income Ratio  (1980 earliest) 3.1 2.7 3.7 3.3 2.8 4.0
Per Capita Federal Transfers 557 302 1,587 992 533 1,869
Demographics:
Median Age 28.4 23.8 33.5 35.5 27.1 38.9
Share of Population 5-17 25.6 22.0 29.4 20.3 17.6 25.2
Share of Population 18-24 14.4 12.3 17.5 10.5 8.5 15.7
Share of Population > 65 11.4 2.7 17.9 13.4 6.2 18.7
Percent Nonwhite  (1981 earliest) 16.9 1.4 67.0 20.5 3.1 75.7
Share 5-17 Population Nonwhite 20.4 0.6 70.7 25.8 4.3 83.8
Share 18-24 Population Nonwhite 20.0 2.5 63.4 25.3 4.8 75.2
Share >25  Population Nonwhite 15.7 1.2 68.9 21.2 2.2 63.0
Share > 65 Population Nonwhite 11.6 0.4 72.0 11.6 1.0 77.2
Share Pop 25 and Older w/ HS Degree 65.5 50.0 81.5 85.4 78.2 91.7
Share Pop 25 and Older w/ College Degree 15.3 8.3 22.7 25.2 14.8 36.2
In-Migration % (All) (1980, 1990, 2000) 13.0 5.6 32.1 12.0 6.4 27.5
Out-Migration % (All Ages) 10.9 6.3 29.6 9.6 5.7 20.0
In-Migration % (College Age) 21.1 8.4 45.3 21.5 10.3 39.3
Out-Migration % (College Age) 10.8 6.2 29.8 9.5 4.8 20.7
Enrollment Pressure
Share HE Enroll Privates (1999 latest) 21.0 0.0 56.7 23.9 5.0 61.5
Share K12 Enroll Privates (1981 earliest) 9.4 1.6 19.0 9.2 2.4 16.7
Share HE Enroll 2-Years  (1999 latest) 22.5 0.0 53.0 27.3 3.6 56.0
Enrollment Rate (1999 latest) 53.5 6.9 140.0 58.4 30.1 101.2
FTE HE Enrollment (2000 latest) 161,464 9,082 1,074,346 214,367 16,290 1,329,270
K12 Enrollment (2000 latest) 871,775 89,295 4,313,926 934,034 91,757 6,050,609
Capacity 1.23 0.80 2.08 0.82 0.33 2.14
SAT (1980 earliest) 945 784 1,062 1,069 974 1,196
Competing Interests & Economic Conditions: 
Crime Rate (per 100,000) - (1998 latest) 4,968 2,391 8,461 4,714 2,469 7,272
Health (Share >65 x Health CPI) (2000 latest) 6.0 1.4 9.5 32.7 14.9 45.8
Unemployment Rate 7.0 3.3 10.4 3.9 2.2 6.6
Unemp. Rate Nonwhites (1978 earliest) 12.3 0.0 22.2 7.3 0.0 16.7
# States with Court K12 Reform 2 24
GSP Share Finance, Ins, Real Est, Svc (1978 earliest) 25.4 18.4 46.6 37.9 23.1 56.1
Share GF Revs - Corp Income Tax 6.1 0.0 13.7 4.0 1.3 12.4
Share GF Revs - Indiv Income Tax 18.3 0.0 41.9 23.9 0.0 47.1
Share GF Revs - Lotteries 0.4 0.0 3.1 1.8 0.0 8.0
Share GF Revs - Sales Taxes 35.4 4.8 62.4 29.9 1.6 66.7
Political Factors: 
# States with Democrat Governor 37 17
Assembly Seats per Senate Seats 3.02 1.67 16.67 2.95 1.67 16.46
Assembly Seats per 100,000 Population 5.9 0.0 47.3 4.6 0.0 32.0
Senate Seats per 100,000 Population 2.1 0.0 7.9 1.6 0.0 7.3
Voting Participation Rate 52.0 22.4 69.5 51.4 33.4 67.4
Higher Education Factors: 
Endowment per Student (1996 latest) 1,562 58 11,432 2,850 72 21,997
Giving per Student 526 0 2,047 2,824 0 7,282
Ph.D degrees / BA degrees 3.12 1.18 6.78 3.14 1.03 5.57
Proportion HH w/Inc. Below Pell Max 64.4 43.0 76.8 56.7 42.0 71.0
Research Expenditures per Capita 36 8 203 82 29 174
Share Ph.D awarded in Science and Eng. 61.3 33.0 100.0 67.4 35.1 96.3
Avg Instate Tuition at 4-Years (1999 latest) 1,637 829 2,968 3,225 1,960 6,894
Note:  All dollar values are constant dollars
1977 2001
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Table 2.2 displays the level of general fund budget expenditures, education 
budget expenditures and higher education budget expenditures for four representative 
states and the national average, and is useful for assessing the magnitude of the 
impacts of regression estimates presented in the next section.  These data indicate that 
even very small percentage changes in budget shares translate into very large dollar 
amounts.  For instance, a one percentage point increase in the HESHARE in an 
average state would result in an additional $75 million for higher education, and as 
much as a quarter-billion additional dollars in New York.   
 
Table 2.2 
Representative Budget Measures in $millions for FY2001 
General Fund Education Higher Education
(share) (share)
National Average 20,867 7,491 1,231
35.9% 16.4%
Iowa 11,199 4,397 871
39.3% 19.8%
New York 89,237 23,569 3,353
26.4% 14.2%
North Carolina 28,860 11,960 2,452
41.4% 20.5%
Texas 58,183 24,805 4,087
42.6% 16.5%
 
The choice of the general fund as my unit of analysis was made with great 
care.  A state receives revenues from a variety of sources including federal 
government appropriations, bond sales, broad based taxes and earmarked programs.  
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Though average general fund expenditures account for slightly less than 50% of total 
state expenditures, what happens in the state general fund is the best single gauge of 
the financial position and commitment of a state.85  This is because the general fund 
does not include any special funds restricted by law for specific government activities 
or functions, nor does it include monies used to fund ongoing capital projects or from 
other branches of governments.  Therefore, the general fund is the portion of state 
budgets that legislatures and governors have the most appropriative power over in 
order to fund the ongoing operations of the various state budget items.   
Though the Census Government Finance data files report separately budgeted 
expenditures on higher education, the information I use to construct the HESHARE 
and INSHARE variables is obtained from the Center for the Study of Education Policy 
at Illinois State University (called Grapevine).  Grapevine makes great efforts to 
capture the most discretionary portion of state higher education budgets.  The data do 
not include appropriations for capital outlays and debt service, no appropriations from 
monies derived from federal sources, student tuition or fees, auxiliary enterprises and 
other non-tax sources.  For example, all tuition revenues in Texas are collected by the 
state and redistributed to the schools in the Texas system.  These expenditures are 
included in the Census finance files, but not in the Grapevine data.86  From this data, I 
subtract the total amount allocated to private colleges and universities, as reported by 
the NCES’ Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System. 
                                                 
85 NASBO State Expenditure Report, 2001 p.2.  
 
86 One might argue that tuition redistribution is up to the discretion of state legislatures as well, but I 
want to capture the allocation of tax dollars to higher education.  Nonetheless, regression estimates that 
use only census data to compute budget shares are very similar to estimates using the Grapevine data 
and their presentation is therefore suppressed.  
CHAPTER THREE 
WITHIN STATE ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES 
 This chapter presents empirical findings that explain why public education, and 
public higher education in particular, seems to be a diminishing state priority.  The 
estimates should be viewed as linear approximations to the underlying demand models 
discussed in chapter two.  Using state level data for 26 years between 1972 and 2001, 
the first sub-section presents baseline regression results.  The second sub-section 
presents estimates of a model that reconsiders the context in which budgetary 
decisions are made by estimating the extent to which states practice incremental 
budgeting.  The third sub-section discusses a number of simple extensions while the 
fourth summarizes statistical and interpretive challenges. 
 For each of the three outcome measures I specify the error term from equation 
2.5 to be ( ittiit cu εγ ++= ), and propose the following model: 
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This is akin to restating the data as deviations from state means and estimating the 
following equation: 
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The parameters of interest, βk, answer the question, “holding all other factors constant, 
what is the expected change in the HESHARE within a state if some observable factor 
increases by one unit?”87
                                                 
87 The within estimator (often referred to as a “fixed effect” estimator) is a convenient choice to control 
for state specific omitted variables because it allows for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved 
state effect and observed explanatory variables that other estimation strategies do not permit (it is very  
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 The inclusion of state effects (ci) and year effects (γi) allow me to take full 
advantage of the panel nature of the data and understand why budget shares change 
within a state over time.  Inclusion of state effects controls for unobservable state-
specific factors that are constant over time.  These factors might include: climate, 
presence of national parks, high levels of average wages, historical factors, etc. – each 
presumed to vary across states, but to have a constant impact over time within states.  
If the state effects were excluded from these regressions, the answer may be 
misleading if the excluded state effects were correlated with explanatory variables in 
the model.  For example, states with no parkland will have more resources available to 
devote to higher education.  However, if the level of out-migration is negatively 
correlated with the number of state parks, then the estimated effect of out-migration on 
the HESHARE would not only pick up the investment decision that states face, but 
also the impact of a state park system on higher education budgets.  
 Year effects are included in the models to control for unobserved, time-specific 
factors that are constant across all states.  These factors include: changes in federal 
laws, federal court decisions, international conflicts and trade patterns, changes in the 
value of the Pell grant, changes in technology and the education production function, 
etc. – each presumed to change over time, but to impact all states in the same way.88  
                                                                                                                                            
likely in this setting that unobserved fixed factors that affect budget shares also are correlated with 
observed time varying factors.  For instance, the year of statehood is very highly correlated with the 
percentage of college students enrolled in private schools).  Though other strategies may be more 
efficient (which would be important in such a small data set such as the one I employ), the within 
estimator is still consistent.  The unobservable effects are treated as parameters to be estimated in this 
model, which is useful to analyze state preferences for particular budget items. Further, the within 
estimator is useful for making predictions about how states will respond to changing demographic, 
economic or political conditions within a state. 
 
88 Since the explanation of cross-sectional differences in state budgeting for higher education or K12 
education are largely understood (historical factors, private influences, industrial composition in the 
state, demographic structure, etc.), I present these results in the next chapter for comparative purposes.  
The distinction between the within estimator presented in this section and the between estimators is 
worthy of more attention, and is largely ignored in the related empirical literature.   In most cases, it 
would be a large coincidence to observe the same difference in budget share outcomes from observation 
of two different states with a one unit difference in an explanatory variable between them versus 
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Inclusion of time effects also removes the impacts of systematic changes in the 
explanatory variables so that the results presented below reflect within-state responses 
to idiosyncratic shocks alone.  For example, when systematic changes in enrollment 
pressures are controlled for, one might expect to observe smaller changes in budget 
shares when there are idiosyncratic shocks to enrollment pressure, due to competitive 
tax pressures, institutional capacity and other factors unique to a given state.89    
 
Baseline Econometric Estimates  
 I estimate equation 3.2 via ordinary least squares (OLS) for each of the three 
outcome measures I am interested in.  Table 3.1 presents OLS regression estimates for 
the education share (EDSHARE) and higher education share (HESHARE) equations 
while table 3.2 presents OLS estimates for the institutional share (INSHARE) 
equation.  The dependent variables are each defined in percentage point terms, so that 
an estimated coefficient of 2.5, for instance, indicates that an increase in an 
independent variable of 1 unit results in an increase in the relevant share by 2.5 
                                                                                                                                            
observation of a single state that experiences a one unit increase in that same explanatory variable.  
While it might be true that some variables act like this, there is no theoretical reason why all of them 
should.   For example, if I observe two different states, one with a court-reformed K12 finance system 
and the other without, I might expect the HESHARE to be larger in the reform state because this state 
likely had lower state support for K12 education, resulting in the court decision.  On the other hand, if I 
observe a single state before and after the reform decision, I expect the HESHARE to be smaller, 
because this is implicitly what the court mandates. 
 
89 For example, impacts of K12 enrollment changes on HESHARE changes would be net of any 
national trends in K12 enrollments.  It is agreed that rising K12 enrollments were a key factor in the 
growth of state and local spending in the late 50s and 60s as well as in the 90s.  Allowing for year 
effects removes such systematic changes in the size of the school-age population from affecting the 
results in this analysis.   
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percentage points.90  All of the results discussed below are ceteris paribus, holding all 
other factors constant.91  
 The results in column (i) of table 3.1 suggest that changes in the distribution of 
income and age composition within a state are responsible for changes in the 
EDSHARE depicted in figure 1.2.  Each $1,000 increase in real household income 
(INC) results in a 1.3 percentage point loss in education’s share of the overall budget.  
This relationship is nonlinear however and reaches a minimum at $58,000, just beyond 
the distribution of income observed in 2001 (Maryland = $53,000).  The results also 
suggest that the increasing inequality of income (INEQU) has resulted in a fall in 
preferences for public education.  Together, these estimates suggest that changes in the 
distribution of income have accounted for over 100% of the observed changes in the 
EDSHARE since 1972.92  
 
                                                 
90 Models were also estimated using a variety of definitions for most of the independent variables and 
produced qualitatively similar results.  For example, in models where the age distribution is entered 
continuously, I find that the EDSHARE decreases as the median age of the state increases, ceteris 
paribus.  These and other models are available upon request. 
 
91 Though some state level variables do not exhibit great variation year over year, over the entire 30 
year period of the sample there is considerable variation.  Regression results using 3 year moving 
averages or 5 year intervals of data are qualitatively similar to the results reported below.  Further, a 
cursory analysis of the outcome data indicates that the largest changes have occurred for the 
HESHARES.  If one were to rank the states according to the budget share measures, one would observe 
that the rank order correlation on each outcome is not constant over time for the HESHARE, and is 
much more constant for the EDSHARE and INSHARE.   For example, the correlation of state rankings 
on EDSHARE between 1977 and 2001 is 0.67 while the correlation of state rankings on HESHARE is 
0.36 – indicating that changes at the macro-economic level are not solely responsible for changes in the 
HESHARE, but rather state specific factors are important. 
 
92 Real income increased by approximately $6,000 over the entire period, the ratio of income of the 75th 
percentile to the 25th percentile increased by 0.2 points since 1977.   
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Table 3.1 
OLS Baseline Regressions for Education's Share of General Fund Budgets and 
Public Higher Education's Share of the Education Budget - Within Estimates 
*Bold 95% significance, ** italics = 90% (I) (II)
-1.27 * 0.61 *
(0.28) (0.23)
0.011 * -0.004 *
(0.002) (0.002)
-5.13 * 4.12 *
(1.81) (1.52)
-0.41 * 0.22 **
(0.18) (0.13)
0.62 *
(0.12)
0.13 *
(0.04)
1.42
(1.10)
-0.15
(0.14)
0.04 *
(0.01)
0.02 -0.02
(0.05) (0.03)
0.06 -0.13 *
(0.06) (0.06)
-0.56
(0.36)
-0.05 -0.22 *
(0.06) (0.05)
-0.02
(0.06)
0.03
(0.12)
1.18 * -1.19 *
(0.30) (0.25)
Within R2 0.319 0.663
Observations 1300 1300
Out-Migration (share of population in state 5 years ago that does 
not reside here today) (OUTMIG)
In-Migration (share population in state today that did not reside 
here 5 years ago) (INMIG)
Squared Income (INC2)
75-25 Income Ratio (INEQU)
Health Costs (HEALTH)
Crime Rate (CRIME)
Unemployment Rate (UNEMP)
(Nonwhite college pop / Nonwhite K12 pop) *Share Adult 
Population Nonwhite  (RACEINTERACT)
Federal Transfers per Capita ($1,000) (FEDTRAN)
Court Reform State (COURT)
Nonwhite college pop / Nonwhite K12 pop (COLK12RACE)
EDSHARE
Share of Population Aged 5-24 (SCHOOLAGE)
Share of Population > 65 Years Old (ELDERLY)
Share Pop. 18-24 / Share Pop. 5-17 (COLRATIO)
Nonwhite schoolage / Nonwhite non-schoolage 
(SCHOOLRACERATIO)
Median Income in $1,000 (INC)
HESHARE
Notes: All regressions include year effects and dummy variables correcting for missing values that equal 1 when the 
relevant explanatory variable is missing and 0 otherwise.  All also include interactions between income level and 
distribution and EDSHARE and INSHARE include relative price measures, none of which are statistically relevant and 
measures controlling for private enrollment pressures.  In-migration and out-migration for EDSHARE equation are rates 
for entire population while for HESHARE and INSHARE are calculated for college aged population alone.  The missing 
values of the explanatory variables take a value of 0 when the missing dummy equals one.  All within R2 represent 
proportion of within variation in outcome explained by changes in explanatory  variables exclusive of the state effects. 
Standard errors in (parentheses). 
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 The changing age composition within a state produced expected changes in the 
EDSHARE.  Changes in the fraction of the population that is school-aged 
(SCHOOLAGE) were positively correlated with the EDSHARE while an increase in 
the share of the population that is elderly (ELDERLY) caused a fall in the EDSHARE.    
Prior research by Poterba (1997), Case et al (1993) and Borge and Rattso (1995) all 
find a negative correlation between student cohort size and per pupil education 
funding levels.  Though I find a strong positive effect of student-cohort size on budget 
shares, one cannot infer how expenditures per student will fare. While the point 
estimate on the elderly share does not appear large, it implies that by the year 2025, 
when the elderly share is expected to increase by an average of 5 percentage points, 
that education will lose an additional 2 percentage points in state budgetary priority – 
representing nearly a half-billion dollars in an “average” state (2001 dollars).93
 An important finding is that in state-years after a court rules that a state’s K12 
education finance system is unconstitutional (COURT), the share of the general fund 
budget allocated to education increases by 1.2 percentage points.  This result is 
consistent with Murray et al’s (1998) finding that court reforms in 16 states led to an 
average increase in per capita K12 spending of 23%.   
Turning to the HESHARE results in column (ii), I find that in addition to the 
factors that affect EDSHARES in column (i), changes in demographic heterogeneity, 
migration patterns and economic conditions help explain why public higher education 
has been crowded out by K12 education.  While changes in the income distribution 
have worked in HESHARE’s favor, the effects are offset by the losses suffered 
through education’s declining priority in the overall budget process.  Increases in 
household income of $1,000 (INC) result in increases in HESHARE by 0.6 points 
                                                 
93 http://www.census.gov/population/projections/nation/summary/np-t3-f.pdf.  This may also partially 
be picking up the impacts of the increasing Medicaid burden within states, as the elderly make up a 
large fraction of beneficiaries.   
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throughout the entire range of observed income (the maximum is reached at 
$79,000).94  The estimates also suggest that an increase of income inequality within a 
state (INEQU) results in a larger share of the available education dollars being 
allocated to higher education.  This result, while a positive one for higher education, 
may not be in the best interests of society at large.  Previous research by Hansen and 
Weisbrod (1969), Windham (1970), UNESCO (2003), suggest that the economic 
middle and upper class have been able to shift income toward itself in the political 
process using the higher education finance system, and that in places where inequality 
is severe, investments in higher education will exacerbate the existing income 
differentials.95      
 Age demographic shifts have also worked in higher education’s favor.  While 
states are favorably responsive to changes in the relative size of the college aged 
cohort to the K12 aged cohort (COLRATIO), there is also modest evidence that aging 
populations (ELDERLY) look more favorable on higher education than K12 
education. This result may reflect a lower perceived relative tax price for higher 
education by the elderly or a more immediate public benefit perceived to be available 
through financing university research.96
 Taken together, income distribution and age demographic shifts indicate that 
higher education’s share of the education budget should have gone up by nearly 5 
                                                 
94 To highlight, an increase in median income in an average state of $1,000 would result in higher 
education reaping 17% of the education budget as opposed to 16.4%.  However each $1,000 increase in 
median income also results in a decline in the EDSHARE to 34.9% from 36.1% in 2001.  Therefore, 
higher education’s share of the overall budget remains roughly constant at 5.9%.   
 
95 However, Lee, Ram and Smith (1999), Cardak (1999), Hight and Pollock (1973) and Biggs and Dutta 
(1999) present evidence that the system of higher education finance can also be useful to redistribute 
income toward the economically less advantaged.  
 
96 A majority of elderly wealth is concentrated in home equity, from which property taxes are assessed 
to finance local schools.  Further, since income levels are smaller – they pay less (or no) income taxes 
and are often granted discounts on state sales taxes which might be used to finance higher education 
appropriations. 
 79
percentage points since 1977.  Since the HESHARE fell by approximately 6 points, 
other factors must account for an 11 percentage point fall.   
There are two estimates that will help predict why higher education may face 
difficulties in the future, but are not able to explain the observed changes in the past – 
out-migration and unemployment.  While the estimated coefficient on the out-
migration of the college-aged population (OUTMIG) suggests that increases in out-
migration lead states to devote fewer resources to higher education, over this time 
period the average level of out-migration across states has remained fairly constant.97  
Similarly, I find that as the unemployment rate (UNEMP) increases by one percentage 
point, states respond by cutting the HESHARE by .22 points; however, the average 
unemployment rate over this time period fell by 2 ½ percentage points.   
  The estimates in column (ii) suggest a trend that demographic heterogeneity 
can have a very important effect on education spending.  I have included two variables 
in this equation to capture these impacts.  First, I include a variable for the ratio of the 
college-aged population that is non-white relative to the K12-age population that is 
non-white (COLK12RACE).  To see whether the impact of this heterogeneity varies 
according to the racial make-up of the non-school age population in the state, I also 
interact it with the share of the population aged 25 and older than is nonwhite 
(RACEINTERACT).  While not statistically significant, an interesting result is that as 
the college-aged population becomes more nonwhite relative to the K12 population, 
states devote more resources to the population that is “whiter.”  However, the impact 
of this heterogeneity becomes statistically significant and larger when the non-school 
age adult population is more homogeneous.98       
                                                 
97 Though, wages and other factor prices may fall when out migration increases, so lower higher 
education expenditures may not necessarily indicate that lower levels of service are being provided in 
the face of out-migration patterns. 
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 K12 court reforms have had a large impact on the HESHARE.  The estimates 
suggest that as a state moves to more centralized methods of K12 financing (COURT), 
the average impact over time has been to decrease the share of the education budget 
allocated to public higher education by 1.2 points.  In an average state in 2001, this 
represents $90 million more that public higher education would have been allocated in 
the absence of the reform program.  This result somewhat contradicts the work of 
Murray et al (1998).  While they conclude that the increased expenditures on K12 
education did not come at the expense of any other budget item, their study concluded 
in 1994.  Taken together with the EDSHARE result, I find that public higher education 
spending has been partially crowded out by the increased K12 expenditures resulting 
from the K12 court reforms.99
The estimated effects of the independent variables on INSHARES in the left 
hand column (i) of Table 3.2 can be described briefly.  The relationship between 
demographic changes and the share of higher education budgets appropriated directly 
to institutions is strong.  Increases in the share of the population that is college-aged 
(COLLAGE) result in higher INSHARES, so that the subsidy is received by a larger 
pool of people than would otherwise be the case.  However, the size of the college 
aged cohort fell markedly between 1972 and the early 1990s, resulting in a one point 
loss in the INSHARE.  Aging populations tend to support institutions rather than 
students as well.  The Pell grant variables yield interesting results.  As more 
                                                                                                                                            
98 In other words (ignoring the fact that I am estimating changes for a moment), higher education 
funding falls more in states with more heterogeneous racial compositions across different school age 
cohorts.  The more white the non-school age population gets, the more precipitous this fall will be.  
Only a couple of researchers have looked into this variable.  Poterba (1997) finds that different racial 
mix affects funding for K12 education at the state level while Ladd and Murray (2001) do not find 
evidence at the local level.   
 
99 The total loss is near $60 million according to 2001 figures for the average state.  In the absence of 
the reforms, higher education in an average state received 16.4% of the education budget which 
received 36.1% of the overall budget, or about 5.9% of the overall budget.  After the reform, higher 
education receives only 15.2% of the education budget, which received 37.2% of the overall budget, or 
about 5.6%.  The general fund budget in an average state in 2001 was approximately $20 billion.    
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households become eligible for federal Pell grant awards (PELL), it appears that states 
respond by reducing the share of aid awarded to institutions, and that this effect is 
larger when the share of the population that is college-aged (PELLPOP) is larger, 
though the overall magnitude is minimal.  Since more students would be eligible to 
receive Pell grants (and federal subsidized and unsubsidized loans) when tuition rates 
are higher, there is a perverse incentive built into the federal financial aid system that 
encourages states to behave strategically.  I am not being pedantic.  The Chancellor of 
the State University of New York, Robert King, was recently quoted saying,  “I would 
suggest that there should be (a tuition increase) …  … for students whose family’s 
incomes is $50,000 or less, the state’s tuition assistance program picked up the entire 
$950 of last year’s hike …  …  students from most needy families are pretty much 
insulated from this …  … for those families that can afford to pay, eventually, we’re 
gonna say, you gotta pay a little more.”100
                                                 
100 Ithaca Journal, 12/3/03 
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Table 3.2 
OLS Regressions for Institutional Share of Public Higher Education Budgets - 
Within Estimates 
*Bold 95% significance, ** italics = 90% (I) (II)
0.23 0.27
(0.16) (0.17)
-0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001)
1.59 1.67
(1.09) (1.07)
0.38 * 0.38 *
(0.10) (0.10)
0.275 * 0.374 *
(0.116) (0.076)
-0.009 * -0.005
(0.003) (0.007)
0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.02)
-0.09 ** -0.11 *
(0.05) (0.05)
0.03 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
0.019 0.033 *
(0.012) (0.012)
-0.006 -0.005
(0.012) (0.012)
-0.06 * -0.07 *
(0.03) (0.03)
0.0037 ** 0.0039 **
(0.0022) (0.0022)
-0.21 * -0.14
(0.09) (0.09)
-0.15 -0.14
(0.12) (0.11)
0.29 ** 0.31 **
(0.18) (0.17)
-2.86 * -6.89 *
(0.27) (3.49)
0.06
(0.09)
0.12 *
(0.03)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0029 *
(0.0009)
Within R2 0.390 0.411
Observations 1250 1250
MERIT x INC x COLRACERATIO
Share College Enroll Two-Years (TWOYEAR)
Regional Nonresident Tuition ($1,000) (REGTUIT)
PhD Degrees Awarded per BA Degrees Awarded (PHDBA)
SAT (100 points) (SAT)
Merit Aid State (MERIT)
MERIT x INC
MERIT x COLRACERATIO
INC x COLRACERATIO
Proportion Below Pell (PELL)
Share College Enroll Privates (COLPRV)
Share of Population > 65 Years Old (ELDERLY)
Nonwhite college / Nonwhite non-college (COLRACERATIO)
Share of Population Aged 18-24 (COLLAGE)
In-Migration (share population in state today that did not reside here 5 years ago) 
(INMIG)
Out-Migration (share of population in state 5 years ago that does not reside here 
today) (OUTMIG)
Unemployment Rate (UNEMP)
"Psuedo-Experiment"
PELL x COLLAGE (PELLPOP)
Baseline
Median Income, in $1,000 (INC)
Squared Income (INC2)
75-25 Income Ratio (INEQU)
Notes: All regressions include year effects and dummy variables correcting for missing values that equal 1 when the relevant explanatory variable is 
missing and 0 otherwise.  All also include interactions between income level and distribution and EDSHARE and INSHARE include relative price 
measures, none of which are statistically relevant.  In-migration and out-migration for EDSHARE equation are rates for entire population while for 
HESHARE and INSHARE are calculated for college aged population alone.  The missing values of the explanatory variables take a value of 0 when the 
missing dummy equals one.  All within R2 represent proportion of within variation in outcome explained by changes in explanatory  variables exclusive of 
the state effects. Standard errors in (parentheses). 
 
As with the HESHARE, ethnic heterogeneity across age cohorts has an 
important impact on the INSHARE, with the share going to institutions falling when 
the college-aged population becomes more nonwhite relative to the adult non-college-
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aged population (COLRACERATIO).101  Whether this decline is due to an effort to 
direct merit aid away from nonwhites, or because nonwhites have a larger demand for 
state need-based aid cannot be immediately discerned from this result.  I return to this 
important issue in a moment below with a “psuedo-natural experiment” treatment.    
Looking to the bottom panel of the table, the estimates suggest that movement 
to a merit aid program (MERIT) reduces the INSHARE by nearly 3 percentage points.  
Also, as the nonresident tuition rates at public four year institutions in the geographic 
region (REGTUIT) increase, states are increasingly turning to student aid rather than 
institutional appropriations – explaining approximately one percentage point in the 
INSHARE drop.  Again, the reasons for doing so are unclear.  It may be the case that 
higher regional tuitions permit instate publics to charge higher tuitions as well, 
reducing the pressure on direct state support, or reduce the demand for own residents 
leaving the state.  It may also be the case that higher regional tuition signals an 
improvement in school quality, and in an effort to compete with these institutions, the 
state induces its resident students to stay by providing them with larger student aid 
packages. 
Column (ii) presents regression estimates that try to explain the motivation for 
the increasing popularity of state student merit aid programs.  Taking liberty with 
nomenclature and variable interpretation, I accomplish this by including four 
additional variables to the specification in column (i): second order interaction terms 
between the merit aid variable (MERIT) and the median income level (INC); MERIT 
and the relative nonwhite college age population (COLRACERATIO); INC and 
COLRACERATIO; and finally, a fully-interacted variable of MERIT x 
                                                 
101 In results not reported in Table 3.2, it appears as though the effect of the racial heterogeneity is felt 
most acutely by states that are aging fastest.  When an interaction between the share of the population 
aged 65 with the ethnic heterogeneity variable is included in this model, the first order impact of the 
ethnic heterogeneity disappears, but I find that the elderly support for institutions falls as the college 
aged population becomes more nonwhite. 
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COLRACERATIO x INC.102  This fully interacted model is akin to a natural 
experiment approach that answers the question, “Do merit aid states that have heavily 
nonwhite college populations favor broad based institutional aid or more targeted 
student based aid?”  The results are disheartening.  While the impacts of the variables 
in the baseline specification are largely unchanged by the inclusion of the interacted 
variables, the first-order impact of moving to merit aid programs grows dramatically 
to nearly 7 percentage points.  The variable of interest, MERIT x COLRACERATIO x 
INC, which can be viewed as a continuous analog to a “difference-in-difference-in-
differences” estimator, yields a statistically significant negative result.  Considered 
liberally, this implies that while merit aid states with large nonwhite college aged 
populations favor institutional support, these states only do so when income is low.  
When income is high in these states, student aid is preferred – with the somber 
implication that the increasing popularity of merit aid programs has not been 
altruistically motivated.  Targeted, non-means tested programs seem to be used to 
redistribute income to middle- and upper-income families and to avoid providing 
broad-based support to economically disadvantaged members of the populace. 
                                                 
102 For the sake of brevity, I do not present the estimates from intermediate regressions that introduced 
the second order interactions independently.  In each of these regressions, the second-order interactions 
were each statistically significant and of the expected sign.  MERIT x COLRACERATIO yielded 
positive and statistically significant results – indicating that states that move to merit aid tend to favor 
student aid less when the college aged population is increasingly nonwhite – providing support for the 
notion that the rising importance of merit aid programs has been largely a political scheme to attract 
middle and upper class white votes and dollars.  MERIT x INC yields statistically significant negative 
results – which can be interpreted as when income increases in the merit aid states, support for student 
aid is more dramatic than when income increases in the non-merit aid states.   INCx COLRACERATIO 
yields a statistically significant negative result – indicating that when income increases in states with 
relatively more nonwhite college age population, broad based institutional support falls more than when 
a state is less nonwhite in its college age population.  
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Econometric Estimates – Incremental Budgeting 
 The results presented in tables 3.1 and 3.2 have implicitly assumed that 
legislators receive utility from every single dollar budgeted for a specific agency.  In 
other words, the baseline specifications allow the entire budget share to be a decision 
variable.  The inability of the explanatory variables in these models to explain all of 
the declines in the observed budget shares signals that this may not be the case in 
practice. 
It has been suggested that states make funding decisions on an incremental 
basis, with previous budget levels taken as given when determining current budget 
allocations.103  Consider the HESHARE equation as an example.  The interpretation is 
that for any level of budgeted funds for education, the legislators first make 
expenditures for the minimum level of services required to be provided by K12 and 
higher education.  Then with the remaining budgeted funds, they choose the 
increments to these budget levels so as to maximize the branch utility function (branch 
III in figure 1.5), which depends only on the increments to the minimum expenditures, 
not on the absolute levels. 
The empirical implications of this behavior are that rather than estimating an 
equation for the HESHARE that resembles: 
 
ittiitit ecXaHESHARE ++++= γβ  , (3.3) 
 
I would need to estimate an equation that resembles: 
 
                                                 
103 It has also been put forth that budgetary decisions may transition away from incremental budgeting 
in scarce times due to the increased competition for resources when resources are limited.  In these 
cases, other practices may be adopted.  (The Profession of Budgeting. Public Budgeting and Finance 
v10, n2 (Summer 1990): 102-06  Standard No: ISSN: 0275-1100. ) 
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ittiititit ecXaHESHAREHESHARE ++++=− − γβθ 1  , (3.4) 
 
If (3.4) is the correct model, then shifting the lagged dependent variable to the right 
hand side and estimating within state changes will lead to a correlation between the 
error term and the lagged dependent variable, even if the error terms themselves are 
not auto-correlated.  This violation of the orthogonality assumption will not only result 
in biased estimates of θ, but will likely introduce bias in many of the other parameter 
estimates in the model. 
Fortunately, techniques have recently been developed that allow for a 
satisfactory treatment of this complication.104  The even numbered columns of Table 
3.3 present estimates of the baseline equations using the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel 
estimation technique.  While there is some efficiency loss due to the necessity of using 
lagged dependent variables as instruments, as long as the error terms are well behaved, 
the results will be consistent.105  For completeness, I present the results of 
uninstrumented models in the odd numbered columns.  State budgeting would be 
strictly incremental if the estimated effects of the lagged dependent variables were 
each equal to one.  If the coefficients equal zero, then it is the case that the entire 
budget is determined “from scratch” each budget cycle.  Therefore, values of θ  
                                                 
104 To be consistent with the estimates in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, I want to preserve my “fixed effects 
assumption” that the unobserved state specific effects are correlated with the observed explanatory 
variables.  Until recently, dynamic panel estimation techniques were unable to accommodate this 
assumption.  They required an explicit specification of the distribution of ci, and also required that its 
conditional expectation (on X) to be zero.  Instrumental variables generalized methods of moments 
techniques have recently been developed that take first differences of equation (5) and use lagged 
differences or lagged levels of the dependent variables as instruments for the endogenous lagged 
dependent variable.  See Greene (pp. 582-584) and Wooldridge (pp. 412 and 493-495) for more detailed 
discussions. 
 
105 One key assumption is that there is no second order auto-correlation in the first differenced 
idiosyncratic errors.  If errors are auto-correlated, even if only first-order, specification (3.4) is subject 
to bias as both HEi,t-1 and ei,t-1 appear on the right hand side of the equation. 
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Table 3.3 
Dynamic Panel Estimation on Baseline Regressions: Uninstrumented Fixed 
Effects Estimates (Odd Columns), Instrumental Estimates using Dynamic Panel 
GMM Estimator (Even Columns) 
*Bold 95% significance, ** italics = 90% (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.81 * 0.73 * 0.62 * 0.56 * 0.75 * 0.53 *
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
-0.39 * -0.45 * 0.31 * 0.17 -0.057 -0.105
(0.17) (0.23) (0.16) (0.21) (0.115) (0.134)
0.003 * 0.003 ** -0.003 * 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
-1.72 -2.39 ** 1.49 1.78 0.09 0.23
(1.09) (1.45) (1.08) (1.36) (0.76) (0.87)
-0.01 0.12 0.01 -0.07 0.095 0.002
(0.12) (0.22) (0.10) (0.21) (0.074) (0.173)
0.03 -0.09
(0.08) (0.15)
0.15 * 0.44 *
(0.06) (0.08)
0.03 0.04
(0.03) (0.05)
0.90 0.72 -0.003 -0.005 **
(0.72) (1.09) (0.002) (0.003)
-0.06 -0.19
(0.10) (0.13)
0.015 ** 0.04 *
(0.009) (0.01)
0.04 0.04 -0.05 * -0.03 0.003 0.004
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.016) (0.016)
0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.052 -0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.033) (0.03)
-0.33 -0.36
(0.22) (0.28)
-0.05 0.01 -0.13 * -0.15 * -0.032 -0.027
(0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.029) (0.041)
-0.02 0.00
(0.04) (0.05)
-0.13 ** 0.01
(0.08) (0.10)
0.44 * 1.04 * -0.56 * -0.92 *
(0.20) (0.34) (0.19) (0.33)
0.001 0.029 *
(0.008) (0.011)
0.001 0.008
(0.022) (0.025)
-0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
-0.082 -0.158 **
(0.066) (0.096)
-0.086 -0.246 *
(0.083) (0.120)
0.072 0.215
(0.137) (0.215)
-1.39 * -0.83 *
(0.19) (0.29)
Within R2 0.733 0.806 0.708
Observations 1200 1150 1200 1150 1200 1150
HESHARE INSHARE
1-Period Lagged Outcome (LAG)
EDSHARE
Median Income in $1,000 (INC)
Squared Income (INC2)
75-25 Income Ratio (INEQU)
Share of Population > 65 Years Old (ELDERLY)
Share Pop. 18-24 / Share Pop. 5-17 (COLRATIO)
Nonwhite college pop / Nonwhite K12 pop 
(COLK12RACE)
Nonwhite school/collage  / Nonwhite non-
school/collage (SCHOOL/COLRACERATIO)
Regional Nonresident Tuition ($1,000) (REGTUIT)
PhD Degrees Awarded per BA Degrees Awarded 
(PHDBA)
SAT (100 points) (SAT)
In-Migration (share population in state today that did 
not reside here 5 years ago) (INMIG)
Out-Migration (share of pop. in state 5 years ago that 
does not reside here today) (OUTMIG)
Unemployment Rate (UNEMP)
Proportion Below Pell (PELL)
PELL x COLLAGE (PELLPOP)
(RACEINTERACT)
Share of Population Aged 5-24 (SCHOOLAGE)
Share of Population Aged 18-24 (COLLAGE)
Merit Aid State (MERIT)
Health Costs (HEALTH)
Crime Rate (CRIME)
Federal Transfers per Capita ($1,000) (FEDTRAN)
Share College Enroll Two-Years (TWOYEAR)
Court Reform State (COURT)
Notes: All regressions include year effects and dummy variables correcting for missing values that equal 1 when the relevant explanatory variable is missing and 0
otherwise.  All also include interactions between income level and distribution and EDSHARE and INSHARE include relative price measures, none of which are 
statistically relevant.  In-migration and out-migration for EDSHARE equation are rates for entire population while for HESHARE and INSHARE are calculated for 
college aged population alone.  The missing values of the explanatory variables take a value of 0 when the missing dummy equals one.  All within R2 represent 
proportion of within variation in outcome explained by changes in explanatory  variables exclusive of the state effects. Standard errors in (parentheses).  
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between 0 and 1 provide for the possibility that expenditures within any budget 
category can be cut to some extent during that budget cycle.   
It is not surprising the that estimates in Table 3.3 indicate that budget shares 
are determined in part by an incremental process, and in part by a discretionary 
process.  Looking to the EDSHARE results in column (ii), including the lagged 
EDSHARE diminishes the importance of the income distribution and court reform 
variables, while removing the influence of demographic changes on changes in 
education budget shares.  The coefficient on the lagged variable (LAG) indicates that 
in each period, 73% of the EDSHARE budget is preserved, with the remaining 27% 
left to legislative discretion.   
 Including the lagged dependent variables in the HESHARE equation (column 
iv) has a similar impact on its baseline estimates.  Compared to the results in Table 
3.1, column (ii), the impacts of the changing income distribution are removed and the 
magnitude of the court rulings on budget share changes is smaller.  However, the 
ethnic heterogeneity result is robust to this specification change.  As one might expect, 
it appears that legislatures exercise more discretion over the higher education budget 
share determination than they do to the process one branch above, with only 56% of 
the HESHARE determined by the level of HESHARE one period earlier.   
 Moving to the INSHARE equation in column (vi), it appears that legislatures 
exercise discretion over about ½ of this budget decision.  Inclusion of this lag results 
in the loss of importance of the elderly demographic on INSHARES, but also causes 
many of the higher education specific variables to become important.  In particular, I 
find that as the share of college students that attend two-year institutions 
(TWOYEAR) increases, and as the number of bachelors degrees awarded relative to 
graduate degrees (PHDBA) increases, states look more favorably upon institutional 
funding.  This may reflect preferences for undergraduate education, or simply 
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represent the fact that two-year colleges are less expensive to operate than four year 
colleges and that undergraduates are less expensive to educate than graduates.   
To summarize, table 3.3 suggests that legislatures do in fact exercise a great 
deal of discretion over all three budget shares, with the least amount of discretion 
taken at the highest branch on the tree.106  Further, treating the process as incremental 
as opposed to fully discretionary diminishes the impacts of some of the results in 
tables 3.1 and 3.2, but does not have a substantial qualitative impact on the 
interpretation of those results. 
 
Econometric Estimates – Extensions 
 This section presents three simple extensions. First, I present results from 
augmented specifications of the baseline models.  Second, I summarize relevant 
findings from estimation of the baseline models on different sub-samples of the data.  
Third, since the previous estimates indicate that the falling HESHARE cannot be fully 
explained by changes in demographic, economic or income characteristics, I explore 
this issue in a bit more detail by considering the impact of tuition changes.   
 
Augmented Specifications 
Tables 3.4 - 3.6 present results that are similar to those in tables 3.1 and 3.2, 
but added to each baseline specification are groups of variables that capture political 
and voting characteristics (column 1), the sources of state general fund revenues 
(column 2), the composition of gross state product by industry (column 3), higher 
education specific variables (column 4 of tables 3.4 and 3.5) and other demographic 
characteristics (column 4 of table 3.6 and column 5 of tables 3.5 and 3.6).  Since 
                                                 
106 Statistical tests with the null hypothesis that the coefficient on each of the lags is equal to one are 
easily rejected. 
 90
inclusion of any single group of variables had virtually no impact on the original 
baseline estimates, I have suppressed their presentation.107   
The augmented EDSHARE regressions in Table 3.4 yield few notable results.  
The only important political variable is that as the state government moves from 
multiparty control to single party control (UNIPARTY), the education budget share 
increases.108  States’ increasing dependence on individual income taxes (REVINC) 
bodes well for education, though its impact is small.  Each percentage point increase 
in the share of revenues generated from this source results in an EDSHARE increase 
of 0.07 points (the average share of revenues generated from individual income taxes 
increased by 4.6 points from 1977 to 2001).  The results in column (3) suggest that the 
changing industrial composition within a state has had an important impact on 
education budget shares.  Without exception, the results indicate that as the 
importance of all industry sectors increases relative to that of the sectors aside from 
Finance, Real Estate, Insurance and Services (GSPFIRE), education budgets expand.  
However, all of these sectors have seen dramatic decreases in their contributions to 
state economies since 1977.  The results indicate that the changing industrial 
composition has contributed to a 1.6 percentage point drop in the EDSHARE.109
                                                 
107 I do not present models with all of the explanatory variables included due to the enormous 
multicollinearity in the data.  Further, adding this many variables rapidly diminishes the degrees of 
freedom available in an already limited model. 
 
108 Estimates not reported indicate that this result is invariant to the specific party that is in control.  
 
109 The share of gross state product generated from FIRE grew by 13 points between 1978 and 2001.  
The magnitude of the estimate could be retrieved from a regression including only the share of GSP 
from FIRE, and omitting all other GSP variables.  I do not include this variable in the baseline results 
due to its high correlation with the median income variable and the share of schooling that occurs in the 
private sector.  Therefore, it is difficult to assess what this variable represents.  
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Table 3.4 
OLS Regressions for Share of State General Fund Budgets Allocated to 
Education (EDSHARE) - Supplemental Specifications 
*Bold 95% significance (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.19
(0.16)
0.01
(0.01)
0.55 *
(0.17)
-0.28
(0.21)
0.12
(0.17)
0.02
(0.06)
-0.43 *
(0.08)
0.07 *
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.07)
0.04
(0.03)
0.21 *
(0.04)
0.26 *
(0.03)
0.46 *
(0.07)
0.49 *
(0.11)
-0.06 *
(0.02)
-0.13
(0.13)
-0.08
(0.05)
-0.04
(0.03)
R2 0.332 0.330 0.351 n/a
Observations 1300 1300 1300
GF Revenues: Indiv. Income Taxes (REVINC)
GF Revenues: Lottery (REVLOT)
GF Revenues: Sales (REVSALE)
Share GSP: Ag., Forest, Fishing, Mining (GSPAG)
Assembly per Senate Seats (LEGSEAT)
Voter Turnout (VOTE)
State Government Uniparty (UNIPARTY)
Governor Election Year (GOVELECT)
Share Pop >25 with HS degree (EDHS)
Share GSP: Const., Manu., Transp., Utilities 
(GSPCON)
Share GSP: Government (GSPGOV)
Share GSP: Wholesale and Retail Trade (GSPTRADE)
Unemployment Rate - Nonwhites (UNEMPNON)
Nonwhite Unemp / White Unemp (UNEMPRATIO)
Share Pop >25 with College degree (EDCOL)
Governor Democrat (GOVDEM)
GF Revenues: Corp. Income Taxes (REVCORP)
GF Revenues: Fuels (REVFUEL)
Notes: All regressions include year effects and dummy variables correcting for missing values that equal 1 when the relevant explanatory 
variable is missing and 0 otherwise.  The missing values of the explanatory variables take a value of 0 when the missing dummy equals one.  
All within R2 represent proportion of within variation in outcome explained by changes in explanatory variables exclusive of the state 
effects. Specifications (4) was not run using all variables in each model, I have compressed them into one category for presenation purposes. 
All specifications include variables from Table 3.1.  
Moving to table 3.5, the results in column (1) indicate that uniparty 
governments (UNIPARTY) prefer to fund K12 education, and this result does not 
depend on the specific party that is in control (not shown).  The composition of 
political interests within state legislatures, represented by the number of assembly 
seats per senate seats (LEGSEAT), produces an interesting (albeit of small magnitude)  
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Table 3.5 
OLS Regressions for Share of State Education Budgets Allocated to Public 
Higher Education (HESHARE) - Supplemental Specifications 
*Bold 95% significance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
-0.34 *
(0.13)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.37 *
(0.14)
0.08
(0.17)
-0.13
(0.14)
0.12
(0.05)
0.07
(0.07)
0.03
(0.02)
-0.12
(0.06)
0.02
(0.02)
0.00
(0.03)
-0.04
(0.03)
0.07
(0.06)
0.03
(0.09)
0.012 *
(0.006)
-0.32 *
(0.13)
0.26
(0.16)
0.03 *
(0.01)
-0.24
(0.41)
-1.20
(0.66)
-0.36 *
(0.10)
0.00
(0.05)
3.78 *
(1.03)
1.86 *
(0.38)
-0.65
(0.42)
-0.04 *
(0.02)
0.04
(0.11)
0.45
(3.19)
R2 0.664 0.660 0.659 n/a n/a
Observations 1300 1300 1300
Endowment per Student ($1,000) (ENDOW)
Share Pop >25 with College degree (EDCOL)
Capacity (CAPAC)
Unemployment Rate - Nonwhites (UNEMPNON)
Nonwhite Unemp / White Unemp (UNEMPRATIO)
Share PhD Awarded in Science and Engin. 
(PHDSCI)
Merit Aid State (MERIT)
Assembly per Senate Seats (LEGSEAT)
Voter Turnout (VOTE)
State Government Uniparty (UNIPARTY)
Governor Election Year (GOVELECT)
GF Revenues: Sales (REVSALE)
Share GSP: Ag., Forest, Fishing, Mining (GSPAG)
Giving per Student ($1,000) (GIVE)
Governor Democrat (GOVDEM)
GF Revenues: Corp. Income Taxes (REVCORP)
GF Revenues: Fuels (REVFUEL)
GF Revenues: Indiv. Income Taxes (REVINC)
Share GSP: Const., Manu., Transp., Utilities 
(GSPCON)
Share GSP: Government (GSPGOV)
Share GSP: Wholesale and Retail Trade 
(GSPTRADE)
GF Revenues: Lottery (REVLOT)
this result does not vary by political party
Research & Development Expend. Per Capita 
($100) (RND)
Average SAT in 100s (SAT)
College Enrollment Rate (ENRATE)
Weighted Average Nonresident Tuition in the 
Geographic Region in $1,000 (REGTUIT)
Number of PhD degrees awarded per Bachelors 
Degrees Awarded (PHDBA)
Share of Public Higher Education Enrollments in 
Two-Year Colleges (TWOYEAR)
Notes: All regressions include year effects and dummy variables correcting for missing values that equal 1 when the relevant explanatory variable is missing 
and 0 otherwise.  The missing values of the explanatory variables take a value of 0 when the missing dummy equals one. All within R2 represent proportion of 
within variation in outcome explained by changes in explanatory variables exclusive of the state effects. Specifications (4) and (5) were not run using all 
variables, I have compressed them into two categories for presenation purposes.  All specifications include variables from Table 3.1.  
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result.  The estimate indicates that as local representation becomes more prevalent in 
statehouses relative to representation of larger geographic areas, higher education does 
more poorly.110   
The estimates in column (4) also merit discussion, though the higher education 
specific variables may have some degree of endogeneity built into them.  Working up 
from the bottom of this column, there is not strong evidence that HESHARES have 
been falling in response to increases in seating capacity (CAPAC) in public higher 
education institutions.  The positive coefficient on the share of PhD degrees awarded 
in science and engineering (PHDSCI) indicates that states look favorably on higher 
education when it produces highly skilled professionals in emerging science and 
technology fields.  Legislatures are also more supportive of higher education when a 
larger share of students attend two-year colleges (TWOYEAR), presumably due to the 
low cost of these colleges and because their accessibility allows for the subsidy to be 
received by a larger pool of residents.  This may also reflect political factors however; 
as community colleges are more numerous and reside in more political districts than 
their four year counterparts.   
The most dramatic, and concerning, result in table 3.5 is the negative and 
significant coefficient estimate on real private giving per student at public research 
universities within a state (GIVE).  As state funding continues to lag behind, public 
universities have increasingly looked to private donations to supplement their revenue 
streams.  However, some observers have worried that states would view these 
revenues as replacements for future state appropriations, and allow institutional 
                                                 
110 While one might expect this variable to only vary in the cross-section, only 13 states did not change 
the number of assembly seats between 1972 and 2001 and only 10 experienced no changes in the 
number of assemblypersons per senator.  Aside from capturing the impacts of self-interested 
assemblypersons, this variable may also reflect demographic factors, as changes in legislative 
representation and even in district lines are a function of changing population sizes and ethnic 
heterogeneity.   
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appropriations to lag in the future.  Their fears are well founded.  Despite the 
seemingly small point estimate (each additional $1,000 per student raised resulting in 
a 0.36 point loss in the HESHARE), the magnitude of this crowding out cannot be 
ignored, especially in the most recent decade.  For example, public research 
universities in Maine have increased their annual private giving per student by $5,800 
since 1990.  The coefficient estimate indicates that their HESHARE should have 
dropped by 2.1 points as a result – which explains nearly all of Maine’s 2.3 point drop 
over this period.  In fact, for each of the five states that have seen their public 
universities increase per-student giving by over $3,000, the average fall in 
HESHARES has been 6.4 points while the five states that have not increased private 
fundraising efforts since 1990 have seen their shares fall by only 3.9 points.111  This 
result also casts doubt on the ability of public universities to generate rainy-day funds 
or to stockpile appropriations in lush times (as their private counterparts can do), due 
to a fear that future appropriations would be smaller in response.  
Turning to the INSHARE results in table 3.6, the estimates indicate that 
political factors (column 1) are contributing to the decline in institutions’ share of 
higher education budgets.  The estimates indicate that as a state’s voters become more 
active (VOTE), and that as a state moves from a Republican governor to a Democratic 
governor (GOVDEM), student aid increases in attractiveness relative to institutional 
appropriations though the magnitude of these effects is small.112
                                                 
111 I plan to examine this issue in greater detail in the future.  There is an obvious concern about timing 
and/or endogeneity.  With regard to timing, I estimated equations using a 1 period lag of giving and find 
even stronger results – with the coefficient rising to –0.420 (0.104).  I plan to re-estimate this equation 
with an instrument for giving.  See Ehrenberg and C. Smith (2001) for a description of the factors that 
should be included. 
 
112 These results hold when the equation is re-estimated excluding Georgia (Democratic governor Zell 
Miller was the driving force behind the introduction of the large and politically popular HOPE merit 
scholarship program in 1993).   
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Table 3.6 
OLS Regressions for Share of State Public Higher Education Budgets Allocated 
to Public Institutions (INSHARE) - Supplemental Specifications 
*Bold 95% significance (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0.02
(0.10)
-0.03 *
(0.01)
0.04
(0.11)
0.05
(0.13)
-0.27 *
(0.11)
0.06
(0.04)
0.20 *
(0.05)
-0.035 *
(0.018)
-0.06
(0.05)
0.01
(0.02)
0.01
(0.03)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.05)
0.09
(0.08)
-0.027 *
(0.005)
0.90
(0.52)
-0.23 *
(0.07)
-0.03
(0.04)
-3.63 *
(0.81)
0.44
(0.32)
-0.02
(0.01)
-0.14
(0.08)
-0.03
(0.03)
R2 0.320 0.320 0.308 n/a n/a
Observations 1250 1250 1250
GF Revenues: Corp. Income Taxes (REVCORP)
GF Revenues: Fuels (REVFUEL)
Share Pop >25 with College degree (EDCOL)
Capacity (CAPAC)
Unemployment Rate - Nonwhites (UNEMPNON)
Nonwhite Unemp / White Unemp (UNEMPRATIO)
Research & Development Expend. Per Capita ($100) 
(RND)
Giving per Student ($1,000) (GIVE)
Endowment per Student ($1,000) (ENDOW)
GF Revenues: Lottery (REVLOT)
GF Revenues: Sales (REVSALE)
Assembly per Senate Seats (LEGSEAT)
Voter Turnout (VOTE)
State Government Uniparty (UNIPARTY)
Governor Election Year (GOVELECT)
Governor Democrat (GOVDEM)
Share GSP: Ag., Forest, Fishing, Mining (GSPAG)
Share PhD Awarded in Science and Engin. (PHDSCI)
Share GSP: Const., Manu., Transp., Utilities 
(GSPCON)
Share GSP: Government (GSPGOV)
Share GSP: Wholesale and Retail Trade (GSPTRADE)
College Enrollment Rate (ENRATE)
GF Revenues: Indiv. Income Taxes (REVINC)
Notes: All regressions include year effects and dummy variables correcting for missing values that equal 1 when the relevant explanatory variable is missing and 0 
otherwise.  The missing values of the explanatory variables take a value of 0 when the missing dummy equals one. All within R2 represent proportion of within 
variation in outcome explained by changes in explanatory variables exclusive of the state effects. Specifications (4) and (5) were not run using all variables in each 
model, I have compressed them into two categories for presenation purposes.  All specifications include variables from Table 3.2.
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While the estimates of the industrial mix variables (column 3) and other 
demographic variables (column 5) yield no significant results, the variables 
representing a state’s revenue sources (column 2) and higher education specific 
characteristics (column 4) do.  The estimates in column 2 suggest that as states rely 
more on the individual income tax (REVINC), student aid programs grow in 
popularity.  Since so many of the merit based aid programs are funded from lottery 
revenues, it is somewhat surprising that the share of a state’s revenues coming from 
lottery sources (REVLOT) has no impact on INSHARES, though this may be due in 
part to its representing a small overall share of state general fund revenues.  
Though there is a strong negative relationship between the share of PhDs 
awarded in the sciences (PHDSCI) and institutional aid shares, this may simply reflect 
the impacts of targeted student aid programs many years earlier.  As with the 
HESHARE results in Table 3.5, institutional efforts to raise private monies (GIVE) 
seem to be met with retaliatory action by the states.  The estimates in Table 3.6 
indicate that every $1,000 increase in real private giving per student results in 0.23 
points of the higher education budget leaving institutional coffers and going into the 
hands of the students.   
Without any further discussion, it is worth citing the factors that do not seem to 
have an impact on any of the observed budget shares.  These include: the education 
level of the population (EDCOL, EDHS), the level of public K12 and higher education 
enrollments (not shown), higher education seating capacity (CAPAC), the relative 
unemployment of nonwhites versus whites (UNDIF), relative prices (not shown) and 
endowment per student (ENDOW).   
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Econometric Estimates on Sub-Samples of Data  
Table 3.7 depicts how the three budget share measures have changed from 
1977-2001 in different sub-samples of the states.  Though none of the reported 
changes within each category are statistically different from one another at the 95% 
level, several glaring patterns stand out.  It appears that non-reform states, non-
northeast states, low density states and single party states have cut their EDSHARES 
the most, while two-year budget cycle states, court reform states, limited governor 
power states, politically competitive and multiparty states have cut their HESHARES 
the most.  Finally, it appears that students have benefited over institutions in single-
year budget cycle states, in states where governors have substantial appropriative 
power, in dense states and in states controlled by multiple political parties.  
When the baseline models are re-estimated on these different sub-samples of 
data, a number of interesting patterns emerge.  Some of the patterns indicate that the 
baseline results were driven only by a particular sample of states, and some indicate 
that the lack of evidence of impacts in baseline regressions were due to confounding 
effects in different samples.113  Five broad observations are worth highlighting; table 
3.8 summarizes the significant findings. 
                                                 
113 I only report differences that are statistically different with at least 90% confidence.  A complete 
analysis is available upon request. 
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Table 3.7 
Percentage Point Changes in Outcomes by State Institutional Characteristics 
Institutional Characteristic ∆EDSHARE ∆HESHARE ∆INSHARE
Yes (25 states) -3.28 -5.77 -3.58
No (25 states) -3.85 -6.51 -3.51
2-Years (23 states) -3.03 -7.27 -2.81
1-Year (27 states) -4.01 -5.17 -4.17
Yes (24 states) -2.42 -7.15 -3.02
No (26 states) -4.91 -5.22 -4.03
Yes (29 states) -4.23 -5.71 -3.78
No (21 states) -2.63 -6.74 -3.22
Yes (37 states) -3.66 -5.60 -4.26
No (13 states) -3.27 -7.68 -1.52
Yes (9 states) -2.04 -5.69 -4.45
No (41 states) -3.89 -6.24 -3.35
Competitive (25 states) -3.29 -6.77 -3.44
Non-compet. (25 states) -3.84 -5.51 -3.65
Dense (25 states) -2.96 -6.02 -4.77
Less Dense (25 states) -4.17 -6.26 -2.32
Yes (43% of state-years) -5.25 -5.44 -2.62
No (57% of state-years) -2.10 -6.40 -3.92
Notes: Represent 1977-2001 changes.
No raw changes are statistically different across categories at 95% confidence level.
Uniparty states not constant over time, so changes are for inconsistent sample.
Uniparty Government
Governor Can Reduce 
Appropriations w/out 
Approval
New England / Northeast
Population Density
Political Competition
Autonomy of Higher Eduction 
Institutions
Budget Cycle Length
Court Reform State in 2001
Funding Formula
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 First, from estimating each equation separately for the years 1972-1982, 1983-
1992 and 1993-2001, it is apparent that changes in economic factors are increasing in 
importance on EDSHARES and HESHARES over time.  The most concerning 
individual result was that while a one percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate between 1972-1982 resulted in a fall in HESHARES by 0.1 points, today a similar 
increase results in nearly a half point fall in the HESHARE.114   
 Second, I find evidence that states with funding formulas respond more 
dramatically to changes in enrollment pressures than do non-formula states, as 
expected.  Further, very few variables are significant in the HESHARE equation 
estimated on the formula states, indicating that funding formula states may do a better 
job at insulating higher education from the budget axe than non-formula states.   
 Third, there is evidence that changes in competing interests (HEALTH, 
CRIME) and federal transfers (FEDTRAN) have a substantial impact on EDSHARES 
depending on the sub-sample of states one looks within.  For example, in states where 
governors have power to reduce appropriations without legislative approval, and in 
states that operate on a two-year budget cycle, increases in federal grants per capita 
result in sizable decreases in the education budget share.  Further, I find evidence that 
the increasing cost of health care has crowded out education in states that operate on a 
single-year budget cycle, in states with multi-party governments, in states where 
governors have significant power, and especially in high density states.   
 Fourth, the impacts of racial heterogeneity on the HESHARE and INSHARE 
equations have been increasing over time.  With respect to the HESHARE, increasing 
ethnic heterogeneity across age groups have led to the largest declines in states that 
                                                 
114 It is also worth noting that the positive impact of SAT on INSHARES in table 3.2 is due to the 
positive effect this variable had on institutions in the 1970s.  There is a statistically significant, and 
sizable, negative effect in the most recent decade – indicating that as high school student quality 
increases, states are increasingly turning to student aid programs, likely in an attempt to keep these 
students from leaving the state.  
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exercise more control over its public institutions, in non-formula states and in those 
where governors have significant power over appropriations cuts.  Further, in the 
INSHARE equation, increasing ethnic heterogeneity has caused institutional shares to 
fall in states with annual budget reviews, in less densely populated states and in those 
with a high degree of political competition. 
 Fifth, though column (ii) of table 3.1 indicates that an aging state population 
looks favorably on higher education, it turns out that this result is driven by the impact 
the aging population had in the 1970s.  Regression estimates indicate that in the 1990s, 
as the share of the population that is over 65 increased by one percentage point, the 
HESHARE fell by 0.56 points.  This effect is statistically different than the effect in 
the 1970s with more than 99% confidence.  Further, the impact (favorable) of aging in 
the HESHARE and INSHARE equations is driven by states outside of the Northeast.  
There is also evidence that the impact of an aging population has larger effects when 
political competition is greatest. 
 
Tuition 
 Tuition rates at public higher education institutions are determined by the level 
of state support (Lowry 2001, Rizzo and Ehrenberg 2004), and are often times 
implicitly set by the legislatures or governors in a state.  In just one of many examples, 
the state of Massachusetts and the University of Massachusetts agreed to keep tuition 
very low in the 1990s in return for strong support from the state, but are now 
considering changing this policy.115  In any case, just as federal legislators are loathe 
to increase the maximum value of the Pell grant due to concerns about the “Bennett 
                                                 
115 Jeffrey Selingo, Chronicle of Higher Education, 2/27/03.  Under Governor Romney’s plan, the 
state's flagship public campus, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, would be spun off "to 
become a premier research university." Making it independent from the system, the governor said, 
would allow the institution to increase tuition rates to be more in line with other public flagships so it 
could "more successfully recruit out-of-state students and compete for top research faculty and grants." 
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Hypothesis”, state legislators may respond to increasing tuition rates by cutting future 
appropriations, giving rise to a cycle of further tuition increases and budget cuts.  
Higher tuition rates may also cause future appropriations to be cut simply because they 
generate distaste for higher education.  Since, tuition rates are also likely a function of 
a long history of state appropriations as well, it would be very difficult to estimate its 
impact on current budget shares.   
The results of several papers uncover mixed evidence on the concurrent 
relationship between state appropriations and tuition in the cross-section.  Lowry 
(2001) finds no evidence that tuition rates affect state appropriations at the 
institutional level; Koshal and Koshal (2000) find limited evidence of a relationship in 
a single year state level analysis; and Strathman (1994) finds that states that charge $1 
more in tuition tend to have lower state appropriations by 93 cents.  Though the 
authors each attempt to control for the endogeneity of tuition, these cross-section 
results are likely confounded by omitted variables, and cannot be used to conclusively 
say how within a state funding for higher education is expected to change as tuition 
rates increase.   
I re-estimate the HESHARE regression including a one-period lag of the 
enrollment weighted average tuition at four-year public institutions in a state as an 
explanatory variable.116  Coefficient estimates on the one-period lagged tuition suggest 
that when tuition increases by $1,000 one year prior to this budget cycle, legislatures 
respond by cutting the HESHARE by 3.4 points.  Though the estimates of the other 
explanatory variables in the model are unaffected by this change, I also test a 
                                                 
116 Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests indicate that in changes the one period lead, the current period level and 
one period lag are all endogenous in the HESHARE equation.  Tests also indicate that the two-period 
lead and two-period lag are not endogenous.  The test is executed by regressing the suspected 
endogenous variable on all other exogenous variables and computing the residuals from this regression.  
The test for endogeneity is simply a t-test on the coefficient of this residual when it is included in the 
original outcome equation along with the suspected endogenous variable.   
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specification in which the one-period lag of tuition is instrumented for by lagged 
values of variables that are expected to have an impact on tuition, but that might not be 
expected to directly impact HESHARES one year later.117  The results are striking and 
indicate that when lagged tuition increases by $1,000 within a state, HESHARES are 
slashed by 6.3 points, with no resulting changes in the other estimated parameters.   
Though these results should be viewed with caution, they are very 
suggestive.118  Real average public tuition rates at four-year institutions have grown by 
approximately $1,500 since 1972.  The coefficient estimate above indicates that 
HESHARES fell by almost 9.5 percentage points as a result of increasing tuition rates 
– explaining a majority of the missing 11 percentage point decline from above.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis and Interpretations 
That so little of the fall in HESHARES seems to be explained by changes in 
observable factors suggests that the functional forms of the baseline estimates are mis-
specified.  However, log-log, linear-log and log-linear specifications, among others, do 
not yield any addition insight into these causes.119   
There are statistical and pragmatic concerns that will influence the way the 
results should be interpreted.  Since the outcomes of interest in my estimating 
equations are proportions with restricted values between zero and one, one would 
suspect that my data are not normally distributed.  However, scatter plots of both 
                                                 
117 These variables include combinations of: enrollments, share of enrollments in two-year programs, 
share of enrollments in graduate programs, regional nonresident tuition rates, average faculty salaries 
(or a proxy for this), share of enrollments in private higher education, share of PhD awarded in 
sciences, research dollars per faculty in the state and some specifications with further lags of tuition.  
 
118 For instance, some schools will increase tuition in a year in anticipation of future appropriations cuts, 
making it difficult to disentangle the impacts of tuition and state support on each other.  
 
119 These estimates are available in the appendix to my dissertation.  Log-log specifications indicate that 
the income elasticity in the EDSHARE equation is –5 and in the HESHARE equation is +5.  These 
results simply suggest that the education budget is less income elastic than the overall general fund 
budget and that the higher education budget is more elastic than the overall education budget. 
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EDSHARE and HESHARE both within and across states indicate that this is not the 
case, while the distribution of INSHARE appears to be slightly skewed to the right.  
Regardless, estimates of regressions that “normalize” the data yield qualitatively 
identical results to the raw data, so I eschew their presentation here.  A second concern 
is that OLS regression predictions are not restricted to fall between zero and one.  
Again, this is of little concern in this paper because all of the predicted values from my 
OLS regression estimates fall within this range, and also because regressions 
estimated using a logit-transformation of the budget shares produce similar results to 
the non-transformed regressions.120
 While the previous concerns were largely cosmetic, the following two are 
more substantial because they have the potential to affect the parameter estimates in 
each of the regressions.121  The first concern results from the long time-series 
contained in my panel.  I have found evidence that the crucial orthogonality 
assumption required for OLS estimates to be unbiased is violated due to time series 
correlation in the regression residuals.  I computed the residuals from all three baseline 
regression equations and estimated a variety of regressions of these residuals on their 
one and two period lags.  The results indicate that approximately 2/3 of the variation 
in today’s residuals can be explained by one-period lagged residuals.  When the 
second lag is added, the same total amount of variation is explained, except with ½ 
                                                 
120 A logit transform of a variable Y is ln[ Y / (1-Y) ].  Also called the “log-odds” ratio, this 
transformation results in the regression predictions being constrained between 0 and 1.  
 
121 An issued analyzed more deeply in my dissertation is whether or not these three equations are 
determined simultaneously, and more specific, recursively.  If one believes that changes in the 
EDSHARE affect changes in the HESHARE, and that changes in the HESHARE affect changes in the 
INSHARE, then finding that the higher branch budget allocations are endogenous in the lower branch 
equations would cast doubt on the validity of the separability assumption.  Preliminary results indicate 
that OLS and IV estimates of the higher level budget shares in the lower level equations are vastly 
different, though the remaining exogenous variables are unaffected.  In part, the results indicate that 
each percentage point increase in the EDSHARE results in a 0.6 point fall in the HESHARE while a 
one point increase in the HESHARE results in a 0.6 point fall in the INSHARE.  However, I should 
caution that these estimates have not satisfactorily controlled for the spurious negative correlation 
introduced between the budget share measures.   
 105
due to the one-period lag and 1/6 due to the two-period lag.122  If included explanatory 
variables are correlated with these lagged residuals, then the parameter estimates in 
my regressions will be biased.  This bias may be exacerbated when lagged dependent 
variables are added to the model.123
 The second concern is that the prices included in the EDSHARE and 
HESHARE equation are endogenous.  Aside from the obvious fact that the earnings of 
public employees are a function of the level of state support for that particular budget 
item, in the case of education, higher earnings are highly correlated with educational 
quality – which might also be a choice variable for the legislature.  To complicate the 
interpretation of the price variables, in some states it is the case that higher education 
is heavily subsidized by the federal government in ways which are not at all related to 
federal taxes, therefore the relationship between the true marginal cost of higher 
education and the price as seen by voters/legislatures is unstable (Alexander 2001, 
Bound et al 2001).124
Nonetheless, regression estimates in equations that attempted to control for the 
potential endogeneity of the price variables were very similar to those where the prices 
were dropped, or treated as exogenous.  As a result, for expository purposes, the 
                                                 
122 This is true both in states that operate on a single year budget and on a biennial budget, so another 
factor must be causing this correlation. 
 
123 Using methods derived in Baltagi and Wu (1999) I re-estimate the baseline models attempting to 
control for the autocorrelation in two ways.  Both methods do a bit of violence to the reported baseline 
estimates in that there is a substantial loss of efficiency and the impacts of the elderly, unemployment 
rate and court reforms disappear in these models.   
 
124 A detailed discussion of the treatment of price variables can be found in an appendix to work in 
progress.  To summarize, statistical tests of the price endogeneity in both the EDSHARE and 
HESHARE equations provided mixed results.  The tests amount to including residual values from 
regressions of the suspected endogenous variables on all of the exogenous variables in the original 
outcome equations.  Simple t-tests on the residual in these augmented regressions indicated that prices 
are exogenous in the EDSHARE equation and endogenous in the HESHARE equation.  
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relative price measures were included exogenously in the above baseline 
regressions.125
The results should be interpreted with caution because included variables may 
not only capture the demand for education spending, but also differences in 
technology or other supply factors within states with different demographic and other 
characteristics.  For example, it may seem reasonable to exclude OUTMIG from the 
higher education production function, and so impacts on HESHARE from changes in 
migration likely result from demand side factors alone.  However, changes in the size 
of the college-aged cohort are more difficult to interpret because economies of scale 
could make it possible to deliver the same education to larger cohorts with less than 
proportional increase in spending.   
Policymakers should be concerned with the true functional form of legislative 
utility functions.  This understanding is important to know whether certain marginal 
conditions require influence, or rather an expansion of the budget is necessary to 
improve the fortunes of public higher education.  If the underlying utility function 
depicted by my utility-tree is homothetic, then the cost of reaching higher levels of 
utility must be proportional to the level of utility – budget shares are independent of 
utility levels and wealth levels.  If this is the case, then simply increasing the size of 
the education budget will do nothing to alter the increasing substitution of K12 for 
higher education services.  Consumer demand studies typically reject this functional 
form.  In a rough attempt to understand this, I re-estimated the HESHARE and 
INSHARE equations by including a measure of the total size of the education budget 
in the HESHARE equation and the size of the higher education budget in the 
                                                 
125 In the EDSHARE equation, one instrument for the relative price of education instructors to non-
education employees was an estimate of the share of education employees that are unionized relative to 
the share of non-education public sector workers that are unionized.  In the HESHARE equation, the 
instrument was an estimate of the share of public higher education instructors that were unionized to the 
share of all education instructors that were unionized.  
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INSHARE equation.  The estimates on the budget levels indicate that increasing the 
size of the education budget will not affect the HESHARE, but increases in the size of 
the higher education budget, lead to a smaller share of resources going to 
institutions.126   
The results presented above may be hard to interpret literally because there 
may be cross-variable utility effects associated with higher education spending.  For 
example, spending on public higher education may reduce the incidence of crime and 
thereby raise the utility of everybody, not just the college aged population when 
additional dollars are allocated to higher education.  Therefore, my estimates may 
overstate the direct importance of cohort sizes and other variables on budget share 
changes.  This difficulty is related to the fact that it is nearly impossible to control for 
all factors that affect state legislative decisions.  For example, I do not include 
information on state-wide programs involving property tax limits.  Though their 
impact on budget shares is unclear, their use is increasing across the country, and 
varies by income and demographic conditions – which may explain some of the 
variation in the estimated coefficients on these variables above.  The impact of these 
property tax exemptions on a variety of outcomes is something I will investigate more 
deeply in the future. 
Finally, the aggregated data used in state-level analyses abstracts from a large 
degree of within state heterogeneity in the explanatory variables, which likely affects 
budget outcomes.  If this heterogeneity is constant over time, then my within 
estimation techniques will control for it, however, there is reason to believe that 
variables such as the homogeneity of households with college aged children have 
changed over time.  Future work should make greater efforts to incorporate this 
variation.   
                                                 
126 There is spurious negative correlation in these estimates which will be addressed in future work. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
POOLED ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATES 
 
 This section presents empirical findings that seek to explain why public 
education budgetary equilibriums vary across states.  For each of the three outcome 
measures, the following model is proposed: 
 
itt
K
k
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. (4.1) 
 
This is akin to restating the data as deviations from annual means and estimating the 
following equation: 
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The parameters of interest, βk, answer the question, “holding all other factors constant, 
what is the expected difference in budget shares between two states if they differ in 
some observable factor by one unit?”  Inclusion of the γt (i.e. “year effects”) in 
equation 4.1 allows for the intercept term to vary by year and controls for unobserved 
aggregate time-specific effects that have the same influence on budget shares across 
all states.  These factors might include: changes in federal laws and court rulings, 
cohort quality, immigration patterns,  international conflicts and trade patterns, 
changes in the value of the Pell grant, changes in technology and the education 
production function, etc. – each presumed to change over time, but to impact all states 
in the same way.  The cross-section estimator would be biased if year effects were 
excluded and if unobservable state-invariant, time-specific factors are correlated with  
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explanatory variables in the models.127 For example, higher education institutions 
were given a 15 year grace period to comply with the federal mandatory retirement 
law passed in 1979 (it made mandatory retirement illegal).  If this law resulted in an 
average increase in the “price” of higher education nationwide, then the estimated 
effect of HEPRICE on HESHARE would not only pick up cross-state budget share 
differences as a result of price differences, but also cross-state differences in the 
impact of the mandatory retirement law change on budget shares.128   
 I estimate equation 4.1 using pooled OLS, controlling for heteroscedasticity.  
The baseline estimates presented in this chapter are not corrected for serial correlation 
because tests of serial correlation do not reject the null hypothesis that no serial 
correlation exists in the data.129  The test I ran was simply including lagged residuals 
from regressions of equation 4.1, , into equation 4.1 and running a t-test on the 
coefficient of these lagged variables.  I was unable to reject the null in any of the three 
outcome regressions.  As acknowledged in chapter three, pooled OLS estimates of β
1−
∧
itε
k, 
are not likely to be consistent if fixed state factors are unobservable and correlated 
with the explanatory variables in my model.130  This inconsistency does not mean the 
                                                 
127 A true cross-section estimator would be recovered from a separate regression for each of the 26 
years of data and allowing the coefficients to vary each year.  Due to a limited number of observations 
and a less than parsimonious specification, I pooled all of the data and included year effects to allow the 
intercept to vary by year.  My use of the term “cross-section” refers to the latter of these specifications, 
which should more properly be referred to as a “pooled cross-section.” 
 
128 For instance, if two states differed only in the average age and tenure of higher education faculty 
members, one might expect to observe a lower HESHARE in “older” state as a result of the mandatory 
retirement law change, not because this state responds differently to price changes than other states. 
 
129 Estimates from pooling the sample and running OLS and from running various specifications of 
feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) were nearly identical, so I present the OLS findings in this 
paper for simplicity. 
  
130 In order for pooled OLS estimates of βk to be consistent for the true βk two conditions must hold.  
First, there must be orthogonality between the regression residuals and the explanatory variables in each 
time period.  Second, the matrix of explanatory variables must satisfy a rank condition that does not 
allow for any perfect linear dependencies on the right hand side.  The presence of time-invariant state 
specific factors violates the first of these assumptions in most cases. 
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answer to the question of what explains cross-sectional differences is wrong, rather it 
indicates that what explains differences across states and changes within states may in 
fact be different.  I will address this issue in the next chapter. 
 
Baseline Estimates 
 Table 4.1 presents pooled OLS regression estimates for the education share 
(EDSHARE) and higher education share (HESHARE) equations while table 4.2 
presents pooled OLS estimates for the institutional share (INSHARE) equation.  The 
dependent variables are each defined in percentage point terms, so that an estimated 
coefficient of 2.5, for instance, indicates that if two states differ in the value of an 
independent variable by 1 unit, all else equal their budget shares can be expected to 
differ by 2.5 percentage points.131  All of the results discussed below should be 
considered as taking place holding all other factors constant, including the impact of 
private schooling alternatives, migration patterns and the age distribution of the 
population in each state. 
 It is commonly believed that the observed declines in education spending, and 
higher education spending in particular, have occurred as a result of the increasing 
costs of health care (Medicaid) in states as well as explicit pressures to fund other 
budget items.132  At best, my empirical findings provide tepid support for this view in 
the cross-section.   
The results in column (i) of table 4.1 suggest that states with older populations 
(ELDERLY) do not spend less on education than their younger counterparts.  Further,  
                                                 
131 Models were also estimated using a variety of definitions for most of the independent variables and 
produced qualitatively similar results.  For example, in models where the age distribution is entered 
continuously, I find that the EDSHARE is smaller in states where the median age is higher, ceteris 
paribus.  These and other models are available upon request. 
 
132 Kane and Orszag for example. 
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Table 4.1:  Pooled Cross-Section OLS Regressions for Education's Share of 
General Fund Budgets & Public Higher Education's Share of Education Budget 
*Bold 95% significance (I) (II)
0.24 -0.23
(0.44) (0.27)
-0.012 * 0.002
(0.004) (0.002)
-5.81 * -0.19
(2.73) (1.73)
0.32 0.27 *
(0.20) (0.06)
1.05 *
(0.09)
0.02
(0.05)
-1.79
(1.16)
-0.52
(0.41)
-6.51 *
(1.37)
-1.41 *
(0.32)
0.05 *
(0.01)
0.19 * -0.13 *
(0.10) (0.05)
-0.31 * 0.08
(0.13) (0.09)
-0.17 * 0.00
(0.04) (0.04)
-0.14 * -0.05 *
(0.01) (0.01)
2.27 * 0.96 *
(0.42) (0.23)
-6.44 *
(2.14)
-0.20 * -0.76 *
(0.10) (0.07)
0.06
(0.12)
0.71 *
(0.14)
0.98 * -0.03
(0.33) (0.22)
Adjusted R2 0.544 0.508
Observations 1300 1300
Relative Higher Education Price (HEPRICE)
Out-Migration (share of population in state 5 years ago that 
does not reside here today) (OUTMIG)
(Nonwhite college pop / Nonwhite K12 pop) *Share Adult 
Population Nonwhite  (RACEINTERACT)
Health Costs (HEALTH)
Crime Rate (CRIME)
Nonwhite college pop / Nonwhite K12 pop (COLK12RACE)
Federal Transfers per Capita ($1,000) (FEDTRAN)
Court Reform State (COURT)
Unemployment Rate (UNEMP)
Share of Population Aged 5-24 (SCHOOLAGE)
In-Migration (share population in state today that did not reside 
here 5 years ago) (INMIG)
Median Income in $1,000 (INC)
Squared Income (INC2)
75-25 Income Ratio (INEQU)
Share of Population > 65 Years Old (ELDERLY)
Share Pop. 18-24 / Share Pop. 5-17 (COLRATIO)
Relative Education Price (EDPRICE)
EDSHARE HESHARE
South
Share of K12 enrollments in private schools (K12PRV)
Share of Higher Education enrollments in privates (COLPRV)
Nonwhite schoolage / Nonwhite non-schoolage 
(SCHOOLRACERATIO)
Notes: All regressions include year effects and dummy variables correcting for missing values that equal 1 when the relevant 
explanatory variable is missing and 0 otherwise.  All also include interactions between income level and distribution.  In-
migration and out-migration for EDSHARE equation are rates for entire population while for HESHARE and INSHARE are 
calculated for college aged population alone.  The missing values of the explanatory variables take a value of 0 when the 
missing dummy equals one.  All R2 are adjusted R2 and standard errors in (parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
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cross-state heterogeneity in health care costs (HEALTH) does not explain differences 
across states in education budget shares.  After Medicaid expenditures, the second 
fastest growing item in state budgets has been corrections.  Once I control for differing 
income distributions and employment conditions across states however, I find the 
counterintuitive result that states with higher crime rates spend larger shares of their 
budgets on education than states with lower crime rates.133     
Including the unemployment rate (UNEMP) in this regression directly controls 
for the health of the labor market in a state (and therefore the demand for social 
program expenditures such as unemployment insurance) and indirectly for the demand 
for Medicaid services (caseloads expand as the economy stagnates under means-tested 
entitlement programs).  While the estimated effect of unemployment on EDSHARES 
is significant at the 95% level, its magnitude is very small.  The coefficient of -0.2 
indicates that if one state differs from another (ceteris paribus) solely by having an 
unemployment rate that is one percentage point higher, that state will spend 0.2 points 
less on education.  For 2001, the standard deviation in the unemployment rate across 
states was just about 0.9 percentage points, which suggests that 95% of the states (48 
of them) would fall within 3.6 percentage points in their unemployment rates, and 
have an expected spread in their EDSHARES by less than ¾ percentage points.  The 
actual spread in EDSHARES in 2001 for the middle 95% of states was 23 points, so 
differences in unemployment rates do not explain very much of this variation. 
An important finding is that in the 24 states where courts have ruled K12 
education finance systems unconstitutional (COURT), the share of the general fund 
                                                 
133 This may either be a result of reverse causality (i.e. states that spend a larger share of their budgets 
on education must spend a smaller share on corrections, and therefore crime rates are higher), or the 
possibility that states spend a larger share of their budgets on education when crime rates are higher 
because of the belief that a more highly educated population will promote a more civil society.  A third 
possibility is that more educated people become more sophisticated and more accomplished criminals.  
There is a large empirical literature devoted to this issue and I will eschew any meaningful discussion of 
it in this chapter. 
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budget allocated to education is approximately one percentage point higher.  
Therefore, ceteris paribus, states that have taken efforts to reform their K12 finance 
systems spend approximately $210 million more on education than their counterparts.   
It appears that a substantial portion of the cross-sectional differences in 
preferences for funding education emanate from differences in cross-cohort ethnic 
heterogeneity across states (SCHOOLRACERATIO).  I find that states where the 
school age population is more nonwhite than the adult non-school age population 
spend a considerably smaller portion of their budgets on education than do states with 
more homogenous cross-cohort populations.  The point estimate suggests that if two 
states differ in this factor by one percentage point, their EDSHARES will differ by 6½ 
percentage points. The range of the SCHOOLRACERATIO variable for 2000 was one 
percentage point, and therefore is attributable to a $1.365 billion difference in 
educational spending between the most homogeneous and heterogeneous states if the 
size of the discretionary budgets in each state were equal to the national average.  
Last, while differences in the levels of income across states do not appear to 
explain EDSHARE differences, heterogeneity in the dispersion of income does.  
States with more unequal distributions of income (INEQU), as measured by the ratio 
of household income for households at the 75th percentile relative to those at the 25th 
percentile, spend much less on education than do states with more equal distributions 
of income.  To clarify the significance of the point estimate of -5.8, consider that the 
standard deviation of INEQU in 2001 was 0.3 and that all 50 states fell within three 
standard deviations of the mean of 3.3.  The income distribution was much more 
unequal in states like New York and Mississippi (approximately 4.0) than in states 
such as Utah and Minnesota (approximately 2.8). The point estimate therefore 
suggests that if New York and Minnesota were equal along all other dimensions aside 
from INEQU, the difference in EDSHARES between them would be 7 percentage 
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points or about $1½ billion if the size of the discretionary budgets in each state were 
equal to the national average. 
Turning to the HESHARE results in column (ii), the salient findings are those 
variables that do not appear to affect higher education’s share of the education budget.  
Unlike the EDSHARE results above, neither differences in the levels and dispersion of 
income across states explain differences in HESHARES, nor do the 24 states that have 
mandated K12 court reforms behave differently than the 26 that have not.  Differences 
across states in the relative cost of higher education to K12 education also do not 
explain any differences in higher education budget shares.   
Two additional results deserve mention.  If state legislatures follow the multi-
stage choice process described earlier, the crowding out of higher education due to 
changing pressures from other budget items would only be realized through income 
effects via the impact of other budget items on the EDSHARE.  If the states do not 
follow this procedure directly, or if the variables representing competing budget items 
also capture other factors affecting preferences between higher education and K12 
education, then inclusion of these variables in the HESHARE equation may produce 
estimates that are statistically different than zero.  While my inclusion of the 
unemployment rate in the HESHARE equation was intended to address the latter of 
these two issues, it is conceivable that the first holds as well.  Nonetheless, the 
estimates in column (ii) suggests that states with higher unemployment rates, ceteris 
paribus, spend a larger share of their education dollars on K12 education.   
Last, just as with education’s share of the general fund budget, it appears that 
states systematically shift resources away from under-represented segments of the 
population.  In states where the college aged population is relatively more non-white 
than the K12 aged population (COLK12RACE), a larger share of education dollars are 
spent in the K12 sector.  Further, the magnitude of this impact is largest in the states 
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where the adult non-college aged population is more white (RACEINTERACT).  
Though the point estimate on COLK12RACE is rather large, the difference between 
the 95% most heterogeneous and most homogeneous states on this factor is only 0.4 
percentage points – translating into a 0.56 expected difference in HESHARES based 
on this racial heterogeneity alone. 
The estimated effects of the independent variables on INSHARES in Table 4.2 
can be described briefly.  The 10 states with substantial merit scholarship programs 
give 2.2 percentage points less to institutions than do states without merit programs.  
On average, this represents $160 per student less funding than for institutions in merit 
states than those in non-merit states.  The small, but positive, coefficient on SAT 
scores provides some evidence for the notion that states with more talented pools of 
prospective college students will choose to invest more in public higher education 
institutions than in states with less talented high school students.134
Just as in both the EDSHARE and HESHARE equations, it appears that states 
use the INSHARE to shift resources away from underrepresented segments of the 
population.  The negative estimate on COLRACERATIO suggests that states with 
more cross-cohort ethnic heterogeneity target more funding to students than do states 
with more homogenous populations.  In other words, in states with substantial 
minority populations of college age residents (relative to adults), higher educational 
resources are less likely to be distributed in the form of generous across-the-board 
subsidies that all residents can benefit from and more likely to be targeted to specific 
students.  Though the motivation for this distribution of funds cannot be ascertained 
from these regression estimates, looking at how cross-cohort ethnic heterogeneity 
                                                 
134 In results not shown, it appears that the magnitude of this effect is much larger in states with smaller 
shares of students enrolled in private schools. 
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affects each of the three funding decisions is indicative that malevolent forces may be 
at play.    
 
Table 4.2:  OLS Regressions for Institutional Share of Public Higher 
Education Budgets - Cross-Section Estimates 
*Bold 95% significance
-0.10
(0.36)
0.007 *
(0.003)
2.74
(2.45)
0.14 *
(0.07)
0.66 *
(0.23)
-0.05 *
(0.01)
0.03
(0.06)
0.05
(0.10)
0.71 *
(0.24)
-0.23 *
(0.06)
-0.16 *
(0.01)
-0.009
(0.008)
0.07
(0.06)
0.002
(0.005)
0.00
(0.13)
-0.51 *
(0.08)
0.57 *
(0.20)
-2.17 *
(0.63)
Adjusted R2 0.438
Observations 1250
PELL x COLLAGE (PELLPOP)
Median Income, in $1,000 (INC)
Squared Income (INC2)
75-25 Income Ratio (INEQU)
Share College Enroll Privates (COLPRV)
Share of Population > 65 Years Old (ELDERLY)
Nonwhite college / Nonwhite non-college (COLRACERATIO)
Share of Population Aged 18-24 (COLLAGE)
In-Migration (share population in state today that did not reside here 5 years ago) (INMIG)
Out-Migration (share of population in state 5 years ago that does not reside here today) (OUTMIG)
Unemployment Rate (UNEMP)
South
Share College Enroll Two-Years (TWOYEAR)
Regional Nonresident Tuition ($1,000) (REGTUIT)
PhD Degrees Awarded per BA Degrees Awarded (PHDBA)
SAT (100 points) (SAT)
Merit Aid State (MERIT)
Proportion Below Pell (PELL)
Notes: All regressions include year effects and dummy variables correcting for missing values that equal 1 when the relevant explanatory variable is missing and 0 
otherwise.  All also include interactions between income level and distribution.  In-migration and out-migration for INSHARE are calculated for college aged 
population alone.  The missing values of the explanatory variables take a value of 0 when the missing dummy equals one.  All R2 are adjusted R2 and standard errors in
(parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
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Augmented Specifications 
Tables 4.3 – 4.5 present results from models that are identical to those in tables 
4.1 and 4.2, but added to each baseline specification are groups of variables that 
capture political and voting characteristics (column 1), the sources of state general 
fund revenues (column 2), the composition of gross state product by industry (column 
3), and various combinations of higher education specific and other demographic 
variables (column 4).  Since inclusion of any single group of variables had virtually no 
impact on the original baseline estimates from tables 4.1 and 4.2, I have suppressed 
their presentation.135   
The augmented EDSHARE regressions in Table 4.3 indicate that differences in 
the political climates across states contribute significantly to differences in preferences 
for funding education.  Most notably, states in which the governor is a democrat 
(GOVDEM) and in which the entire government is run by a single party 
(UNIPARTY) spend a larger share of their discretionary budgets on education than 
states with republican governors or with jointly controlled governments.136  These 
results, coupled with the negative effects of voter turnout (VOTE) and local 
representation in state congress (LEGSEAT), suggest that education funding is not 
what gets people elected. 
                                                 
135 I do not present models with all of the explanatory variables included due to the enormous 
multicollinearity in the data.  Further, adding this many variables rapidly diminishes the degrees of 
freedom available in an already limited model. 
 
136 Estimates not reported indicate that the UNIPARTY result is invariant to the specific party that is in 
control.  
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Table 4.3:  OLS Regressions for Share of State General Fund Budgets Allocated 
to Education (EDSHARE) - Supplemental Specifications 
*Bold 95% significance (1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.45 *
(0.08)
-0.05 *
(0.02)
1.88 *
(0.43)
-0.31
(0.37)
0.63 *
(0.28)
-0.27 *
(0.06)
-0.05
(0.11)
0.16 *
(0.02)
-0.61 *
(0.09)
0.12 *
(0.02)
0.07
(0.04)
0.21
(0.03)
0.05
(0.06)
0.78
(0.12)
0.02 *
(0.01)
2.52 *
(0.38)
R2 0.588 0.625 0.589 n/a
Observations 1300 1300 1300 1300
Share GSP: Const., Manu., Transp., Utilities (GSPCON)
Share GSP: Government (GSPGOV)
Share GSP: Wholesale and Retail Trade (GSPTRADE)
Share Pop >25 with College degree (EDCOL)
Assembly per Senate Seats (LEGSEAT)
Voter Turnout (VOTE)
State Government Uniparty (UNIPARTY) (interact is negative and significa
Governor Election Year (GOVELECT)
Governor Democrat (GOVDEM)
GF Revenues: Corp. Income Taxes (REVCORP)
GF Revenues: Fuels (REVFUEL)
College Enrollment Rate (ENRATE)
GF Revenues: Indiv. Income Taxes (REVINC)
GF Revenues: Lottery (REVLOT)
GF Revenues: Sales (REVSALE)
Share GSP: Ag., Forest, Fishing, Mining (GSPAG)
Notes: All regressions include year effects and dummy variables correcting for missing values that equal 1 when the relevant explanatory variable is missing and 0 otherwise.  
The missing values of the explanatory variables take a value of 0 when the missing dummy equals one.  All R2 are adjusted R2 and standard errors in (parentheses) are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity.  Specification (4) was not run using all variables in each model, I have compressed them into one category for presenation purposes.  All 
specifications include variables from Table 4.1.  
The results in columns (2) and (3) indicate that states that are dependent upon 
businesses to generate revenues, particularly those in financial services, prefer to fund 
non-education budget items.  This can be inferred from the negative estimates on the 
share of general fund revenues coming from corporate income taxes (REVCORP) and 
the positive coefficients on the share of gross state product coming from sources other 
than finance, real estate and insurance businesses (the omitted GSP category).  These 
regressions already control for income levels and private schooling alternatives in the 
states, so these results likely are capturing the impact of business interest groups on 
state spending or some other factors that affect preferences for education spending. 
 119
 Moving to table 4.4, the results in columns (1) and (4) merit some discussion.  
The political variables in column (1) suggest that democratic governors prefer to fund 
K12 education over higher education and that states in which larger shares of the 
legislature are composed of local representatives (assemblypersons) as opposed to 
regional representatives (senators) prefer to fund K12 education.  The latter result is 
not surprising given the likelihood that most assemblypersons have elementary and / 
or secondary schools in their voting district, but a far smaller number have a post-
secondary institution in their district.   
Though the higher education specific variables may have some degree of 
endogeneity built into them, the results in column (4) are notable nonetheless.  Two 
surprising findings are that states do not seem to make higher education funding 
decisions conscious of nonresident university tuition rates in their region (REGTUIT) 
and that states in which the quality of public higher education is high spend a smaller 
share of their education dollars on higher education than states in which the quality of 
public higher education is not high (BARRONS).  Rather, my findings suggest that 
those states that fund higher education more generously are taking a utilitarian 
approach to doing so.  This can be seen by three results.  First, states which graduate a 
larger percentage of PhDs relative to BAs spend more on higher education (PHDBA) 
presumably because PhDs are more highly skilled and whose services are not easily 
substitutable.  Second, states in which undergraduate enrollments are more 
concentrated in two-year colleges as opposed to four-year colleges spend more on 
higher education (TWOYEAR).  The community colleges typically offer a substantial 
number of vocational degree paths and serve their communities by providing job 
retraining programs and even job training programs for businesses located nearby.  
Finally, states with higher quality high school graduates (SAT) will spend a larger 
share of their education dollars on higher education.   
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Of concern to those in higher education should be two results that suggest that 
states view private dollars as replacements for public support of higher education.  The 
results indicate that states whose public colleges generate more private giving (though 
this is not statistically significant) and those whose colleges have built substantial 
endowments spend a smaller share of their educational dollars on higher education 
than their counterparts.  The magnitude of this endowment result is substantial.  The 
difference in endowment per student from the “wealthiest” states to the “poorest” 
states (in terms of endowments) in 1996 was approximately $18,000 per full-time 
equivalent student.  The point estimate suggests that if the wealthy states and poor 
states were identical along all other factors except endowment wealth and with 
education budgets at the national average level, their HESHARES would differ by 6½ 
points – or about $500 million (about $3,000 per student).   
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Table 4.4:  OLS Regressions for Share of State Education Budgets Allocated to 
Public Higher Education (HESHARE) - Supplemental Specifications 
*Bold 95% significance (1) (2) (3) (4)
-0.18 *
(0.04)
0.07 *
(0.01)
0.23
(0.24)
-0.14
(0.25)
-0.48 *
(0.18)
0.08 *
(0.04)
0.46 *
(0.07)
0.03 *
(0.01)
-0.18 *
(0.07)
0.00
(0.01)
0.20 *
(0.02)
0.13 *
(0.02)
0.17 *
(0.04)
0.45 *
(0.07)
0.00
(0.00)
0.70
(0.09)
0.06
(0.01)
1.63
(0.17)
-0.93
(0.53)
-0.11
(0.10)
-0.36
(0.04)
-3.42
(1.08)
-0.91
(0.27)
-2.16
(0.38)
0.93
(0.24)
R2 0.560 0.552 0.541 n/a
Observations 1300 1300 1300 1300
Research & Development Expend. Per Capita ($100) (RND)
Average SAT in 100s (SAT)
Weighted Average Nonresident Tuition in the Geographic Region in 
$1,000 (REGTUIT)
Number of PhD degrees awarded per Bachelors Degrees Awarded 
(PHDBA)
Share of Public Higher Education Enrollments in Two-Year Colleges 
(TWOYEAR)
Share GSP: Const., Manu., Transp., Utilities (GSPCON)
Share GSP: Government (GSPGOV)
Share GSP: Wholesale and Retail Trade (GSPTRADE)
GF Revenues: Lottery (REVLOT)
GF Revenues: Corp. Income Taxes (REVCORP)
GF Revenues: Fuels (REVFUEL)
GF Revenues: Indiv. Income Taxes (REVINC)
Public Higher Education Quality (Barron's)
Assembly per Senate Seats (LEGSEAT)
Voter Turnout (VOTE)
State Government Uniparty (UNIPARTY)
Governor Election Year (GOVELECT)
GF Revenues: Sales (REVSALE)
Share GSP: Ag., Forest, Fishing, Mining (GSPAG)
Governor Democrat (GOVDEM)
Giving per Student ($1,000) (GIVE)
Endowment per Student ($1,000) (ENDOW)
Share Pop >25 with College degree / Share Pop >25 HS Grads
Capacity (CAPAC)
Share PhD Awarded in Science and Engin. (PHDSCI)
Notes: All regressions include year effects and dummy variables correcting for missing values that equal 1 when the relevant explanatory variable is missing and 0 
otherwise.  The missing values of the explanatory variables take a value of 0 when the missing dummy equals one.  All R2 are adjusted R2 and standard errors in 
(parentheses) are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  Specification (4) was not run using all variables in each model, I have compressed them into one category for presenation 
purposes.  All specifications include variables from Table 4.1.  
The findings in table 4.5 can be described briefly.  States which rely on 
lotteries to generate sizable portions of their revenues prefer to fund student aid over 
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institutional appropriations (REVLOT).  This is not surprising given that many of the 
merit based aid programs in the United States are funded from dedicated lottery 
revenues.  Just as in the HESHARE results above, supporters of public higher 
education institutions should be concerned that states in which public colleges 
generate more annual giving (GIVE) and accumulate larger endowments (ENDOW) 
than their counterparts will spend considerably less on institutions relative to students.  
The combined effects of these two estimates suggest that if two states were identical in 
all aspects aside from giving and endowment levels at their public colleges, and one 
state were at the top end of this private fundraising distribution and the other at the 
bottom, their INSHARES would be expected to differ by almost 3 percentage points.  
In other words, states in which public colleges take measures to ensure long-term 
fiscal health will provide institutional appropriations per student at approximately 
$225 below states whose colleges do not take such measures. 
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Table 4.5:  OLS Regressions for Share of State Public Higher Education Budgets 
Allocated to Public Institutions (INSHARE) - Supplemental Specifications 
*Bold 95% significance (1) (2) (3) (4)
0.54 *
(0.05)
0.05 *
(0.01)
0.54
(0.29)
-0.10
(0.28)
0.03
(0.20)
-0.08 *
(0.03)
0.86 *
(0.07)
-0.087 *
(0.009)
-0.18 *
(0.07)
-0.07 *
(0.01)
0.12 *
(0.02)
0.07 *
(0.02)
0.23 *
(0.04)
0.19 *
(0.09)
-0.014 *
(0.006)
0.33
(0.71)
-0.34 *
(0.10)
-0.11 *
(0.05)
-2.12
(1.35)
2.25 *
(0.32)
0.02
(0.13)
-0.64 *
(0.27)
R2 0.492 0.549 0.456
Observations 1250 1250 1250 1250
Share Pop >25 with College degree (EDCOL)
Capacity (CAPAC)
Regional Nonresident Tuition ($1,000) (REGTUIT)
Research & Development Expend. Per Capita ($100) (RND)
Giving per Student ($1,000) (GIVE)
Endowment per Student ($1,000) (ENDOW)
GF Revenues: Indiv. Income Taxes (REVINC)
Assembly per Senate Seats (LEGSEAT)
Voter Turnout (VOTE)
State Government Uniparty (UNIPARTY)
Governor Election Year (GOVELECT)
Governor Democrat (GOVDEM)
GF Revenues: Corp. Income Taxes (REVCORP)
GF Revenues: Fuels (REVFUEL)
GF Revenues: Lottery (REVLOT)
GF Revenues: Sales (REVSALE)
Share GSP: Ag., Forest, Fishing, Mining (GSPAG)
Share PhD Awarded in Science and Engin. (PHDSCI)
Share GSP: Const., Manu., Transp., Utilities (GSPCON)
Share GSP: Government (GSPGOV)
Share GSP: Wholesale and Retail Trade (GSPTRADE)
College Enrollment Rate (ENRATE)
Notes: All regressions include year effects and dummy variables correcting for missing values that equal 1 when the relevant explanatory variable is missing and 0 otherwise.  The 
missing values of the explanatory variables take a value of 0 when the missing dummy equals one.  All R2 are adjusted R2 and standard errors in (parentheses) are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity.  Specification (4) was not run using all variables in each model, I have compressed them into one category for presenation purposes.  All specifications include 
variables from Table 4.2.  
Finally, states that have excess seating capacity (CAPAC) at their public 
colleges give a considerably larger share of higher education dollars to institutions 
than do states that have run up against capacity constraints.  For example, the 
University of California and California State University Systems in the 2004-2005 
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academic year do not have enough room to accommodate all of the students that 
would normally be qualified to attend these institutions.  As a result, the state of 
California has agreed to award scholarships (in the amount of the total tuition bill) to 
any of these students that choose to matriculate at a community college rather than a 
Cal State or UC school.137
 
Estimates on Sub-Samples of Data  
Table 4.6 depicts how the three budget share measures varied in 2001 in 
different sub-samples of the states.  Though none of the raw differences within each 
category are statistically different from one another at the 95% level, the magnitudes 
of several differences are substantial.  There are four factors that seem to be correlated 
with favorable treatments toward higher education institutions.  In states that have 
higher education funding formulae, in states outside of New England, in states where 
there is little political competition and in states with low population densities, the 
outcome measures are considerably larger.  In addition, institutional support is favored 
over student support in states operating on biennial budget cycles, in states where 
colleges have little autonomy, where governors have limited power to reduce 
appropriations and where the governments are controlled by a single party.   
                                                 
137 Peter Y. Hong. “Cuts Will Detour Some Students Bound for UC, Cal State.”  Los Angeles Times, 
03/07/04. 
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Table 4.6:  2001 Outcome Levels by State Institutional Characteristics 
Institutional Characteristic EDSHARE HESHARE INSHARE
Yes (25 states) 36.20 16.49 91.91
No (25 states) 35.88 16.32 96.34
2-Years (23 states) 36.75 16.47 95.47
1-Year (27 states) 35.49 16.39 92.16
Yes (24 states) 36.52 15.68 94.31
No (26 states) 35.66 16.47 93.10
Yes (29 states) 36.93 17.13 94.14
No (21 states) 34.88 15.43 93.05
Yes (37 states) 36.34 16.49 92.59
No (13 states) 35.31 16.22 96.78
Yes (9 states) 29.99 13.54 88.57
No (41 states) 37.40 17.05 94.80
Competitive (25 states) 35.25 15.93 92.26
Non-compet. (25 states) 36.89 16.93 95.10
Dense (25 states) 35.05 15.94 91.36
Less Dense (25 states) 37.09 16.90 96.01
Yes (43% of state-years) 36.00 16.40 94.75
No (57% of state-years) 36.11 16.16 93.06
Notes: No raw differences are statistically different across categories at 95% confidence level.
Political Competition
Autonomy of Higher Eduction 
Institutions
Budget Cycle Length
Court Reform State in 2001
Funding Formula
Uniparty Government
Governor Can Reduce 
Appropriations w/out 
Approval
New England / Northeast
Population Density
 
Despite these large raw differences, the conditional means are nearly identical 
for each sub-sample (not shown) and most of the baseline findings from tables 4.1 and 
4.2 are maintained when the models are re-estimated in these different sub-samples.  
Several exceptions merit attention however and table 4.7 summarizes the statistical 
results. 
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Re-estimating the baseline regressions after splitting the sample into the 25 
most densely populated and the 25 least densely populated states provides useful 
insight into why different states exhibit different preferences for funding education 
rather than other budget items.  Court mandated elementary and secondary school 
district spending equalization initiatives seem to lead to larger EDSHARES in rural 
states that have them (relative to rural states that do not have them), while leading to 
lower EDSHARES in more densely populated states that have them (relative to urban 
states that do not have them).  The negative impact of cross-cohort ethnic 
heterogeneity in the baseline model is most dramatic in the less densely populated 
states.  Further, I find evidence that the lack of importance in health care costs in 
explaining cross-sectional differences in education funding preferences may be due to 
the finding that health care costs lead to a crowding-out of education in the rural states 
while health care costs seem to be related to a crowding-in in the more urban states.  
At first glance, it is hard to understand why education budget shares would increase 
when health care costs increase, but this might be due to the fact that health care costs 
are capturing very large improvements in the quality of health care in these states, 
which is understood to have a synergistic relationship with worker productivity, and 
perhaps education investments.   
Turning to the decision to fund higher education versus K12 education, it 
appears that factors affecting preferences for higher education funding are comparable 
in most sub-samples of states, with the exception of states with higher education 
funding formulas and in densely populated states.  It is not very surprising that in 
funding formula states, those that have undergone court mandated elementary and 
secondary school equalization initiatives do not differ in their preferences for funding 
higher education from those that have not.  This is not surprising because the cross-
section estimates do not capture changes in the formulas over time (which might be 
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impacted by the court mandated equalization programs), only the fact that higher 
education spending in these states is a function of the composition of enrollments – 
which is not impacted by the court mandated reforms to K12 education.   
The impact of cross-cohort ethnic heterogeneity is driven by the large effect in 
densely populated states.  While the baseline estimate in table 4.1 suggests that if two 
states differ in COLK12RACE by one percentage point, their HESHARE will differ 
by 1.4 percentage points, within the sub-sample of densely populated states, a one 
percentage point difference in this cross-cohort ethnic heterogeneity variable would 
suggest that the more heterogeneous states give 3 percentage points less to higher 
education than their homogeneous counterparts. 
Moving to the INSHARE results, I find that the lack of an impact of regional 
tuition rates explaining cross-state differences in INSHARES is likely due to the fact 
that states that within the group of states that grant their colleges and universities 
substantial governing autonomy, those in areas where regional tuition is high have 
significantly lower INSHARES than in those where regional tuition is low.  By 
allowing INSHARES to fall, this is an implicit allowance by these states to have their 
public colleges and universities increase tuition rates in response to regional tuition 
pressures.  On the other hand, within the states that exert a strong amount of influence 
in institutional governance matters, states in areas where regional tuition rates are high 
have larger INSHARES than in the states where regional tuition rates are low.  The 
large difference in INSHARES explained by differences in the availability of merit aid 
programs is primarily seen in the states with little institutional autonomy.     
Finally, the difference in the conditional expectation of INSHARES in 
politically non-competitive states versus the competitive states is much larger than the 
unconditioned difference from table 4.6.  While the unconditioned difference is nearly 
three percentage points, I find that controlling for the explanatory variables in the 
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baseline models, states in which political competition is most intense have 
INSHARES nearly five percentage points lower than their less-competitive 
counterparts.138  In plain English, states with intense political competition make 
greater use of student aid than do states without much competition.  One need look no 
further than Zell Miller’s successful campaign for governor in Georgia in the early 
1990s as evidence that student aid programs ring a politically popular note with voters. 
                                                 
138 A simple t-test indicates that this difference is statistically significant with 99% confidence assuming 
zero covariance between the conditional means in each sample. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
 
COMPARISON OF CROSS-STATE AND WITHIN-STATE ECONOMETRIC 
ESTIMATES 
 
This chapter briefly describes how the cross-state results from this chapter 
diverge from the within-state estimates from chapter three and the implications of 
these differences.  In this section, I present tests of whether estimates from the pooled 
OLS regressions in chapter four are statistically different than the estimates from the 
within-state regressions in chapter three.  Any particular pooled OLS estimate may be 
biased for the true population impact of the explanatory variable on that particular 
budget share if unobserved state characteristics are correlated with some of the 
explanatory variables in the model.  In most cases, I do not have an a priori 
expectation as to the sign of the bias, only that it is likely to exist.   
 
Table 5.1: Omnibus Test of Difference between Pooled OLS Estimator of 
Chapter Four and Within Estimator of Chapter Three 
 
Equation χ2 Statistic Degrees of Freedom p-value
EDSHARE 2,718 17 0.000
HESHARE 71 15 0.000
INSHARE 646 17 0.000
 
In the test depicted in Table 5.1, I find that collectively the estimates produced 
by the pooled OLS estimator are statistically different than the estimates produced by 
the within state estimator for each of the three baseline budget share equations.  While 
interesting, this fact alone does not provide one with any insight as to which particular 
estimates are driving this finding.   
Since regression estimates are simply weighted mean functions, in order to test 
whether the pooled OLS estimator (call it Tβ ) is statistically different than the within 
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state estimator in chapter three (call it Wβ ) one need merely to construct a t-statistic:   
 
WT
WT
ββσ
ββ
−
−
. (5.1) 
The dimension of this vector is equal to the number of parameters (k) estimated for 
each of the three outcome measures.  Acquiring the standard deviation of the 
difference in the estimators requires getting one’s hands dirty.  Start with an 
expression for the variance of ( WT ββ − ): 
 
( ) ( ) ( WTWT CovVarVar )ββββ ,2−+ . (5.2) 
 
This is a (k x k) symmetric matrix.  In order to compute the covariance term it would 
be useful to take advantage of the fact that the pooled OLS estimator is a matrix 
weighted average of the within estimator and what is known as the between estimator 
(call it Bβ ).139  Write this relationship as: 
 
BWT I βθθββ )( −+= . (5.3) 
 
Then, the covariance of Tβ with Wβ is: 
 
( ) ( )[ WBWWT CovCov ]ββθθβββ ,)1(, −+=  (5.4) 
 
( ) ( WBWW CovCov )ββθβθβ ,)1(, −+=  (5.5) 
                                                 
139 The between estimator, bβ , for the sample of data I use in this dissertation would be retrieved from 
estimating the regression:  ∑
=
+=
K
k
ikikbi uXoutcome
1
β . 
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( WBCovW ββθθσβ ,)1(2 −+= )  (5.6) 
 
And plugging equation 5.6 into equation 5.2, the variance of the difference in the 
means is: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }WBWTWT CovVarVarVar W ββθθσββββ β ,)1(2)( 2 −+−+=−  (5.7) 
 
And since the between estimator and the within estimator are orthogonal, their 
covariance is zero and equation 5.7 can be rewritten as:140
 
222 2)(
WWTWT
Var βββ θσσσββ −+=− . (5.8) 
 
To test the similarity of one parameter at a time, the square root of the corresponding 
matrix coordinate in equation 5.8 will yield the appropriate denominator in the test 
statistic given in 5.1.  In order to construct the test statistics given by equation 5.1 I 
need to calculate the weights θ in equation 5.3; all of the other necessary parameters 
have been estimated with the baseline regressions.  The (k x k) matrix θ can be 
computed directly from my raw data since it is an algebraic combination of the within 
sum of squares of the explanatory variables (call this Wxx) and the between sum of 
squares (times the number of time periods) of the explanatory variables (call this 
Bxx).141  Of course, a separate θ needs to be calculated for each outcome measure.142  
                                                 
140 They are orthogonal because the mean is the quantity such that deviations from it are orthogonal to 
it.  The orthogonality of the between and within estimators is simply the first order condition from 
minimizing the sum of the squared errors of the total deviations.  
 
141 Contact the author for a derivation.  The theta is retrieved by computing the following matrix: 
( ) XXXXXX WBW 1−+=θ .  This is a K x K matrix. 
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 Tables 5.2 through 5.4 present the results from statistical tests that examine 
whether the pooled OLS estimates are statistically different than the within state 
estimates for a subset of variables in each of the three outcome equations.  The tables 
present the estimated coefficient and standard error from the corresponding baseline 
models in the first two columns.  The third and fourth columns present the standard 
deviation of the difference between the pooled OLS estimate and the within state 
estimate (pulled from the diagonal of the variance-covariance matrix calculated by 
solving equation 5.8 - the off diagonal covariance terms are used when testing 
multiple parameter estimates.) and the relevant p-value for each statistic. 143   
The results for the EDSHARE equations in Table 5.2 indicate that unobserved 
state-specific and time-invariant factors are positively correlated with median income 
(INC).  This 1½ percentage point difference between the pooled OLS estimator and 
the within-state estimator is statistically significant with more than 99% confidence. 
For example, it might be the case that states with a “smarter” population have higher 
incomes, but that I haven’t captured this measure well enough by my current vector of 
                                                                                                                                            
)
142 The variance-covariance matrix of the difference in the estimators used to construct the test statistics 
is available from the author upon request.  
 
143 ( WTVar ββ −  is a (k x k) matrix that has the variance of the difference of each of the k individual 
parameter estimates in the pooled sample versus the within sample along the diagonal and the 
covariance of the difference across different parameters off of the diagonal.  The diagonal elements of 
this matrix are all I need to do the pair-wise tests I propose.  The off-diagonal elements would only be 
needed to test cross-parameter differences, or more practically, the significance of multiple differences.  
The variance – covariance matrix will thus look like: 
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explanatory variables.  Then in the cross-section, the impact of median income reflects 
the true negative relationship of income on EDSHARES, but also the positive 
contribution of a more educated population’s relative preference for education 
spending.  To reemphasize an earlier point, this statistical difference does not change 
the interpretation of the pooled OLS estimates on their face (in this case that observed 
differences across states in income levels do not explain observed differences across 
states in EDSHARES), but rather indicates that the within state estimates control for 
these unobservables better than the pooled OLS estimates do.  In such a case, 
inferences about policy should be drawn from the within state estimators.144
                                                 
144 Assuming that the within state equations are properly specified and that systematic measurement 
error is not prominent in the data.  
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Table 5.2: Comparison of Selected Estimates from Table 4.1 and Table 3.1 
Education's Share of State General Fund Budgets (EDSHARE) 
(standard errors)
Pooled OLS 
Estimates (βT)
Within State 
Estimates (βW) σβT-βW p-value
0.24 -1.27
(0.44) (0.28)
-5.81 -5.13
(2.73) (1.81)
0.32 -0.41
(0.20) (0.18)
1.05 0.62
(0.09) (0.12)
-6.51 1.42
(1.37) (1.10)
0.19 0.02
(0.10) (0.05)
-0.31 0.06
(0.13) (0.06)
-0.14 -0.05
(0.01) (0.02)
-6.44 -0.56
(2.14) (0.36)
-0.20 -0.05
(0.10) (0.06)
0.06 -0.02
(0.12) (0.06)
0.71 0.03
(0.14) (0.12)
0.98 1.18
(0.33) (0.30)
** statistically different with at least 99% confidence
*   statistically different with at least 95% confidence
0.069
0.364 0.339
0.000 0.000 **
3.270 0.435
0.242 0.102
0.096
0.117 0.098
0.070
1.336 0.050 *
0.087 0.147
0.021 0.071
0.002 0.000 **
0.096 0.177
0.105 0.291
SCHOOLRACERATIO
OUTMIG
HEALTH
CRIME
FEDTRAN
COURT
UNEMP
COLPRV
0.150
SCHOOLAGE
INMIG
INC
INEQU
ELDERLY
 
 
Three additional results stand out from Table 5.2.  The substantial negative impacts of 
both cross-cohort ethnic heterogeneity (SCHOOLRACERATIO) and federal 
government transfers to the states (FEDTRAN) in the cross-section are not likely due 
to differences in sampling variation across the two estimated equations, but more 
likely due to systematic negative correlations between fixed unobservables and 
SCHOOLRACERATIO and FEDTRAN.  Third, this table provides even stronger 
evidence than the baseline estimates that competing interests in the state do not seem 
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to be crowding out education spending as the estimated differences of CRIME, 
HEALTH and UNEMP are not different that zero, nor are their individual impacts.  
 Turning to the tests in table 5.3 it is striking that though the point estimates of 
many of the explanatory variables pass the “eyeball test” that they are different across 
the two equations, statistically these differences are likely due to sampling variation 
rather than there being any important unobserved effects playing a role in 
HESHARES.  However, the one near significant finding is that if one were to ignore 
the within state estimates, as many studies in political economy are forced to do, one 
would not be able to find any impact of court reforms on HESHARES.  States with 
court reforms do not spend any less on higher education than states without them, but 
looking within a state, when a court reform is mandated, the HESHARE will fall 
substantially in response.  There must be unobserved state-specific and time-invariant 
characteristics that are positively associated with whether a state has a court reform 
that are being captured by COURT in the cross-section causing the statistical zero 
estimate.  Also, since the variance of COURT is not very large, the size of the bias is 
likely to be larger than for a variable that exhibits more dramatic random variation. 
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Table 5.3: Comparison of Selected Estimates from Table 4.1 and Table 3.1 
Higher Education's Share of the Education Budget (HESHARE) 
(standard errors)
Pooled OLS 
Estimates (βT)
Within State 
Estimates (βW) σβT-βW p-value
-0.23 0.61
(0.27) (0.23)
-0.19 4.12
(1.73) (1.52)
0.02 0.13
(0.05) (0.04)
-1.41 -0.15
(0.32) (0.14)
0.05 0.04
(0.01) (0.01)
-0.13 -0.02
(0.05) (0.03)
0.08 -0.13
(0.09) (0.06)
-0.76 -0.22
(0.07) (0.05)
-0.03 -1.19
(0.22) (0.25)
** statistically different with at least 99% confidence
*   statistically different with at least 95% confidence
0.034
1.439 0.332
1.634 0.115
0.011 0.252
0.244 0.066
0.784 0.306
0.043 0.119
0.345 0.329
COLRATIO
RACEINTERACT
INC
INEQU
COLK12RACE
0.091
0.385 0.095
INMIG
COURT
UNEMP
OUTMIG
 
 
 As with the HESHARE results while many of the coefficients on the 
explanatory variables in the pooled OLS estimates in table 5.4 appear to be different 
than the coefficients derived from the within estimator, with few exceptions this is 
most likely due to sampling variation.  The two notable exceptions are that the large 
differences across estimators in the impact of regional tuition rates (REGTUIT) and in 
the share of students enrolled in private higher education institutions (COLPRV) are 
statistically significant – suggesting that unobservables are responsible for the 
negative estimate of COLPRV and the zero estimate of REGTUIT in the cross-section 
regressions. 
 
 138
Table 5.4: Comparison of Selected Estimates from Table 4.2 and Table 3.2 
Institutional Share of Higher Education Budgets (INSHARE) 
(standard errors)
Pooled OLS 
Estimates (βT)
Within State 
Estimates (βW) σβT-βW p-value
-0.10 0.23
(0.36) (0.16)
0.14 0.38
(0.07) (0.10)
0.66 0.28
(0.23) (0.12)
0.05 -0.09
(0.10) (0.05)
-0.23 0.03
(0.06) (0.04)
-0.16 0.02
(0.01) (0.01)
0.07 -0.06
(0.06) (0.03)
0.00 -0.21
(0.13) (0.09)
-0.51 -0.15
(0.08) (0.12)
0.57 0.29
(0.20) (0.18)
-2.17 -2.86
(0.63) (0.27)
** statistically different with at least 99% confidence
*   statistically different with at least 95% confidence
COLLAGE
INC
ELDERLY
PELL
UNEMP
0.000REGTUIT
MERIT
0.077 0.166
0.016 0.029 *
0.095
0.057 0.070
COLPRV
OUTMIG
0.000 **
0.194 0.087
0.062 0.060
0.065 0.084
0.263 0.192
0.042
PHDBA 1.153 0.404
SAT 0.002 0.002 **
 
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
The race to the bottom in state funding for public higher education has serious 
implications for academic quality at our public colleges and universities and for the 
productivity and security of our nation in the future.  No institution is immune from 
the resource squeeze.  The University of Michigan is being forced to make tradeoffs 
just like Wichita State University and Tompkins-Cortland Community College.  While 
the decisions each face are different (e.g. Michigan might decide between increasing 
the size of its introductory classes or hiring more part-time faculty while Wichita State 
might decide between keeping faculty salaries constant while accommodating 
increased enrollments or increasing faculty salaries but turning deserving students 
away), the causes are the same.  In nearly all 50 states, the share of state tax dollars 
ultimately finding its way to public higher education institutions has fallen by well 
over 25% in the past 30 years and schools and states are rapidly spiraling toward the 
private high-tuition equilibrium.   
With the higher education act up for reauthorization this year a lot of attention 
will be paid to the high sticker prices of colleges and universities or the unpleasant 
outcomes of institutional decisions forced by the aforementioned tradeoffs.  What will 
largely be ignored are the questions of how we got here and who ultimately bears the 
burden of the withdrawal of state funding.  Like a fish tank that leaks a drop of water 
per week, it will go largely unnoticed until after several years someone complains that 
their fish are near death because there’s so little room to swim.  There’s only so many 
roofs that higher education institutions can delay maintaining – they can’t continue to 
seek temporary financial equilibrium by marginalizing the future.  Before I summarize 
the empirical results of this dissertation, allow me to answer several questions. 
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Why Might the Private High-Tuition Equilibrium be Undesirable? 
If one were to write down an economic model of higher education finance, the 
most efficient outcome would be for all universities to charge a price equal to 
marginal cost for each student.  Given the ability of most colleges and universities to 
generate revenues from outside sources, they could then discount tuition prices for 
those least able to pay.  Theoretically this is a great idea, but it has some difficulties in 
its application. 
Under a high-tuition high-aid strategy (HTHAS) there is no guarantee that the 
aid dollars will go to those students that need it the most.  The most transparent reason 
for this is the difficulty in ascertaining what true ability to pay is.  A family of four 
with a combined income of $100,000 and renting a home is not necessarily more able 
to pay for college for one of its children than a family of four with a combined income 
of $40,000, but which owns a home worth $1,500,000.  An HTHAS poses a 
substantial moral hazard problem. 
If it is true that there are substantial spillover effects and other positive 
externalities from individual investments in higher education, under a HTHAS the 
classic under-provision problem for public goods may well be exacerbated due to an 
inability for high paying students to internalize all of the benefits.    
Dramatic tuition increases that would accompany a HTHAS may 
disproportionately hurt the middle-class (and likely the median voters) whose family 
incomes would be too high to receive financial aid, but have not increased fast enough 
to keep pace with the rate of tuition increases.  A recent study by Hill, Winston and 
Boyd (2004) indicates that at twenty-eight of the most highly selective (and most 
costly) private colleges and universities (COFHE schools) low income students 
actually pay very little to attend these institutions (at one school an average student 
from the bottom income quintile paid less than $800 per year to attend).  The study 
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also found that while average sticker prices at the COFHE schools are 66% of median 
U.S. family income, the average student coming from a family with that level of 
income pays only 23% of her family income to attend.  These results do not likely 
have external validity as the resource base at the COFHE schools dwarfs that of the 
average public institution.     
Movement to a HTHAS may lead to an increase in competition for those 
students that are able to pay the full sticker price.  The larger the share of a student 
body that pays full price, the more generous institutional financial aid packages can be 
to those students that cannot afford to pay.  Such a strategy would likely decrease the 
number of low-income students that attend higher quality institutions and will result in 
even more institutional stratification in quality than that which exists today and at the 
extreme case an unraveling as envisioned in a pure adverse selection model.  The 
movement away from having a continuum of student financial aid packages and 
toward a two-peaked discrete distribution might diminish the collegiality within an 
institution as inevitably the students (and their families) that are paying full cost are 
receiving the same education as students that are paying substantially less.  Finally, the 
gap between the institutional haves and have-nots may continue to widen as the 
schools that are able to enroll a wealthier student body would have a larger base from 
which to draw annual alumni contributions and to build endowments.   
 A conversion to an entirely need-based aid system may cost states more in the 
long run than a system of broad appropriations.  While institutions of higher education 
currently have some incentive to keep tuition low (to ensure that they will receive state 
money the following year), under a HTHAS there would be no such controls as 
institutions will increase tuition as much as possible to maximize revenues from both 
students and state-aid.  This concern is real.  The College Board reports that the 
institutions that have been increasing tuition rates the fastest over the last decade are 
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the for-profit private universities.  One effect of these increases is to transfer a 
substantial pool of public money into the private for-profit sector and likely leads to a 
larger amount of federal money being spent on student aid than otherwise would 
prevail.   
 States that move to a HTHAS will necessarily grant a large degree of 
autonomy to their state institutions.  While in many cases this would lead to better 
institutional outcomes, one area that would be threatened by this move would be the 
public service mission of state colleges and universities.  Extension programs are very 
expensive to maintain, if for the only reason of the overhead cost of maintaining 
numerous satellite outposts throughout each state, and would likely be the first target 
for elimination as universities are granted more autonomy.  One might also begin to 
notice a change in the program offerings of colleges and universities toward more 
profitable enterprises.   
 As states continue to allow their public colleges and universities to pursue 
HTHAS, it would not be surprising to see the public institutions behave more like 
their private counterparts as far as fundraising is concerned.  This might cause concern 
for two reasons.  First, most of the public colleges and universities are starting from 
such a low base of tuition, private giving and endowment levels relative to their 
private counterparts that it would take an extremely long time for them to catch up.  
Second, there are governance and conflict of interest questions that may be more 
important.  For example, the University of Georgia has had to turn to foundation 
trustees to pay half of the President’s salary.  A recent dispute involving the athletic 
program there has caused these trustees to call for his ouster, while the public regents 
that pay the other half of his salary want him to remain.  Additional conflicts may 
result from a deterioration of the “Chinese Wall” between the sources of research 
funding and the independence of the research being undertaken.  The debate over the 
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sanctity of the privately funded biomedical and agricultural research undertaken at 
many national public universities has already begun to rage.   
 Finally if states move to a HTHAS the question remains of whether enough 
students will be able to receive the benefits of a higher education.  If the “average” 
state spent its entire higher education budget on student aid in 2001, 71,000 students 
would have received a full tuition scholarship at those relatively low tuition levels.  
There would be an additional 89,000 students that would be forced to pay the full cost 
of a public education (about $17,000 per student per year).  One-sixth of the students 
that attend my institution (Cornell University) receive a Pell grant and nationwide over 
50% of all students in higher education receive some form of financial aid.  Given the 
conservative estimates above, 56% of the public school students in the average state 
would require substantial financial assistance.   
 
Isn’t Elementary and Secondary Education More Important? 
To make any reasonable assessment here the near impossible task of 
computing the marginal benefits and costs needs to be done.  Even assuming that both 
the K12 and higher education sectors are in equilibrium, it wouldn’t be hard to 
imagine why the marginal dollars should be distributed to both sectors.  K12’s synergy 
with higher education is irrefutable.  The production and quality of the next generation 
of K12 teachers depends vitally on the health of the public higher education sector.  
Also, in allocating marginal dollars, the spillover effects of larger investments in 
higher education are likely to be at least as large as those invested in the K12 sector.   
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Are our Priorities in Order? 
In 2002, residents of the United States spent a combined $50 billion 
consuming alcohol products and legal pornographic products.  In total, the 50 states 
spent $60 billion on public higher education.145  
 
Summary of Empirical Results 
 Though no universally accepted structural (theoretical) model of political 
economic equilibrium exists, empirical specifications describing preferences for public 
spending on public education yield valuable insights into why public higher education 
is facing an alarming fiscal crisis.  The empirical evidence in this dissertation suggests 
that all of the observed four percentage point fall in education’s share of state general 
fund budgets has been attributable to changes in the income distribution within states.  
Though measures of competing interest groups seem to not have crowded out 
education spending, their effects are confounded by them having differential impacts 
in different sub-samples of states.       
 While collectively, observable within state changes are unable to explain the 
six percentage point drop in the share of the education budget allocated to public 
higher education since 1977, there is substantial evidence that the discretionary nature 
of higher education spending and its ability to independently raise revenues have 
caused its decline.  Dynamic panel estimates indicate that states do not practice strictly 
incremental budgeting, and exercise the most discretion over the determination of the 
higher education – K12 split than among other budget decisions.  Further, estimates on 
a sample split by three different time periods indicate that the sensitivity of higher 
education budget shares to declining labor market conditions has increased over time.  
                                                 
145 In total, expenditures on public higher education were just over $120 billion.  Source: 2004 
Economic Report of the President. 
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Attempts by public institutions to respond to lagging state appropriations by 
increasing tuition or private fundraising efforts have been met with substantial chagrin 
by state legislatures and calls into question exactly what institutions are expected to do 
in the face of budget difficulties as they rapidly spiral toward the private equilibrium.   
 The 3.9 percentage point decline in the share of higher education budgets 
allocated to public institutions, as opposed to students, can be fully explained by 
changes in the relative size of the college aged cohort, increases in nonresident tuition 
rates in the geographic region and by a movement to merit aid programs in 10 states 
over the past decade.  Investigation of the merit aid result reveals that the increasing 
popularity of non-means tested aid has not been altruistically motivated.  I find 
evidence that these targeted programs are used to redistribute income to well-off 
families and to avoid providing broad based institutional support that would benefit 
economically disadvantaged members of the populace.  A hypothesis advanced by 
current president of Murray State University, King Alexander (2001), that federal aid 
programs provide perverse incentives for higher education funding in that low tax 
effort states are rewarded with more federal aid than high tax effort states, is supported 
by these results as well.  I find that as more households in a state become eligible to 
receive a federal Pell grant that states respond by moving aid away from institutions 
and toward students.  In fact, these perverse incentives may account for some of the 
unexplained fall in the HESHARE from above.  The more support a state provides for 
its public institutions, and hence the lower the tuition rates are, the less federal aid its 
students will be eligible to receive.  This is consistent with the result in Rizzo and 
Ehrenberg (2004) that increases in federal Pell grant generosity and state need-based 
grant aid awards result in increases in in-state tuition levels at flagship public 
universities.       
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 Several additional results deserve attention.  Similar to other studies, I find that 
court mandated K12 equalization schemes have resulted in substantial increases in 
K12 spending within states.  However, unlike these studies I find that 36% of the total 
spending increase has come at the expense of public higher education – representing 
$280 per full-time public college student in an average sized state.  My results also 
indicate that ethnic heterogeneity across age cohorts results in state funding being 
allocated to the schooling cohorts that look most similar to the non-school age 
population in a state. 
 Figure 6.1 summarizes the results from both the EDSHARE and HESHARE 
regressions in a single table by indicating exactly which states look with favor and 
disfavor on education spending.  The raw data used to create this figure are presented 
both graphically and in tabular form in appendix figures two and three and in appendix 
table two.  The points along the horizontal axis are retrieved by estimating the state 
effect (the ci) from equation 3.1 (for the EDSHARE outcome) and then ranking the 
states according to the size of the unobserved effect.  Broadly speaking this estimated 
ci represents a state’s fixed preference for funding education relative to other budget 
items.  States with a positive unobserved effect give a higher priority to educational 
expenditures than the “average” state.146  In this figure, states that exhibit the strongest 
priority for education funding are assigned a rank in ascending order. 
 The points along the vertical axis are retrieved by estimating the state effect 
(the ci) from equation 3.1 (for the HESHARE outcome) and then ranking the states 
according to the size of the unobserved effect.  Broadly speaking this estimated ci 
                                                 
146 Not too much should be drawn from the magnitude of the unobserved effects.  Their ordinality is of 
larger interest than their cardinality since the estimation method I use restricts .  In other 
words, the estimated fixed effects represent a state’s deviation from the average state when the average 
state effect has been normalized to equal zero. 
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represents a state’s fixed preference for funding higher education relative to K12 
education.  States with a positive unobserved effect give a higher priority to higher 
educational expenditures than the “average” state.  In this figure, states that exhibit the 
strongest priority for higher education funding are assigned a rank in ascending order. 
These state effects can be considered to represent states’ true tastes for higher 
education spending because they are computed while controlling for all of the 
observable factors that are expected to systematically influence budget shares (i.e. the 
explanatory variables in equation 3.1). 
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Figure 6.1 
State Preferences for Funding Public Education 
The 25 states that are located in the two western quadrants (II and III) are those 
that generally prefer to fund education over other budget items.  The 25 states in the 
eastern quadrants (I and IV) are those that prefer to spend state tax dollars on non-
educational items.   The 25 states that are located in the two northern quadrants (I and 
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II) are those that prefer to fund K12 education over higher education, while the 25 
states in the two southern quadrants (III and IV) prefer to fund higher education over 
K12 education.  Therefore those states that look least favorably upon public higher 
education are those located in the first quadrant while those states that look most 
favorably upon higher education are located in the third.   
What immediately stands out from this figure is that quadrant I is dominated 
by the states in the Northeastern U.S.  With the slight exception of Connecticut every 
single northeastern state has a relative distaste for all forms of education spending.  
There is a more random group of states that are strong supporters of public higher 
education that includes North Carolina, Texas, Kansas, Alabama and Idaho.  No clear 
regional distinctions emerge in the other two quadrants.  Delaware, Oklahoma and 
Washington, while each preferring to spend a large share of their budgets on 
education, prefer to direct these education dollars to the K12 sector.  While Nebraska, 
Wyoming, Illinois and Hawaii each do not prefer to devote a substantial share of state 
funds to education, prefer to allocate these scarce dollars to the higher education 
sector.   
A somewhat surprising (to me) finding is that the rank order correlation 
between the EDSHARE state fixed effects and the HESHARE state fixed effects is 
0.02.  It does not appear that a state’s (conditional) preference for higher education 
spending is related to its preference for funding education generally.147  The way that I 
have constructed this figure is that states with a low numerical ranking are those that 
look more favorably upon an education budget share.  Therefore the 0.31 rank order 
correlation between the HESHARE state fixed effects and the INSHARE state fixed 
effects indicates that those states that look less favorably on higher education tend to 
                                                 
147 The rank order correlation between the fixed effect in the EDSHARE equation and the INSHARE 
equation is also low, 0.15.   
 149
use the limited higher education dollars to fund student aid programs as opposed to 
funding bloc grants to its public colleges and universities.  This correlation may be 
capturing the fact that those states that do not have an enormous amount of money tied 
up in public higher education do not want to build costly public infrastructure when 
the private infrastructure is already there (or when a large share of their college-aged 
population leaves the state).  Hence these states turn to student scholarship programs 
to provide its residents with access to an affordable education or to entice its residents 
to remain in the state.   
 
Directions for Future Research 
This dissertation’s broad scope has opened the door to a number of interesting 
research questions.  The strong relationship observed between tuition rates and budget 
shares in chapter three suggests that a focused dynamic analysis of the tuition – state 
appropriations relationship would be a fruitful endeavor.  Among the strategies I 
envision pursuing are constructing a test of Granger causality using a vector 
autoregression (VAR) technique and applying the tools of macroeconomics to 
understand the tuition – appropriation equilibrium using a dynamic programming 
approach.   
I could very well have estimated a fourth equation in this dissertation.  The 
share of student aid dollars in the form of need-based aid has shrunk from 92% to 75% 
in the past decade alone.  Since the INSHARE has been increasing substantially over 
this same period, whether the growth in merit-based aid programs has crowded out 
need-based aid spending is an empirical question that has yet to be answered.   
The large and robust finding that court reforms have led to a partial crowding 
out of higher education spending naturally leads a researcher to ask what other K12 
funding initiatives have an adverse affect on higher education appropriations.  Many 
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states have instituted school property-tax relief programs which provide tax relief to 
certain state residents but these tax savings are reimbursed to the local school districts 
from the state budget (New York State’s STAR program is an example).  In fact, in 
November 2003 the voters in Maine rejected a statewide ballot initiative for a school 
property tax relief program due to the belief that the state would use funds from higher 
education to pay for the program.148   
Examining the impacts of the budget share declines on a number of student and 
institutional outcomes is a fertile ground for future research (in terms of the specific 
impact on student outcomes and institutional quality).  Eric Bettinger of Case Western 
Reserve University and Bridget Long of Harvard University are just beginning work 
analyzing the impact felt by first year students in the Ohio public school system from 
having taken a class from an adjunct faculty member.  They are currently looking at 
student outcomes while still in college such as the probability of passing future 
courses in that field of study and the number of additional credit hours taken in that 
field of study.  Ron Ehrenberg and Liang Zhang at the Cornell Higher Education 
Research Institute are in the process of using institutional level data across the United 
States to determine the impacts of non-tenure track faculty members have on various 
institutional outcomes such as graduation rates.  Given the appropriate data, an 
enormously helpful study would be to determine the long-term labor market effects of 
various institutional quality characteristics on its graduates as well as other impacts of 
the characteristics on the universities themselves.     
A study that I am in the beginning stages of will analyze whether fiscal illusion 
exists in the student matriculation decision.  Since public colleges and universities are 
quickly moving to the private high-tuition high-aid strategy, it would be useful to 
understand how different students will respond to different financial aid packages.  
                                                 
148 Paul Carrier for www.Mainetoday.com, November 8, 2003. 
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One concern is that a student may react differently to two otherwise similarly valued 
financial aid scenarios if they are packaged differently.  For example, for a net price of 
$10,000 a student today may be asked to pay tuition of $12,000 but receive a $2,000 
merit scholarship award from the state.  Would this same student be more or less 
likely to matriculate at the same institution of the tuition were raised to $35,000 per 
year with a corresponding $25,000 scholarship?  Expected utility theory says that she 
ought to.  Prospect theory and my own observations suggest otherwise. 
Finally, it would be useful for someone to estimate how rates of return to 
investments in higher education vary across states and over time within states.  In 
addition, these studies should do their best to do a detailed analysis of the correlation 
between public higher education investments and economic growth in those states.   
 
Policy Implications 
Many of the likely reasons for public higher education’s decline are difficult to 
quantify, but may shed light on policy recommendations and a roadmap for future 
research.  Perception surely represents a challenge for our public institutions.  When 
laypeople think of college, an image of the ivory clad walls and expansive quadrangles 
of Harvard spring to mind and it is hard for them to disentangle this vision with the 
reality at many public institutions.  For example, a common perception in Texas is that 
the public system is egregiously wealthy because the Permanent (endowment) Fund is 
triple the size of the endowment at Rice.  Never mind that the payout on this fund 
supports the operations of seventeen branch campuses and constitute no more than 
1/10th of the revenues per student than the Rice endowment generates.  Many 
taxpayers, politicians, and philanthropic organizations have the belief that their dollars 
will go further if allocated to more “needy” causes.  Further, as the private rate of 
return to education continues to increase it is incumbent upon the public higher 
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education community to reemphasize the importance of broad based access, their 
public service mission, that it is a provider of jobs and essential for economic 
development.149   
Legislators and taxpayers alike need to be educated about how the system of 
higher education finance works.  Too much attention is paid to sticker prices and to 
rates of tuition increase and not enough attention to the fact that public university 
tuition increases are largest when state support is smallest and that only a small 
fraction of students actually pay the full sticker price to attend an institution of higher 
education.  Further, more attention needs to be paid to actual dollars of tuition changes 
as opposed to percentage changes.  For example, take two hypothetical institutions, 
Jeffrey College (JC) and Ephraim College (EC) which both depend on their states for 
funding.  Tuition at JC is $2,000 in 2003-2004 while it is $20,000 at EC.  Due to 
budget cuts in each of their states, both JC and EC increase tuition in 2004-2005 by 
$1,000.  The way the news media and many politicians currently interpret this 
increase, JC would be vilified for increasing tuition by 50% while EC would be lauded 
for increasing tuition by only 5%! 
The “race to the bottom” in state higher education spending suggests we ought 
to think more seriously about the optimal way to organize the higher education sector 
throughout the United States.  The dramatic differences in costs across all of the states 
and in different states having varying degrees of preference for higher education 
suggest that fiscal federalism and higher tier governance may be a better way to 
finance higher education in order to ensure that all Americans have access to a quality 
higher education.150  As it stands our system of financing higher education is wrought 
                                                 
149 The ratio of income of adult male college graduates to high school graduates has increased steadily 
from 1.25 in 1980 to 1.65 in 2000 with a slight dip in the mid-90s.  In future work, I will attempt to 
recover measures of the rate of return to higher education by state to see how funding priority has 
changed as these returns have changed.   
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with inefficiencies which will only increase, not decrease, if we pursue a high-tuition 
high-aid strategy.  The federal student aid programs are an administrative morass for 
students and their families to wade through. Over 14 million students participate in the 
Pell grant program, the Special Education Opportunity Grant, Federal Work Study, 
Perkins Program, Education Tax Credits, Stafford Subsidized Loans, Stafford 
Unsubsidized Loans, PLUS loans and SLS loans – one can only imagine the 
administrative cost of these programs and the opportunity costs to families planning 
for college.151      
As part of this organizational thinking states should also reconsider how they 
organize higher education within their own borders.  Some may wish to create a 
streamlined system of community colleges, undergraduate colleges and research 
universities like in California.  Some may wish to devise an integrated K-16 school 
system.  Some may wish to divest themselves of public higher education entirely 
while others may want to substantially increase the scope of operations.  As with most 
public programs, there is no “one size fits all” solution; the systematic withdrawal of 
state support for the previous three decades indicates that the current equilibrium is 
unstable and states and their taxpayers would be well served to change it.     
  
Closing Thoughts 
Higher education is increasingly becoming a political issue.  Politicians and 
interest groups are most guilty of committing the cardinal sin in economics – 
confusing absolute measures with marginal decisions.  It is unlikely that the median 
person (measuring preferences for state spending) in the United States thinks spending 
                                                                                                                                            
150 The federal government already spends $70 billion on higher education as compared to $60 billion 
by the states.   
 
151 The College Board.  Trends in Student Aid 2003.  
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more money on K12 education is a bad thing.  However, the relevant question is not 
whether K12 expenditures are good or bad;  it is instead how much education 
spending we want – which can ONLY be answered by looking at the marginal benefits 
of education spending compared to the marginal costs.  While there is no concrete 
evidence that the net marginal benefits to higher education investments are positive, 
there is also no evidence for the contrary.  Interest groups and politicians are 
increasingly acting as demagogues, appealing to a fervent but small group of 
supporters that believe more spending on their pet project is the only good thing, 
completely abstracting from the important economic questions that need to be 
considered.   
Clearly the rise of merit aid programs has been politically motivated, but so too 
are initiatives to institute performance and accountability standards (which are 
notoriously difficult to measure and implement). Some of the budget share declines 
may have occurred in response to the growing use by the flagship public universities 
of nonresident enrollments.  They might also be emblematic of implicit agreements 
between public universities and legislatures to trade-off less political oversight in 
exchange for less state funding.          
 Recent work by Bound, et al (2001) provides additional insight.  They find that 
states may not have an incentive to invest in higher education because the flows of 
college educated labor produced in a state have little impact on the stock of college 
graduates that work in a state.  If this is the case, then it might make sense for a state 
to devote its resources to areas where it has a comparative advantage over other states.  
Finally, it might also be the case that statewide property tax initiatives in many of the 
states have contributed to the declining higher education share.  In work just 
underway, I am looking at the question of whether the increased state burden for K12 
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expenditures as a result of local property tax exemptions for particular demographic 
groups has come at the expense of higher education expenditures.152
 A continued decline in state support for public institutions will result in 
innumerable negative consequences for the students that attend, or hope to attend them 
in the future.  Among the consequences are: continued tuition increases153; movement 
away from full-time tenure tracked faculty toward part-time faculty and graduate 
student instructors; increases in student-faculty ratios; an erosion of liberal arts and 
humanities programs in favor of more practical and professional programs; increases 
in time to degree and dropout rates; fall in public service expenditures; increased loan 
burden on students attending college; a limitation of program offerings; and a 
multitude of additional factors.  Further, future budget cutbacks are likely to have a 
disproportionate negative impact on community colleges, which rely on a larger share 
of their operating budget from state sources and where a larger share of minority and 
first time college attendees are enrolled.  While these changes may not be dramatic in 
any single year, over a period of time, the resource gap and faculty quality gap 
between the publics and privates will be so large as to render a private education and a 
public education two entirely different products.154   
 A recent issue of the Chronicle of Higher Education asked a variety of higher 
education experts how they would deal with the tuition crisis facing our institutions, 
                                                 
152 This work is primarily focused on more fundamental questions relating to school district 
expenditures, particularly due to New York State’s STAR program.   
 
153 Although high tuition, high need-based aid strategies are actually quite progressive, the sticker shock 
created by the high sticker prices, especially at two-year colleges, may scare those away who are at the 
margin of college attendance.  The College Board estimates that the largest public high school class on 
record will graduate in 2008, and that a majority of these students will come from minority populations 
and those that would be the first generation to attend college – so the sticker shock is of considerable 
concern. 
 
154 As Ehrenberg and Brewer (1996) have shown that there is already a distinct advantage to attending 
an elite private college. 
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particularly at the publics.155  While laudable, one can’t help but feel uneasy with the 
topic’s implicit acceptance that policies of broad state support and low tuition are 
historical relics.  However, there are steps that states and institutions can take to 
ensure that this doesn’t happen.  It would be comforting to see comparative rates of 
return analyses on different state spending items to justify why higher education is 
falling out of favor, though those are notoriously difficult to calculate.  Among the 
other steps include an increased participation in tuition reciprocity programs and 
cross-institutional cooperation.156  Institutions can attempt to secure multi-year budget 
appropriations from legislatures in order to stop the destructive pattern of mid-year 
budget cuts.  State tax codes can be revised and our public institutions can do a better 
job of marketing the “local public good” aspect of their product.  While programs like 
funding formulas may be popular ways to secure financing for institutions, the 
determination of the formulas themselves are subject to political debate, and may also 
result in a sub-optimal distribution of student types within institutions due to 
institutional attempts to take advantage of these formulas.    
Funding for education is a (less-than) zero sum game played out in statehouses 
across the nation.  States decide how much to spend on education, then decide how 
much to allocate to each sector - and for years have acted as if K12 funding is more 
sacred than higher educational institutional spending.  For instance, each state 
maintains a “rainy day fund” that is supposed to smooth the effects of budget shocks.  
In 2001, New York met the needs for a 5% K12 budget increase and maintained the 
current levels of its student aid program (Tuition Assistance Program) out of this fund, 
but none of it was tapped for SUNY and CUNY institutional needs.  In the 2003-2004 
                                                 
155 September 19, 2003 (Volume 50 Issue 4). 
 
156 See www.ilr.cornell.edu/CHERI and click on “surveys” for a description of these reciprocity 
programs. 
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fiscal year, 24 of 44 states surveyed by the State Higher Education Executive Officers 
indicated that they expected to receive decreases in the level of state spending for 
public higher education and in the 18 states that expected increases, in real per student 
terms funding is expected to remain flat.  Demographic changes and the higher profile 
of K12 education do not bode well for public higher education’s future as well.  A 
dramatic shift in public and legislative priority is required to ensure that future 
generations of students have access to public higher education that is of comparable 
quality to what is available today.  An even larger commitment will be required to 
make this endeavor affordable and to keep our public institutions from falling further 
behind their private counterparts. 
Paul Simon (not the musician, but former United States Senator from Illinois 
and founder of the Public Policy Institute of Southern Illinois) felt that we as 
economists and faculty members need to act as custodians of the American Higher 
Education System.  He put it best when he said, “Robert Frost once challenged each of 
us to become a one-person revolution… … if you are in a position of responsibility in 
education be willing to do that little extra that ultimately can be meaningful.  It may 
require risking a little, and most of us are risk-averse.  But without that small risk, you 
won’t change things… … get together with some of your friends and think about little 
steps that you can take to change things.  We don’t simply need to lobby state 
governments for more money, we need to raise the consciousness of the American 
people, especially those that are down and out, about how important higher education 
is to our society. 
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Figure A.1 (Continued) 
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Figure A.1 (Continued) 
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Figure A.1 (Continued) 
South Dakota
18.0%
20.0%
22.0%
24.0%
26.0%
28.0%
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
Tennessee
18.0%
20.0%
22.0%
24.0%
26.0%
28.0%
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
Texas
15.0%
18.0%
21.0%
24.0%
27.0%
30.0%
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
Utah
14.0%
15.5%
17.0%
18.5%
20.0%
21.5%
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
Vermont
4.0%
6.5%
9.0%
11.5%
14.0%
16.5%
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
Virginia
15.0%
17.5%
20.0%
22.5%
25.0%
27.5%
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
Washington
12.0%
14.5%
17.0%
19.5%
22.0%
24.5%
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
West Virginia
14.0%
16.0%
18.0%
20.0%
22.0%
24.0%
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
Wisconsin
14.0%
17.0%
20.0%
23.0%
26.0%
29.0%
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
Wyoming
18.0%
21.0%
24.0%
27.0%
30.0%
33.0%
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
 
 163
Table A.1 
Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Name Definition / Explanation* Source(s)
Outcomes   
 EDSHARE Total Educational Expenditures / General Fund Expenditures 2 
@ @ @ @ 
 HESHARE 
Public Higher Education Expenditures 
(incl. all grant aid) / Total Educational 
Expenditures 
2, 11, 12, 
13, 18 
@ @ @ @ 
 INSHARE Appropriations to Public Institutions / Public Higher Education Expenditures 
2, 11, 12, 
13, 14, 18
@ @ @ @ 
Income Distribution, Prices & Budget Factors  
 INC Median Household Income 6 
@ @ @ @ 
 INC2 Median Household Income Squared 6 
@ @ @ @ 
 INEQU 
Income of Household at 75th 
percentile / Income of Household at 
25th percentile 
6 
@ @ @ @ 
 INCINEQU 7525 x WEALTH 6 
@ @ @ @ 
 EDPRICE 
Employment Weighted Average of 
K12 and Higher Education Instructor 
Earnings / Employment Weighted 
Average of Non-Education Public 
Employee Earnings 
3 
@ @ @ @ 
 HEPRICE 
Earnings of Public Higher Education 
Instructors / Earnings of Public K12 
instructors 
3 
@ @ @ @ 
 FEDTRAN Per Capita Total Federal Government Transfers 1 
@ @ @ @ 
Demographics   
 ELDERLY Share of Population Aged 65 and Older 4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
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Table A.1 (Continued) 
 SCHOOLAGE Share of Population Between Ages 5 and 24 4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
 COLLAGE Share of Population Between Ages 18 and 24 4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
 COLRATIO Share of Schoolage Population Between Ages 18 and 24 4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
 SCHOOLRACERATIO 
Share of Schoolage Population that is 
Nonwhite (5-24) / Share of Non-
schoolage Adult Population that is 
Nonwhite 
4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
 COLRACERATIO 
Share of College Age Population that 
is Nonwhite (18-24) / Share of Non-
College Age Adult Population that is 
Nonwhite 
4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
 COLK12RACE 
Share of College Aged Population that 
is Nonwhite / Share of K12 Aged 
Population (5-17) that is Nonwhite 
4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
 RACEINTERACT 
COLK12RACE times Share of Adult 
Population (25 and over) that is 
Nonwhite 
4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
 INMIGALL 
Share of Overall Population Residing 
in State Today that Did Not Reside in 
State 5 Years Ago 
4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
 OUTMIGALL 
Share of Overall Population that 
Resided in State 5 Years Ago that No 
Longer Resides In State Today 
4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
 NETMIGALL INMIGALL - OUTMIGALL 4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
 INMIGCOL 
Share of 18-24 Year Old Population 
Residing in State Today that Did Not 
Reside in State 5 Years Ago 
4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
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Table A.1 (Continued) 
 OUTMIGCOL 
Share of 13-19 Year Old Population 
that Resided in State 5 Years Ago that 
No Longer Resides In State Today 
4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
 NETMIGCOL INMIGCOL - OUTMIGCOL 4, 5 
@ @ @ @ 
Enrollment Pressure / Competition  
 COLPRV 
Share of Full-Time Equivalent 
Enrollments in Higher Education 
Institutions that Attend Privates (FTE 
= 40% for graduates, 35% for 
undergraduates and 33% for two-year 
students) 
8, 11, 12, 
13 
@ @ @ @ 
 K12PRV Share of Elementary and Secondary School Enrollments in Private Schools 8 
@ @ @ @ 
 HE_ENROLL 
FTE Graduate, Undergraduate and 
Two-Year Students at All Public Two- 
and Four-Year Institutions 
11, 12, 13
@ @ @ @ 
 K12_ENROLL Total Elementary and Secondary School Enrollments in Public Schools 8 
@ @ @ @ 
 TWOYEAR 
Share of Public Higher Education 
(FTE) Enrollments in Two-Year 
Colleges 
11, 12, 13
@ @ @ @ 
 CAPAC 
Predicted Public Higher Education 
FTE Enrollments / Actual Public 
Higher Education FTE Enrollments 
1, 4, 8 
,11, 12, 
13 
@ @ @ @ 
 EDCOL(HS) 
Either Share of Population Aged 25 
and Older with High School Degree or 
with College Degree 
1, 4, 7 
@ @ @ @ 
 SAT Average SAT Score of High School Graduates that Plan to Attend College 8, 23 
@ @ @ @ 
 ENRATE HE_ENROLL / Number of Public High School Graduates 
8, 11, 12, 
13 
@ @ @ @ 
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Table A.1 (Continued) 
Competing Interests, Economic Conditions  
 HEALTH Health Care CPI x Share of Adult Population Aged 65 or Older 4, 22 
@ @ @ @ 
 CRIME 
Murders, Rapes, Robberies, Assaults, 
Burglary, Larceny and MV Theft per 
100,000 Population 
24 
@ @ @ @ 
 UNEMP Unemployment Rate - Entire Population 10 
@ @ @ @ 
 UNEMPNON Unemployment Rate - Nonwhite Population 10 
@ @ @ @ 
 UNEMPRATIO UNEMPNON / UNEMP  10 
@ @ @ @ 
 COURT =1 in State-Year After Court Decision Mandated K12 Finance Reform 28 
@ @ @ @ 
 GSPAG 
Share of State GSP Generated by 
Agriculture, Forest, Fishing and 
Mining Activity 
9 
@ @ @ @ 
 GSPCON 
Share of State GSP Generated by 
Construction, Manufacturing, 
Transportation and Utilities 
9 
@ @ @ @ 
 GSPFIRE 
Share of State GSP Generated by 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and 
Services 
9 
@ @ @ @ 
 GSPGOV Share of State GSP Generated by Government 9 
@ @ @ @ 
 GSPTRADE Share of State GSP Generated by Retail and Wholesale Trade 9 
@ @ @ @ 
 REVCORP Share of State General Fund Revenues Generated by Corporate Income Taxes 2 
@ @ @ @ 
 REVFUEL Share of State General Fund Revenues Generated by Motor Fules Sales Taxes 2 
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Table A.1 (Continued) 
 REVINC 
Share of State General Fund Revenues 
Generated by Individual Income 
Taxes 
2 
@ @ @ @ 
 REVOTH 
Share of State General Fund Revenues 
Generated by License Taxes and Fees 
and Other Sources 
2 
@ @ @ @ 
 REVLOT Share of State General Fund Revenues Generated by Lottery Revenues 2 
@ @ @ @ 
 REVSALE Share of State General Fund Revenues Generated by State Sales Taxes 2 
@ @ @ @ 
Political Factors   
 GOVDEM =1 in State-Year When Governor is a Democrat 1 
@ @ @ @ 
 UNIPARTY 
=1 in State-Year When Both Houses 
of State Legislature are Controlled by 
the Same Party 
1 
@ @ @ @ 
 GOVELECT =1 in Years When Governor Seat is Up for Election 1 
@ @ @ @ 
 ASSEMBLY Number of Assembly Seats per Capita 1 
@ @ @ @ 
 SENATE Number of State Senate Seats per Capita 1 
@ @ @ @ 
 VOTE 
Share of Voting Age Population 
Casting Votes in Congressional 
Election 
1 
@ @ @ @ 
Other Higher Education Variables  
 ENDOW 
Endowment Generated by Public 
Four-Year Institutions per FTE Public 
Enrollment in the State 
11, 12, 
13, 25, 27
@ @ @ @ 
 GIVE 
Total Giving per FTE Student from 
All Sources at Public Research 
Universities in the State 
11, 12, 
13, 27 
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Table A.1 (Continued) 
 MERIT 
=1 in the State-Year Where there are 
Substantial Merit Aid Scholarship 
Programs 
30 
@ @ @ @ 
 PELL 
Proportion of Households with Annual 
Incomes Below the Maximum to be 
Eligible to Receive a Federal Pell 
Grant 
6, 34 
@ @ @ @ 
 PHDPERBA 
Ph.D degrees Awarded in Public 
Institutions / Bachelors Degrees 
Awarded by These Institutions 
11, 12, 13
@ @ @ @ 
 REGTUIT 
Enrollment Weighted Average 
Nonresident Tuition at 4-Year Public 
Institutions in the Geographic Region 
(exclduing own state) in $1,000 
11, 12, 13
@ @ @ @ 
 RND 
Total Research and Development 
Expenditures at Public Universities 
per Capita 
1, 3, 11, 
13, 32 
@ @ @ @ 
 SCIPHD 
Share of Ph.D degrees Awarded at 
Public Institutions in Science and 
Engineering Fields 
11, 13, 32
@ @ @ @ 
Institutional Characteristics   
 Autonomy Split Sample in Half According to Institutional Autonomy 31 
@ @ @ @ 
 Biennial Budget Cycle 23 States Operate on a Biennial Budget 16 
@ @ @ @ 
 Decades Sample Split by 1972-1982, 1983-1992 and 1993-2001  
@ @ @ @ 
 Funding Formula 29 States Have Higher Education Funding Formulas 33 
@ @ @ @ 
 Governor Power 
37 States Have Governors that Can 
Reduce Appropriations Without 
Legislative Approval 
16 
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Table A.1 (Continued) 
 Political Competition 
Split Sample in Half According to 
Competitiveness of Political Processes 
in the States 
29 
@ @ @ @ 
 Population Density 
Split Sample in Half According to 
Population per Square Mile of Land 
Area 
1 
@ @ @ @ 
 Region Split for 11 Southern States and for 9 Northeastern States 1 
@ @ @ @ 
 Uniparty Government 
Sample Split by State-Year where 
Legislature and Governorship 
Controlled by 1 Party (on average 21 
states per year) 
1 
@ @ @ @ 
* All shares / percentages represented times 100 = e.g. budget share of 25% is represented as 25.  
 All dollar values are actual (e.g. median income is 30,000)  
  All dollar values are deflated to 1998 dollars using Fiscal Year GDP implicit price deflator as of Feb 2002   
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Table A.2 
Data Sources 
1. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1976-2001 
2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Finance Files, 1972-2001 
3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, State Government Employment and Payroll, 1972-2001 http://www.census.gov/govs/www/apesst.html 
4. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Population Estimates Program, http://eire.census.gov/popest/archives/state/st_sasrh.php 
5. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Decennial Census Microdata Files: via IPUMS http://www.ipums.org 
6. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey (unpublished data), Estimates of Income of Households by State 1979-2001 
7. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey Microdata Files: via CPS Utilities at http://www.unicon.com/ 
8. U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, Digest of Education Statistics: 1976-2002 
9. 
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment and 
Earnings. Regional Economic Information System - 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/gsp/ 
10. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. Local Area Unemployment Statistics (published and unpublished data) 
11. U.S. Department of Education's Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) Surveys via WebCASPAR.  http://caspar.nsf.gov 
12. U.S. Department of Education's Higher Education General Information Surveys (HEGIS) via WebCASPAR 
13. IPEDS Peer Analysis System www.nces.ed.gov/ipedspas/ 
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Table A.2 (Continued) 
14. National Association of State Student Grant and Aid Programs (NASSGAP), Annual Survey Reports. www.nassgap.org
15. National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). Fiscal Survey of the States.  Various years. www.nasbo.org 
16. NASBO.  Budget Processes of the States.  Various years. 
17. NASBO.  State Expenditure Reports. Various years. 
18. Illinois State's GRAPEVINE System - http://www.coe.ilstu.edu/grapevine/ 
19. Directory of Faculty Contracts and Bargaining Agents In Institutions of Higher Education (1977-1996) 
20. http://www.unionstats.com/ 
21. Education Commission of the States. http://www.ecs.org/ecsmain.asp?page=/html/IssuesPS.asp 
22. 2003 Economic Report of the President 
23. College Entrance Examination Board, "College-Bound Seniors: 2001 Profile of SAT Program Test Takers" 
24. Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports 
25. Chronicle of Higher Education. http://chronicle.com/stats/ 
26. American Council on Education Center for Policy Analyisis, 2000 Status Report on the Pell Grant Program. 
27. American Council on Education, Voluntary Support of Education, Various years. 
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Table A.2 (Continued) 
28. 
Conference on State Aid to Education, Education Finance and Accountability 
Program, Center for Policy Research, The Maxwell School,  Syracuse 
University (April 2002) 
29.  Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) 
30. Dynarski (2004) 
31. Lowry (2001) 
32. National Science Foundation via WebCaspar 
33. MGT of America 
34. American Council on Education, Status of the Pell Grant Report 
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Table A.3 
Predicted “State Effects” from Baseline Estimating Equations 
         
                  
 EDSHARE  HESHARE  INSHARE 
Rank* State ci  State ci  State ci 
50 MA -12.2 VT -9.3 NY -16.4
49 AK -12.0 DE -4.5 VT -14.9
48 NH -11.9 NH -4.3 PA -9.1
47 CT -10.9 ME -3.8 IL -7.6
46 NJ -7.5 NV -3.4 NJ -6.4
45 SD -7.2 PA -3.3 MA -3.9
44 RI -7.0 RI -3.0 MN -3.8
43 NY -6.9 OK -2.5 RI -3.1
42 MD -5.7 OH -2.4 IN -2.2
41 ME -5.4 WA -2.3 OH -1.9
40 WY -5.1 LA -2.2 IA -1.6
39 OR -4.6 GA -2.1 CO -1.0
38 PA -3.8 MO -1.9 GA -0.9
37 MT -3.6 FL -1.7 WI -0.8
36 HI -3.0 NY -1.7 CT -0.7
35 WI -2.6 KY -1.3 MI -0.6
34 IL -2.5 IN -1.2 FL -0.2
33 NE -2.4 CO -1.1 VA -0.1
32 VT -1.6 NM -1.1 MO 0.1
31 WV -1.4 AK -1.0 OK 0.4
30 ND -0.6 MT -0.8 KY 0.5
29 CA -0.3 WV -0.7 CA 0.7
28 TN -0.3 MI -0.6 WV 0.7
27 MI 0.1 NJ -0.4 SC 0.8
26 LA 0.2 AR -0.4 MD 1.0
25 NV 0.2 UT -0.3 TN 1.1
24 FL 0.9 MA -0.1 NC 1.2
23 OH 1.0 VA 0.2 ME 1.3
22 DE 1.1 IA 0.5 OR 1.6
21 KY 1.5 AZ 0.8 WA 1.8
20 MS 2.1 MN 0.8 ND 1.8
19 MN 2.3 OR 0.9 NH 1.9
18 VA 2.6 SC 1.2 LA 2.0
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Table A.3 (Continued) 
17 AR 2.6 AL 1.4 KS 2.2
16 MO 3.2 ND 1.5 AR 2.4
15 AZ 3.7 MD 1.9 NM 2.5
14 SC 4.6 CT 2.0 AL 2.6
13 ID 4.8 ID 2.1 TX 2.8
12 NM 5.0 SD 2.1 MT 2.8
11 IA 5.2 CA 2.2 SD 2.9
10 KS 5.7 TX 2.4 DE 3.0
9 IN 6.2 TN 2.6 NE 3.3
8 WA 6.3 WI 2.7 NV 3.5
7 CO 6.4 NC 3.0 ID 3.8
6 GA 6.8 HI 3.3 AK 4.0
5 OK 6.9 KS 3.4 AZ 4.2
4 AL 7.1 IL 3.4 MS 4.3
3 NC 8.6 MS 4.2 HI 4.4
2 TX 10.1 WY 5.0 WY 4.8
1 UT 13.1  NE 9.7  UT 4.8
* A more highly numbered rank indicates lower preferences for the corresponding 
budget item 
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